Allahabad High Court Grants Injunction to Woman in 38-Year Possession Despite Sale Deed Cancellation

The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, has held that a person in long and settled possession is entitled to a temporary injunction even if the sale deed on which their title is based has been cancelled. Justice Prashant Kumar, while allowing an appeal by Rekha Saxena and her minor daughter, ruled that a decree cancelling a sale deed does not authorise eviction unless it contains a specific order for delivery of possession.

A Home Built on a Cancelled Deed

The case traces back to 1987. A registered Power of Attorney was executed on June 2 in favour of Augustine Paul, authorising him to sell a plot in Raebareli. The POA was allegedly cancelled on September 18, but the revocation was registered only on September 29. In the interim, on September 22, Augustine Paul executed a sale deed of the land in favour of Savitri Srivastava, the mother-in-law of appellant no.1. A house was subsequently constructed on the property.

In 1991, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Allahabad Private Ltd. filed a suit seeking cancellation of the sale deed, arguing that the POA had already been revoked. The suit was later amended to include prayers for removal of construction and delivery of possession. However, when the suit was decreed ex-parte on April 21, 2001, the trial court only cancelled the sale deed and restrained further construction; it did not order eviction or delivery of possession.

The decree was formally drawn up only on April 7, 2023 — more than 22 years after the judgment. Relying on this decree, the respondents attempted to dispossess the appellants, who had been living in the house since 1987. Facing imminent eviction, the appellants filed a fresh suit for permanent injunction in September 2023, along with an application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The trial court rejected the temporary injunction application on July 3, 2025, holding that the appellants had failed to establish ownership and that no prima facie case existed since the sale deed had been cancelled. This order was challenged in the present appeal.

The Clash of Arguments

Senior Advocate Sridhar Awasthi, appearing for the appellants, argued that the 2001 decree contained no direction for eviction, and that the appellants had been in continuous, peaceful possession for over 38 years. He submitted that the suit for cancellation of the 1987 sale deed was time-barred, and that the trial court had misapplied the judgments of the Supreme Court in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh and Kashi Math Sansthan v. Srimad Sudhindra Teerth Swami . He pointed out that the lines attributed to those judgments in the impugned order did not actually appear in the original rulings.

Per contra, Senior Advocate Amrendra Nath Tripathi, representing the respondents, relied on Section 47 of the Registration Act and the Supreme Court's decision in State of Karnataka v. Ragini Narayan to argue that the revocation of the POA related back to the date of execution, rendering the sale deed void from inception. He contended that the appellants had not filed any document to prove actual physical possession, and that a cancelled sale deed could not form the basis of a prima facie case.

Possession Prevails Over Title at Interim Stage

Justice Prashant Kumar, after a detailed analysis of the law on temporary injunctions, observed that an interlocutory injunction is intended only to preserve the subject matter of the suit and not to determine substantive rights. Citing Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. , Seema Arshad Zaheer v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai , and Zenit Mataplast Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , the court reiterated the three-fold test: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

The court noted that the 2001 decree merely cancelled the sale deed and restrained further construction; it did not order eviction. Relying on Samir Sobhan Sanyal v. Tracks Trade (P) Ltd. , the court held that a person cannot be dispossessed without a decree or order of eviction. It also applied the principle from Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu that even a rightful owner must take recourse to law to evict a trespasser in settled possession.

Critically, the court found that the appellants had made out a prima facie case based on their long and settled possession, not on the strength of the cancelled sale deed. It pointed to paragraphs 37 and 38 of the respondents' own counter affidavit, which admitted the appellants' possession over the property. The court concluded:

"The balance of convenience also lies in favour of the appellants. Their possession for more than three decades, appellant no.1 being a widow and appellant no.2 being a minor daughter and the property in dispute is their residential house, thus, if disturbed during the pendency of the suit, would cause them irreparable injury and loss which cannot be adequately compensated in terms of money or subsequently cannot be restored if they win the suit."

Key Observations from the Judgment

Justice Kumar made several significant observations on the sanctity of possession:

"… this court has no embargo to hold that even where the person in long standing possession and is alleged to be a trespasser, the majesty of law cannot be supplanted by the impulse of force. Due process of law must be followed for his eviction; the rightful owner, however strong his title or just his claim, must seek the aid of law and cannot take the law into his own hands. Possession can only be disturbed only by due procedure sanctioned by law i.e., any direction or order for eviction or dispossession from competent court."

The court also clarified that at the stage of temporary injunction, a mini-trial is not permissible. The trial court's reliance on Dalpat Kumar and Kashi Math Sansthan was found to be erroneous, as the principles laid down in those cases actually support the grant of injunction when a prima facie case exists.

The Verdict

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's order dated July 3, 2025, and granted a temporary injunction in favour of the appellants during the pendency of the suit. The court made it clear that its observations were confined to the prayer for temporary injunction and would not prejudice the final adjudication of the suit on merits. The respondents were directed not to forcibly dispossess the appellants and to pursue their remedies only through due process of law.