Allahabad High Court Bans Bulldozer Demolitions of Accused's Homes for Two Years, Says It's Retributive

In a sharply worded judgment that redefines the limits of executive action, the Allahabad High Court has imposed an unprecedented two‑year ban on demolishing the dwelling places of persons accused of offences. A Division Bench of Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Siddharth Nandan held that such demolitions, carried out under the garb of municipal law violations, amount to a “retributive exercise of executive discretion” and are “the vilest species of colourable exercise of power”. The court adopted all directions issued by the Supreme Court in the landmark bulldozer case ( In re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures (2025) 5 SCC 1) and Rajendra Kumar Barjatya v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad , while also carving out a new legal principle to curb what it termed the “selective outrage” and “collective schadenfreude” driving bulldozer actions.

A Family’s Home Under the Shadow of the Bulldozer

The petition was filed by Faimuddeen and his parents, residents of Hamirpur, Uttar Pradesh. The family claimed ownership of their residential house through a series of sale deeds executed between 2001 and 2009. Their ordeal began on 16 January 2026, when an FIR was registered against Aafan Khan, the cousin of petitioner No. 1, for offences under the BNS, POCSO Act, the IT Act, and the U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Act. Although the petitioners were not initially named as accused, the local authorities swiftly issued a demolition notice to petitioner No. 2 (the father) and sealed both the family’s lodge (“Indian Lodge”) and a saw mill. The petitioners apprehended that their home would be razed to the ground—a fear borne out by the State’s recent pattern of using bulldozers shortly after criminal allegations.

‘You Feel No Remorse Setting Ablaze Entire Settlements’

Opening his 51‑page opinion with a couplet by the late Urdu poet Bashir Badr—“People face ruination in just making a home, and you feel no remorse setting ablaze entire settlements”—Justice Sreedharan did not mince words. He observed that the State’s real motive in many bulldozer cases is “to satiate the perceived blood lust of a society fed on a staple diet of bulldozer justice over the electronic media, social media and messaging platforms.” The judgment noted that despite the Supreme Court’s clear rulings, “the demolitions continue with impunity as though these judgments do not exist, or the State is certain that the defiance towards the law laid down by the highest Court of the land shall not visit them with any adverse consequences.”

The judge introduced the term “retributive exercise of executive discretion” to describe actions where municipal laws are used not to enforce town planning but to punish an accused and his entire family. Quoting from the order, he stated: “Where the State uses the municipal laws to punish an accused for an offence by demolishing his house in order to satiate the collective schadenfreude of the people, the same would be a Retributive Exercise of Executive Discretion and an act most viciously malicious in law.”

The Constitutional Backbone: Right to Shelter as a Lifeline

The judgment extensively traced the jurisprudence linking Article 21 to livelihood and shelter. Justice Sreedharan relied on the Constitution Bench in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) and Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1996) to reaffirm that “the right to life includes the right to livelihood and the right to shelter without which, the right to life itself would be rendered meaningless and animalistic.” Highlighting Uttar Pradesh’s status as India’s second‑poorest State with a per‑capita monthly income of just over ₹9,000, the court reasoned that expecting a person earning that amount to own a fully compliant house is itself a contradiction. The judgment pointedly noted that unauthorised colonies are inhabited by “the les miserables of our people” who, unlike the rich whose illegalities remain “untouchable on account of their influence … and the all‑pervasive culture of corruption that has been normalised and institutionalised in India,” become easy targets for demolition.

Corruption, Connivance, and the Ram Temple Theft

In a stinging aside, Justice Sreedharan lamented that “the average Indian has normalised corruption” and that “nothing can shame a people who remain unfazed by the theft at the Ram Temple which epitomises the nadir of the Indian’s integrity.” He remarked that rampant corruption in municipal bodies enables illegal constructions in the first place, only for the same structures to be demolished decades later. To underscore seriousness, the court directed that whenever a notice for violation of construction norms is issued, simultaneous disciplinary and anti‑corruption proceedings must be initiated against the erring officers. In a bold suggestion, it recommended that the State consider amending the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, to include the death penalty for those convicted of corruption.

Split Verdict on the Moratorium Period

While the bench unanimously held that punitive demolition of an accused’s home is illegal and unconstitutional, Justice Sreedharan went a step further. He ordered that no demolition of the dwelling place of a person accused of an offence shall be undertaken for a period of two years from the date of registration of the FIR . This moratorium is intended to let public anger dissipate and prevent the State from abusing municipal laws for retribution. The only exception is if the demolition is for a “proved public purpose” affecting more than just the accused’s property; even then, all procedural safeguards and Supreme Court directions must be strictly followed.

For ordinary illegal structures occupied continuously for three years or more, the court directed that the State must give one year’s prior intimation before initiating any demolition proceedings, allowing the occupant reasonable time to resettle. Justice Nandan delivered a separate opinion that concurred with the central finding on the vice of retributive action but did not impose the two‑year moratorium; the details of his order are not part of this article.

The Final Order and its Implications

Applying its own directions, the court quashed the demolition proceedings against the petitioners’ residence and lodge, holding them to be a retributive exercise of executive discretion. The proceedings under the Forest Act regarding the sealed saw mill were allowed to continue independently. The judgment directed the Chief Secretary to circulate the order to all district offices for strict compliance and warned that any violation would constitute contempt of this court.

The ruling sends an unmistakable signal: the bulldozer cannot be a tool of instant punishment. By fusing the Supreme Court’s procedural mandates with a robust conceptual framework, the Allahabad High Court has fortified the constitutional guarantee that no person—accused or not—shall be stripped of shelter without lawful justification, fair procedure, and genuine public purpose.