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Rules LARRA Cannot Execute Own Awards Under 2013 Land Acquisition Act
In a significant ruling that clarifies the enforcement mechanism under the (the Act), the has held that the does not possess the power to execute its own awards.
Justice Jaspreet Singh, presiding over a batch of 45 petitions under , declared that while a LARRA award is a “” under , execution must be carried out by the —which acts solely as an executory arm and cannot entertain objections on the merits. The bench further held that the under Section 63 does not extend to execution proceedings, and that land owners may pursue before the High Court in cases of unreasonable delay.
The Dispute: Who Enforces the Award?
The batch comprised petitions from three categories: 33 filed by the , eight by the , one by the and three by land owners seeking expedition of their execution cases before LARRA.
In the SSB matters, an award of over ₹38.89 crore was made in for land acquired in Villages Bendowa and Jagroli, Lucknow. LARRA later enhanced the compensation on a reference, but when SSB’s appeal was dismissed on delay, the land owner sought execution before LARRA itself. The Authority issued , including notice for against SSB officials. SSB challenged LARRA’s jurisdiction to execute, arguing that the Act confers no such power.
UPEIDA and LDA raised similar objections in relation to acquisitions for the Purvanchal Expressway and a housing project, respectively.
Arguments at the Bar
Requiring Bodies (SSB, UPEIDA, LDA): Led by counsels , and , they argued that LARRA is an authority—not a court—and that its powers under Section 60 are limited to six enumerated matters. The absence of an express power of execution, they contended, is a conscious legislative choice, reinforced by the fact that other statutes like the Railway Claims Tribunal Act and the Real Estate Act provide such powers explicitly. They relied on the principle that a statutory tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction beyond what the parent statute confers.
Land Owners and State: Represented by , and others, they submitted that LARRA possesses all trappings of a court, that its award is a , and that the power to adjudicate must include the power to execute. They also placed reliance on a State notification dated and a Division Bench order in to argue that execution jurisdiction stands conferred.
Court’s Analysis: No Room for
Justice Singh undertook a detailed comparison of the 2013 Act with the repealed . Under the old Act, a reference lay to a civil court (Section 3(d)), and Section 53 made the entire applicable by reference. In contrast, the 2013 Act establishes LARRA as an authority and incorporates only six specific CPC powers in Section 60(1)—none of which includes execution. The bench held that this is a case of “,” not “,” meaning no unlisted CPC provisions can be imported.
The court rejected the argument that Section 60(3)—which allows LARRA to regulate its own procedure—could be used to confer substantive execution powers. “Such powers cannot be assumed, by digging out from the regulatory provision,” the judgment stated, “nor can the power of Section 60(3) be interpreted or used to secretly galvanize power of execution for LARRA.”
The bench also noted that the expression “” creates a that must be limited to its purpose—finality and binding effect—and does not by itself grant procedural enforcement powers. Where the legislature intended an authority to execute its own orders, it did so expressly, as seen in the (Section 22), the (Section 174), and the (Section 57).
The Fate of the 2022 Notification
The court considered the State notification dated , which had been relied upon by the land owners and the State to argue that LARRA had been conferred execution powers. Justice Singh observed that the notification was issued under Section 3(d) of the repealed 1894 Act—not under the 2013 Act—and that its validity was debatable since the old Act stood repealed on . However, as the notification’s validity was not under challenge, the court refrained from pronouncing on it conclusively, but held that it did not confer execution power under the 2013 Act.
Key Observations from the Judgment
“After having made a threadbare analysis of the statutory provisions and comprehensive discussions as noted above, it unveils that the power of execution has not been conferred nor any Rules for it have been framed under the Rule making power, hence, the power of execution cannot be read into a statute and so also for LARRA.”
“Giving a to a provision can be understood, if there is a source of power. Liberal construction or a is applicable only if a provision is present. In absence of the provision, there cannot be any liberal or of any provision so as to create a source of power by .”
“Thus, after visiting the various Acts and considering the provisions, as noted above, it would be clear that wherever the Legislature intended to confer the power of execution with the Authority/Court/Tribunal, it has made specific provisions in this regard.”
What Happens Now? Execution through
The court clarified that the award holder is not remediless. Since the award is a , it can be presented for execution before the , which has the requisite legal authority and coercive powers. However, the ’s role is strictly ministerial—it cannot go behind the award or entertain objections under . The court held that entertaining such objections would breach the bar under .
In a rider of practical significance, the bench held that if the requiring body (often a State instrumentality) unduly delays payment even at the execution stage, the land owner may approach the High Court under , as against the State are enforceable through constitutional writs. The court cited and in support.
A Call for Rule Making
The judgment concluded by observing that it would be in the larger public interest for the State to exercise its rule-making power under Section 109(2)(q) to confer execution jurisdiction on LARRA itself, thereby avoiding and additional burden on District Courts. The court noted that the hardship caused to land owners—who have already lost their land—should not be compounded by procedural complexity.
Final Decision
The petitions filed by SSB, UPEIDA and LDA were allowed . The orders passed by LARRA in exercise of were set aside, and LARRA was directed to desist from executing its awards. The three petitions by land owners seeking expedition of execution proceedings were disposed of as having been rendered infructuous.
Case Title: and connected matters
