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: Salary Cannot Be Denied While Approval Subsists
In a significant ruling on service law, the has quashed orders that denied salary to a compassionate appointee, holding that an approval order which continues to operate cannot be defeated indirectly by refusing its consequential benefits. Justice Manju Rani Chauhan allowed the writ petition of Smt. Dharmwati Devi, the widow of a deceased teacher, whose claim for salary on a Class-IV post had been rejected by educational authorities.
A Widow's Decade-Long Struggle for Her Husband's Legacy
The case traces back to , when Vijay Pal Singh, an Assistant Teacher at Kisan Vaidik Junior High School, Latifpur, Gautam Buddh Nagar, died in harness. Five years later, on , his widow Smt. Dharmwati Devi was appointed to a Class-IV post on compassionate grounds — a vacancy created by the termination of a previous employee. The duly approved her appointment on .
However, trouble began when the institution was brought under the , and the raised objections in . The objection claimed her appointment was made without following proper procedure. Her salary was withheld, triggering a legal battle that would span nearly two decades — through an earlier writ petition dismissed in , and a Special Appeal in which the Division Bench directed fresh consideration of her case on .
Conflicting Interpretations of Governing Rules
The petitioner's counsel argued that compassionate appointments are exclusively governed by the Government Order dated , and not . He contended that all requisite papers were forwarded by the and approval was granted, making any subsequent delay or omission by authorities an issue for which the petitioner could not be penalized.
The State, by contrast, maintained that the Government Order only became applicable to the institution on , when it was brought on the grant-in-aid list — before which the petitioner's appointment had no legal sanction. The respondents also argued that the mandatory selection procedure under the Rules of 1984 was never followed, and the rightly rejected her claim.
When Authorities Sat in Judgment Over Their Own Approval
The Court found the foundational premise of the respondents' rejection legally unsustainable. Critically, the approval granted by the on was never withdrawn, recalled, or annulled . As Justice Chauhan observed:
"An administrative order which continues to operate in the eyes of law cannot be rendered otiose by the simple expedient of refusing its consequential benefits. So long as the approval subsists, the respondents are estopped from questioning its efficacy indirectly while simultaneously declining the salary flowing therefrom."
The Court further noted that the authority had
"reopened issues that stood concluded and has virtually sat in appeal over the judgment of the Division Bench"
— an exercise
"wholly impermissible and strikes at the very foundation of the
."
A Process Vitiated by Unfairness
Equally troubling was the procedure adopted. The record revealed that respondent no. 2 relied upon reports submitted by respondents nos. 3 and 4 after the matter had already been heard , without furnishing copies to the petitioner or affording her an opportunity to rebut them. The decision was thus founded on materials collected behind her back.
"Fairness in administrative action is not an empty formality but an indispensable facet of ."
Citing Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner , (1978) 1 SCC 405, and Commissioner of Police Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji , AIR 1952 SC 16, the Court reaffirmed that an administrative order must stand or fall on the reasons recorded therein and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons later.
No Penalty for Official Negligence
The Court also rejected the respondents' attempt to make the petitioner suffer for procedural lapses. Drawing from Asha Kaul (Mrs.) & Anr. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors. , (1993) 2 SCC 573, it held that where delay or procedural default is attributable to authorities, an otherwise eligible candidate cannot be deprived of benefits.
"A citizen cannot be penalised for the negligence or inaction of the State or its instrumentalities. Once the petitioner had submitted all requisite documents and the competent authority itself granted approval, any subsequent administrative lapse cannot extinguish her accrued rights."
The Court underscored the true purpose of compassionate appointments — not a source of largesse, but
"a measure of immediate social welfare intended to rescue the bereaved family of a deceased employee from financial destitution"
— deserving a
.
Final Verdict
Finding the impugned orders vitiated by , , and , and citing Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan , (2010) 9 SCC 496 on the necessity of reasoned decision-making, the Court quashed the orders dated and and allowed the writ petition. The ruling serves as a strong reminder that authorities cannot sidestep binding judicial directions or violate while denying benefits that flow from a subsisting administrative approval.
