The has ruled that a donor cannot unilaterally cancel a once the property has been transferred to the donee, setting aside a executed by a mother against her son and two departmental circulars that permitted such unilateral cancellations.
Justice Subba Reddy Satti, presiding over a single-judge bench, held that the registration of a unilateral by a donor is legally unsustainable and void. The court directed that the only remedy available to a donor who alleges is to approach a civil court for cancellation under .
The ruling came in a filed by Selam Komala Kumar, whose mother, Selam Padma, had executed a in his favour on , covering 288 square yards of site in Nellore. The petitioner accepted the gift and later constructed a building on the property with municipal permission.
Nearly seven years later, on , Selam Padma executed a deed of revocation unilaterally cancelling the settlement, and the Joint Sub-Registrar, Nellore, registered it as document No. 13770 of 2022. The petitioner only learned of the cancellation in when the issued a proposing to remove his name from municipal records based on the revocation.
Challenging the registration, the petitioner argued that the unilateral revocation violated and his right to property under .
Mother's Revocation of Gift Deed Quashed
The court examined the legal framework under the , particularly Sections 123 and 126. Section 123 requires a gift of immovable property to be made by a , and once accepted by the donee, the transfer is complete and absolute. Section 126 strictly limits revocation to cases where the parties agree on a specified event or where the gift could be rescinded as a contract, but not at the mere will of the donor.
The judgment observed:
"Therefore, a reading of
in juxtaposition, it is abundantly clear that once a donor divests themselves of the title to the property via a
, such donor enjoys no residual right to unilaterally revoke it at their mere will. If the donor alleges that the gift was obtained by fraud, coercion, or violation of a
, his/her sole remedy is to institute a suit under
, before a jurisdictional Civil Court."
The court also rejected the Sub-Registrar's defence that Rule 26(i)(k)(i) applies only to sale deeds and not gift deeds. Citing earlier decisions, including , the court held that the term "conveyance" in the rule has a wide connotation encompassing deeds of gift and settlement. The rule requires that any cancellation deed must be executed by all parties to the original deed or be accompanied by a court order or .
Court Strikes Down Circulars Allowing
A critical aspect of the judgment was the court's examination of two departmental memos relied upon by the registration authorities: Memo RC.No.G1/10547/2008 dated
and Memo No.G4/4597/2016 dated
. These circulars directed registering officers that
applied only to
"deeds of conveyance on sale"
and that there was no bar to registering a revocation of gift deed executed unilaterally by the donor.
The court categorically held that these administrative memos could not override statutory rules or substantive law.
"It is a trite law that administrative circulars, memos, or executive instructions cannot override, supplant, or run contrary to substantive law or statutory rules. A registered deed of settlement or gift, once accepted and acted upon, results in an
under the
. The donor is completely divested of his right, title, and interest in the property. Such a
cannot be extinguished at the whims and fancies of the donor through a unilateral deed of cancellation, nor can an administrative memo revive such a void document,"
the court said.
The court further noted that the memos were in direct contravention of Rule 26(i)(k)(i) and the binding precedents of the and the High Court. Allowing such circulars to operate would lead to arbitrary deprivation of property rights without notice or opportunity of hearing to the titleholder.
Legal Framework and Precedents
The judgment traced the evolution of the law on . It noted that the Full Bench decision in had earlier held that registering officers have inherent power to cancel documents, but the subsequent insertion of and the 's decision in laid down that of a registered deed is and . The court also relied on recent decisions in and , which applied the same principle to gift deeds.
Exercising its powers under , the High Court set aside the revocation settlement deed dated and the two impugned memos. The court observed that even though the petitioner had not specifically prayed for setting aside the memos, the wide under Article 226 allowed it to do justice in the case.
The was allowed with no order as to costs, and all pending miscellaneous applications were closed. The practical consequence is that the municipal corporation cannot proceed to remove the petitioner's name from its records based on the now-void , and the registration authorities must adhere to the statutory rule requiring or a court order for any cancellation of a registered conveyance, including gift deeds.