Allahabad HC: Mere Pendency of Mutation Appeals Without Stay Doesn't Bar Tree Felling Permission Under UP Protection of Trees Act, 1976 - 2026-03-10

Arbitrary Denial of Tree-Felling Rights: Allahabad HC Slams Bureaucratic Overreach

In a significant ruling for property owners, the Allahabad High Court has curtailed the discretionary power of forest authorities to deny tree-felling permits based on speculative or pending litigation. The bench, comprising Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Siddharth Nandan, ruled that the mere pendency of mutation proceedings—absent a formal stay order—cannot serve as a legal barrier to the exercise of an owner's rights under the U.P. Protection of Trees Act, 1976.

The Conflict: A Tug-of-War Over Trees

The petitioner, Bihari Lal, acting as the power of attorney holder for Sharda Investment Company Ltd., sought permission to fell 10 teakwood trees located on company property. Despite a positive report from the Sub Divisional Forest Officer (Section Incharge, Bankata), the local authorities rejected the application. The reasoning provided was the pendency of various land-related cases before the civil court and the High Court.

However, the Court found these grounds precarious. The State failed to present any evidence of an interim stay order that would strip the petitioner of their rights. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the, "pendency of the appeal cannot be construed as a stay or an interim order, as such, the same could not have been the basis for the rejection of the claim of the petitioner."

Moving the Legal Goalposts

A disturbing aspect of the State’s defense was the attempt to justify the rejection ex post facto by raising new concerns regarding the lack of physical partition in minjumla (joint) plots. The bench was quick to reject this, emphasizing that administrative orders must stand or fall on the reasoning provided at the time they were issued.

Justice Siddharth Nandan expressed deep concern over the respondent’s conduct, observing that the official, "tried to carve out a new case before this Court" to fill the voids in their original, legally insufficient rejection order.

Key Observations from the Bench

The High Court underscored the rigidity of the law regarding administrative accountability:

• "It is no longer res integra that the impugned order has to justify itself on the basis of the reasoning given therein and here is a case where the affidavit also does not supplement the reasoning purportedly based on which the impugned order has been passed."
• "Since, we do not intend to pass an order which may otherwise infringe the right of the State, we refrain ourselves from passing any further order vis-a-vis the respondent no.4 but he is cautioned that in future he must take steps which are in consonance with the provisions of the law."
• "Provided further that such permission shall not be refused without affording the opportunity of hearing to the applicant."

A Framework for Future Requests

The ruling mandates that for applications involving minjumla plots, authorities must act with transparency. If the State disputes ownership or possession, they are required to initiate demarcation proceedings at their own behest within specific timelines rather than indefinitely freezing a citizen's request.

The Court has allowed the petition and set aside the rejection order. Bihari Lal is now empowered to submit a fresh application. If there is no existing judicial stay on the property, the authorities are legally obligated to reconsider the application in light of the original forest department recommendation.

This judgment serves as a stern reminder to administrative bodies that they cannot hold property rights hostage based on unsubstantiated claims of litigation, particularly when the procedural law—in this case, the 1976 Act—provides clear guidelines for inquiry and approval.