Ajeet Bharti: Delhi Court Ties Anticipatory Bail to Police Notice in SC/ST Act Case

In a carefully calibrated interim order, a Delhi court has conditioned the progress of YouTuber and commentator Ajeet Bharti’s anticipatory bail plea on the issuance of a police notice under the new criminal procedure code, while reserving its own power to assess whether the allegations even disclose an offence under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The development marks an early skirmish in a case that sits at the intersection of protected speech, caste-based atrocity law, and the procedural safeguards introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).

Additional Sessions Judge Saurabh Pratap Singh Laler of Patiala House Court heard the matter on August 25, 2025, and posted it for further arguments on August 31. The judge issued notice to the Delhi Police on the plea and summoned the investigating officer. More significantly, the court directed that if the police chooses to serve a notice of appearance under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, a copy must be placed on the court’s record. The court will then examine the date of issuance and, crucially, the prima facie satisfaction regarding the ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act before disposing of the bail application.

The Allegations and the FIR

The case originated from an FIR registered at Delhi’s North Avenue Police Station on August 23, following a complaint by Balakram Bauddh, the Delhi State President of the Azad Samaj Party (Kanshi Ram). The complaint concerns a video published on Bharti’s YouTube channel titled “SB79: Reservation Hatao Andolan Nautanki & More | Saptahik Bakaiti.” According to the complaint, Bharti used caste-based and abusive language, made objectionable remarks about Azad Samaj Party chief and Nagina MP Chandrashekhar Azad, made sexually degrading comments about women, and issued threats. The FIR invokes provisions of the SC/ST Act, Section 196(1)(c) and Section 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act.

Bharti has publicly defended himself, claiming that his remarks were a direct response to a vulgar comment made about his mother and sister by a viewer. “If someone says about my mother or sister, with a rapist mentality, that he would get her married to Chandrashekhar, and I remain silent, then tell me, what kind of son or brother would I be?” he wrote on social media. He insisted he did not use the casteist term “chamar” as alleged and called the FIR “pressure-driven,” predicting it would not survive two minutes in court.

The Court’s Calibrated Approach

During the brief hearing, Bharti’s counsel – Advocates Jai Anant Dehadrai and Pratyush Prasanna – argued that on the face of the allegations, no offence under the SC/ST Act is made out. They further submitted that the investigating agency had not yet served Bharti with a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS. That provision, reflecting the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar , mandates that in cases carrying a sentence of less than seven years, arrest should not be automatic; instead, the accused must first be called through a written notice to appear and cooperate. Only if arrest becomes genuinely necessary may the police proceed.

The court picked up on this point and fashioned a solution that keeps the plea alive while preventing any hasty coercion. “In the event such notice is issued by the Investigating Officer, a copy thereof shall be placed by IO on record of this Court, so that the Court may examine the date of issuance of the notice and the prima facie satisfaction regarding the ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST (POA) Act, to dispose of this application,” the judge directed.

The direction is notable for its restraint. Rather than granting or denying anticipatory bail at the threshold, the court has effectively tied the bail hearing to the police’s next procedural step. If the police issues a notice, the court will immediately scrutinise whether the notice itself discloses the statutory ingredients of a caste-based atrocity. If it does not, the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act – which ordinarily excludes anticipatory bail once a prima facie case is made out – may not apply, leaving the remedy open.

Significance of the Section 35(3) Mechanism

The court’s reliance on Section 35(3) BNSS is significant for legal practitioners. The provision is the statutory embodiment of the principle that arrest is not a routine step but a last resort. By insisting that any notice served on Bharti be placed on record, the court has ensured that the police cannot use the threat of arrest as a bargaining chip without judicial oversight. This approach aligns with the broader trend in Indian criminal jurisprudence – reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar and subsequently codified – that personal liberty cannot be curtailed on a mere filing of an FIR.

For the defence, this offers a procedural shield: if the investigating officer delays issuing the notice, the bail plea may proceed without the police having even invoked the BNSS’s own preferred mechanism. Conversely, if a notice is issued but fails to specify how the speech amounts to an offence under the SC/ST Act, the court can intervene early, possibly granting anticipatory bail before the police can arrest.

The SC/ST Act’s Anticipatory Bail Bar and the Prima Facie Standard

The SC/ST Act contains a stringent provision – Section 18 – that states nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure (and now the BNSS) shall apply to grant anticipatory bail where an accusation under the Act is made out. The Supreme Court, however, has clarified in decisions such as Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India that this bar is not absolute. If the complaint, taken at face value, does not disclose the ingredients of an offence under the Act, the court is not precluded from granting anticipatory bail. The bar operates only where a prima facie case genuinely exists.

Justice Laler’s order explicitly retains the court’s power to “examine the prima facie satisfaction regarding the ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST (POA) Act.” This signals that the court is alive to the constitutional tension between the special protection intended for marginalised communities and the fundamental right to free speech. By reserving its assessment, the court leaves open the possibility that even if the police file a notice, the judge may conclude that Bharti’s remarks – allegedly made in retaliation to a vulgar comment – do not meet the threshold of a “casteist” slur within the meaning of the Act.

Broader Context: Online Speech and the Reservation Debate

The case unfolds against a backdrop of heightened public discourse around caste-based reservations. Bharti is a prominent voice in the “Reservation Reform Andolan,” which has gained traction through online campaigns and street protests, including an August 21 demonstration at Jantar Mantar. The movement demands a review of the reservation system, sub-categorisation of quotas, and application of a creamy-layer principle. These demands have drawn sharp criticism from Dalit political groups, including the Azad Samaj Party led by Chandrashekhar Azad.

The FIR against Bharti is therefore not merely a criminal proceeding; it is a flashpoint in a larger culture war. Legal professionals will note that the invocation of Section 67 of the IT Act (obscene content) alongside the SC/ST Act is increasingly common in cases involving online speech, reflecting a tendency to pile offences in a single FIR. The court’s order, however, signals a willingness to separate the wheat from the chaff and examine each charge independently.

Implications for Legal Practice

For practitioners dealing with social media-related FIRs, this order offers a useful precedent. It demonstrates that courts can use procedural tools – such as Section 35(3) BNSS – to delay or condition police action while they assess the legal sufficiency of allegations. It also underscores the importance of arguing the Arnesh Kumar principle at the earliest possible stage, even before a formal arrest notice is served.

The case also highlights the need for careful drafting of bail applications under the SC/ST Act. Because Section 18 appears formidable, counsel must proactively demonstrate that the allegations do not even prima facie constitute an atrocity. This may require parsing the exact words used, the context, and the intent – all of which are untested at this stage. Justice Laler’s direction to place the police notice on record effectively creates a mini-hearing on the ingredients before the bail plea is disposed.

Conclusion

As the August 31 hearing approaches, all eyes will be on whether the Delhi Police issues a notice under Section 35(3) and what it will say. If the notice fails to articulate a clear prima facie case, Bharti’s anticipatory bail may be granted, delivering a significant setback to the complainants. If it does, the court will be forced to weigh the gravity of the allegations against the procedural safeguards that anchor personal liberty.

For now, the court has struck a pragmatic balance: it has not granted protection, but it has ensured that any move to arrest will be scrutinised with judicial rigour. In an era where online speech increasingly attracts criminal sanctions, this modicum of procedural caution is welcome. The case will be a valuable study for criminal law practitioners on how to navigate the intersection of special statutes and constitutional guarantees.