28-Year-Old Khoya Adulteration Case: Punjab and Haryana High Court Reduces Jail Term

In a significant ruling that highlights the interplay between mandatory minimum sentences and the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has reduced the imprisonment term of a septuagenarian convict in a food adulteration case to the period he has already served. Justice Deepak Manchanda, while maintaining the conviction under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, held that the extraordinary delay of over 28 years in the legal process itself became a powerful mitigating factor, warranting a lighter sentence enhanced by a steep fine.

A 28-Year Saga: From a Tray of Khoya to the High Court

The seeds of this protracted litigation were sown on August 28, 1998, when Dr. J.S. Bains, under the supervision of Dr. Parveen Taneja, the District Health Officer, Hoshiarpur, inspected the premises of Jagdish Ram. A food inspector found Ram in possession of 1.5 kilograms of khoya intended for public sale. A subsequent analysis revealed that the milk fat content was a mere 4.95%, against the statutory minimum of 20.0%. Consequently, a complaint was lodged under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

The trial court convicted Ram on September 25, 2001, sentencing him to six months of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000. His appeal was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Ad hoc) Fast Track Court, Hoshiarpur, on July 17, 2008, confirming the sentence. Approaching the High Court in revision later that year, Ram obtained a suspension of his sentence and has remained on bail ever since. By the time the High Court heard the matter, Ram had already spent 2 months and 20 days in actual custody and had faced criminal proceedings for over a quarter of a century.

The Contentions: Mercy on Sentence, Not on Merit

At the hearing before Justice Manchanda, counsel for the petitioner, Sarvesh Kumar Gupta, unequivocally gave up any challenge to the conviction on merits. The sole prayer was for a reduction of the substantive jail term. The defence emphasised that the quantity of adulterated khoya was small, that the petitioner was now of advanced age, had clean antecedents with no involvement in any other criminal case, and was no longer engaged in the same trade. The “protracted criminal proceedings of more than 25 years” had already taken a severe mental toll, and the petitioner had already undergone more than two months of the sentence.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Raj Karan Singh, opposed the prayer, filing a custody certificate that confirmed the custody period but urged the court to adhere to the mandatory sentencing framework of the PFA Act.

Legal Labyrinth: Speedy Trial vs. Rigid Sentencing

The court acknowledged the statutory bar on granting probation under Section 20AA of the PFA Act, which explicitly excludes the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to convicts above 18 years of age. At the time of the offence, Ram was around 37 and thus ineligible for probation. The judge also noted the settled principle that sentences under the PFA Act ordinarily cannot be scaled down below the prescribed minimum.

However, Justice Manchanda pivoted to a powerful constitutional shield: the right to an expeditious and fair trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. He drew support from a line of precedents, beginning with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) and followed by the High Court’s own judgments in Nand Lal v. State of Haryana (1992) and Ishwar Singh v. State of Haryana (1994). A coordinate bench had recently granted similar relief in Aditya Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2025), squarely covering the present case.

The court further fortified its reasoning by citing the Supreme Court’s 2026 ruling in Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan Versus State of Madhya Pradesh , where the apex court held that prolonged criminal litigation is itself a relevant mitigating circumstance, particularly in non-heinous offences, and that taking into account the “long passage of time, absence of criminal antecedents and other mitigating circumstances” is permissible while moulding a sentence.

The Final Order: Reduced Term with Enhanced Fine

Balancing these factors, Justice Manchanda passed a carefully calibrated order. The conviction under Sections 7/16 of the PFA Act was “hereby maintained.” The jail sentence, however, was “altered to the extent that the same is reduced to the period already undergone by the petitioner, subject to enhanced fine of Rs.5,000/- to be deposited with the concerned trial Court within a period of two months from today.” The bail bonds were discharged, but the court issued a stern caveat: failure to deposit the fine within the stipulated period would revive the original sentence, and the petitioner would have to serve the remainder.

Key Observations from the Bench

The judgment is studded with observations that underscore the judiciary’s compassionate yet principled approach:

“It cannot be disputed that right to speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Article 21… takes in its sweep the right to expeditious and fair trial.”

“The considerable lapse of time since the commission of the offence, coupled with the prolonged pendency of the proceedings, is a relevant mitigating circumstance.”

“Prolonged criminal litigation is by itself a relevant mitigating circumstance while modifying the sentence.”

“In the above circumstances, it will not be justified to send him behind the bars to carry out the remaining sentence or to release him on probation.”

Implications: Time as a Healing and Mitigating Factor

This decision serves as a persuasive precedent that in cases where trials have meandered for decades, the agony of the process and the demonstrated reformation of the accused can outweigh the retributive demands of a statute. While the court refused to dilute the conviction itself—upholding the seriousness of food safety violations—it recognised that justice, in its truest sense, does not always demand the full measure of incarceration. For an elderly man who had spent 28 years under the shadow of a minor adulteration charge and had already tasted prison, the final order brings both closure and a stark reminder of the value of a speedy trial.