Aditya Birla Real Estate's Captive Power Pricing Upheld by ITAT Mumbai as Valid Internal CUP

The Mumbai bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) has delivered a significant ruling on transfer pricing of captive power transactions, holding that electricity rates actually paid by a taxpayer's manufacturing units to state distribution companies can serve as valid internal comparable uncontrolled prices (CUPs) for benchmarking power supplied by captive generating plants. In a decision that will resonate with industrial groups operating captive power facilities, the tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals against transfer-pricing adjustments totaling ₹1.07 crore for two assessment years, affirming that consumer-side rates—not generator-side procurement rates—are the appropriate benchmark when the captive generator supplies power to the same entity's own units.

The Dispute: Generator vs. Consumer Rates

The case involved Aditya Birla Real Estate Ltd (formerly Century Textiles and Industries Ltd), which operates two captive thermal power plants—Century Cement Thermal Power Plant at Raipur and Maihar Cement Thermal Power Plant at Maihar. These plants supplied electricity to the company's cement manufacturing units at Baikunth/Raipur and Satna/Maihar. Since captive generation did not meet the full requirement, the cement units also purchased electricity from Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Ltd (CSPDCL) and Madhya Pradesh Poorv Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Company Ltd (MPPKVVCL).

For the assessment years 2013–14 and 2016–17, the company used the monthly rates actually paid by its cement units to these two distribution companies as internal CUPs to benchmark the captive power transfers. For 2013–14, the average rates were ₹5.74 per unit for the Raipur plant and ₹6.44 per unit for the Maihar plant. For 2016–17, the consumer-side rates stood at ₹7.20 and ₹6.62 per unit, respectively.

The Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) rejected these rates, opting instead to rely on the electricity procurement rates at the generator or procurement stage—i.e., the rates at which the distribution companies themselves purchased power from generators. Those rates were significantly lower: ₹2.27 per unit for CSPDCL and ₹3.05 per unit for MPPKVVCL in 2013–14, and ₹3.09 and ₹3.74 per unit in 2016–17. This led to adjustments of ₹63.89 crore for 2013–14 and ₹43.10 crore for 2016–17.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) deleted both adjustments, holding that the rates actually paid by the cement units to the distribution companies were the appropriate benchmark. The Revenue appealed to the ITAT.

Key Arguments and Tribunal's Reasoning

Before the tribunal, the Revenue argued that a captive power plant is a generator and should therefore be compared with generator-side transactions. It further contended that consumer tariffs include transmission, wheeling, distribution, network maintenance, and other costs and risks not undertaken by a captive generator, making such rates unsuitable for comparison.

The tribunal acknowledged that generators and distribution companies perform different functions. However, it held that those differences did not, by themselves, make the consumer-side rates unsuitable. The relevant question was whether the comparison provided a reliable measure of the price at which the receiving manufacturing unit could obtain electricity.

In a crucial observation, the bench comprising Judicial Member Amit Shukla and Accountant Member G.M. Doss stated:

“The amendment brings a transfer falling within section 92BA within the arm's-length-price framework; it does not prescribe that the generator must be compared only with another generator, or that a rate at which a distribution licensee procures power must invariably be adopted. The selection of the CUP remains governed by the transaction-specific requirements of section 92C and Rule 10B.”

The tribunal found that the generator-side procurement rates were not shown to be prices at which the cement units could obtain electricity. The Revenue had also not established how the differences between the procurement and distribution stages should be adjusted to make those rates comparable.

For the 2016–17 assessment year, the tribunal noted that the consumer-side rates were contemporaneous prices actually paid by the very units receiving the captive electricity. The Revenue had not demonstrated that those units had access to the lower procurement rates relied upon by the TPO.

Accordingly, the tribunal held that the rates paid to CSPDCL and MPPKVVCL were valid internal CUPs for benchmarking the captive power transfers. It upheld the deletion of the ₹63.89 crore and ₹43.10 crore adjustments and dismissed both Revenue appeals.

Implications for Transfer Pricing of Captive Power

This decision clarifies a contentious issue in transfer pricing: whether the arm's-length price for intra-group captive power supplies must be benchmarked against generator-side rates or can be benchmarked against the actual cost of alternative power available to the consuming unit. The tribunal's emphasis on the transaction-specific requirement—i.e., the price at which the recipient could obtain electricity from an independent party—provides a practical and economically sound approach.

The ruling is likely to benefit industrial groups that operate captive power plants to supply their own manufacturing units. It confirms that the internal CUP can be derived from the rates actually paid to state distribution companies, provided those rates represent the price at which the consuming unit could independently source electricity. The decision also underscores that the Revenue cannot simply substitute a different rate without demonstrating that it reflects a comparable transaction or making appropriate adjustments for functional differences.

Impact on Legal Practice

For tax practitioners, the case offers valuable guidance on constructing transfer pricing documentation for captive power arrangements. It reinforces the importance of identifying the most comparable uncontrolled transaction from the perspective of the tested party—in this case, the manufacturing unit receiving the power, not the generator itself. The tribunal's rejection of a rigid "generator-to-generator" comparison signals that the arm's-length principle must be applied flexibly, based on the specific facts and circumstances.

The decision also highlights the limited scope for the Revenue to reject a taxpayer's chosen CUP without providing a robust comparability analysis. The absence of adjustment for functional differences between generator and distribution stages was fatal to the Revenue's case.

Conclusion

The ITAT Mumbai's ruling in the case of Aditya Birla Real Estate Ltd is a welcome clarification on the transfer pricing of captive power transactions. By affirming that consumer-side electricity rates can serve as valid internal CUPs, the tribunal has provided a workable benchmark that aligns with commercial reality. The decision will likely reduce litigation on similar issues and encourage taxpayers to document their transfer pricing policies based on the actual alternative sourcing costs of their captive power consumers.