Appellate Courts Cannot Skirt Merits Review: Uttarakhand High Court Clarifies Bail Powers Under BNSS

In a pointed reminder to lower courts about their responsibilities in criminal appeals, the Uttarakhand High Court has ruled that simply declaring procedural provisions as “directory” is no substitute for actually examining whether a conviction can stand. Justice Rakesh Thapliyal allowed a criminal revision filed by convict Sandeep, setting aside the order that had denied him bail and suspension of sentence during the pendency of his appeal.

From Trial Court Conviction to High Court Intervention

The revisionist stood trial for offences under Sections 363 and 506 IPC in connection with Case Crime No. 603 of 2018. The trial court convicted him under Section 363 IPC while acquitting him under Section 506 IPC , sentencing him to seven years’ simple imprisonment and a fine. His appeal before the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Roorkee was admitted on 6 March 2026 , yet the same court rejected his application for bail and suspension of sentence on the very same day.

Rather than assessing the strength of the conviction, the appellate court had observed that Section 430(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is directory and not mandatory , and therefore suspension of sentence was not obligatory. The revisionist approached the High Court, arguing that this approach bypassed the real question—whether the conviction itself was sustainable.

Petitioner’s Contentions and State’s Concessions

Counsel for the revisionist highlighted that the appellant had remained on bail throughout the trial without any allegation of misuse. After conviction he had surrendered promptly and filed the application for bail. Crucially, the age of the victim had not been determined in accordance with the Juvenile Justice Act , and the victim herself had not supported the prosecution story. The State’s brief holder did not dispute either the unblemished bail history or the fact that the appeal had already been admitted.

Why Merely Calling a Provision “Directory” Will Not Suffice

Justice Thapliyal found the lower appellate court’s order “very surprising.” The Court noted that once a statutory appeal has been admitted, the appellate judge is expected to look into the merits of the conviction instead of limiting the discussion to whether the power to suspend sentence is mandatory or directory.

In the words of the High Court:

“Instead of going to the merits of the case, whether conviction is bad or not , the learned Judge interpret the scope of Section 430(1) of BNSS 2023 and draw an observation that it is not mandatory to the Appellate Court to suspend the enforcement of order of conviction, since, section 430 of BNSS 2023 is directory not mandatory.”

The judgment further records that the 1st Additional Sessions Judge “failed to understand the scope of Section 430(1) of BNSS” by admitting the appeal on one hand and then refusing to examine its merits on the other.

Key Observations

The High Court underscored several pivotal principles through direct observations:

“If the convict preferred an appeal against his conviction then the Appellate Court should examine whether conviction is bad or not which is completely missing in the order impugned.”

“It appears that the 1st Addl. Session Judge, Roorkee without applying its judicial mind passed the order impugned, though appeal preferred by the revisionist (convict) is a statutory appeal which was admitted.”

These remarks dovetail with reporting in other sources that the High Court has expressly held: “Appellate Court Must Examine Merits Of Conviction While Considering Bail; Cannot Merely Interpret S.430 BNSS As Directory.”

Immediate Relief and Wider Impact

Allowing the revision, the High Court quashed the impugned order dated 6 March 2026 and directed suspension of the conviction and sentence during the pendency of Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 2026 before the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Roorkee . The revisionist was granted bail subject to conditions the appellate court may impose.

The ruling sends a clear message that technical interpretations of procedural sections cannot eclipse the substantive duty of appellate courts to assess the tenability of convictions when liberty is at stake. Future bail applications in pending criminal appeals are now likely to receive a more reasoned examination of the merits rather than a mechanical invocation of directory-versus-mandatory distinctions.