Bombay HC Rules Long-Term Ties and Child Birth Qualify as Marriage-Like Under DV Act

In a significant ruling for women's rights in informal relationships, the Bombay High Court at its Nagpur Bench has held that a prolonged intimate relationship involving repeated cohabitation, a sexual tie, and the birth of a child can constitute a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act). Justice M.M. Nerlikar refused to quash domestic violence proceedings against a man accused by his former partner, emphasizing that such elements prima facie establish a domestic relationship deserving protection. However, the court granted relief to the man's family members, quashing the case against them due to lack of direct allegations. This decision, delivered on January 20, 2026, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 209 of 2024 , underscores the judiciary's commitment to a liberal interpretation of the DV Act to safeguard vulnerable women in live-in arrangements, even amid overlapping criminal complaints like rape allegations.

The ruling comes amid growing judicial scrutiny of live-in relationships in India, where formal marriage is not always a prerequisite for legal protections against domestic violence. By relying on Supreme Court precedents, the High Court clarified that a subsequent marriage by one partner does not automatically bar relief under the DV Act at the preliminary stage. This nuanced approach balances individual rights with societal interests in protecting motherhood and relational equity, potentially influencing how lower courts handle similar petitions for quashing under inherent powers.

Case Background

The case originated from a complaint filed under Section 12 of the DV Act by a 22-year-old woman and her eight-month-old daughter against the man with whom she had a long-standing intimate relationship. The petitioners in the writ petition included the man (Petitioner No.1), his parents (Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3), and his wife (Petitioner No. 4), who sought to quash the entire proceedings, including interim orders dated September 8, 2022, and October 19, 2023, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) at Chamorshi in Domestic Violence Case No. 20 of 2022.

According to the woman's complaint and the First Information Report (FIR) lodged on May 7, 2022, the relationship began while she was residing with her brother in Alapalli and later with a friend in Aheri. The man allegedly promised marriage but coerced her into aborting her first pregnancy. Despite this, the relationship persisted, leading to a second pregnancy and the birth of a girl child on October 19, 2023—now Respondent No. 2 in the proceedings. When the man refused to marry her and instead wed another woman on July 6, 2022, the complainant filed the FIR accusing him of rape under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and violations under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, citing her Scheduled Caste background.

The DV complaint followed, alleging emotional, physical, and economic abuse rooted in the "domestic relationship" with the man. The JMFC granted interim maintenance of Rs. 5,000 per month to the woman and Rs. 2,000 to the child, finding a prima facie case of a marriage-like relationship. The petitioners challenged this, arguing the relationship did not meet the DV Act's thresholds and was merely vengeful. No specific timeline for the relationship's start is detailed, but the court noted it spanned a "long time," with cohabitation at shared locations during key events like the pregnancies.

This backdrop highlights a common legal intersection in India: live-in relationships that blur lines between consensual intimacy and exploitation, often leading to parallel civil (DV Act) and criminal (IPC) proceedings. The case timeline underscores delays typical in such matters—FIR in May 2022, charge sheet in June 2022, DV interim orders in 2022-2023, and High Court petition in 2024—reflecting the protracted nature of justice for domestic violence survivors.

Arguments Presented

The petitioners, represented by advocate A.R. Fule, mounted a vigorous challenge to the DV proceedings' validity. They contended that no "domestic relationship" existed as defined under Section 2(f) of the DV Act, which encompasses relationships between persons who are related by marriage, consanguinity, or "in the nature of marriage" and have lived together in a shared household. Emphasizing the absence of cohabitation in a shared household, they pointed to the FIR, where the woman described living with her brother or friend, not with the man. Counsel argued that occasional weekend meetings or isolated encounters amounted to a "one-night stand," insufficient for DV Act coverage, as per Supreme Court observations.

Relying heavily on D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010), the petitioners invoked the four guidelines for identifying a marriage-like relationship: (1) holding out as spouses to society; (2) legal age to marry; (3) eligibility for marriage (unmarried status); and (4) voluntary cohabitation for a significant period. They claimed the first and fourth were unmet, portraying the complaint as revenge for the man's subsequent marriage and the ongoing rape trial. No direct allegations against the parents or wife justified their inclusion, they added, urging quashing to prevent abuse of process.

In opposition, advocate J.A. Anthony for the respondents stressed the relationship's depth and duration. The woman averred in her complaint that they lived "as husband and wife" with an acknowledged sexual relationship, including the forced abortion and subsequent birth of their child—a strong familial bond. Counsel highlighted the JMFC's prior finding of a prima facie marriage-like tie when granting maintenance, arguing that evidence must be led in trial before quashing. She advocated a liberal interpretation of "domestic relationship" to include such ties, preventing evasion of DV protections.

Key factual points included the child's birth as irrefutable evidence of procreation intent, and the man's insistence on abortion as indicative of control akin to marital dynamics. Legally, respondents distinguished the case from casual liaisons, noting the relationship's continuity post-abortion and its emotional, intimate nature. They urged the court not to entertain the petition prematurely, as the rape charge sheet confirmed physical intimacy, and DNA testing for paternity (pending for the child) should await trial.

These arguments framed a classic tension: petitioners seeking early quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to avoid harassment, versus respondents defending the DV Act's remedial purpose for aggrieved women in non-traditional unions.

Legal Analysis

Justice Nerlikar meticulously dissected the arguments, grounding the decision in established Supreme Court jurisprudence to affirm the DV Act's expansive scope. The court first acknowledged the petitioners' reliance on D. Velusamy , which clarified that "relationship in the nature of marriage" requires more than fleeting encounters—mere weekends together or one-night stands fall outside. However, it found the guidelines satisfied prima facie: the parties were of legal age and eligible; they cohabited voluntarily in Alapalli and Aheri for a significant period; and the relationship produced a child, implying societal holding out as akin to spouses.

Elevating the analysis, the court turned to Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755, a landmark on live-in relationships' classifications. Paragraph 56 of Indra Sarma outlined relevant factors for DV Act applicability, including: (56.1) duration ("a reasonable period... depending upon the fact situation"); (56.5) sexual relationship ("not just for pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation"); and (56.6) children ("a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage... Sharing the responsibility... is also a strong indication"). The bench applied these directly: the "long time" relationship, continued post-abortion sexual intimacy leading to childbirth, and the child's existence evidenced intent for a lasting bond. This distinguished the case from casual flings, aligning with the DV Act's object to protect women from violence in akin-to-marriage setups.

The court clarified key distinctions: "domestic relationship" under Section 2(f) need not mimic formal marriage but must involve shared household living "at any point of time." The woman's averments of living as husband-wife, coupled with the man's acknowledgment in interactions, met this threshold preliminarily. Notably, the man's July 2022 marriage to Petitioner No. 4 was deemed irrelevant at the quashing stage—it postdated the primary relationship and did not negate prior protections, as the DV Act focuses on the alleged violence's context, not subsequent events.

Precedents like D. Velusamy were pivotal for thresholds, while Indra Sarma provided nuanced indicators, emphasizing procreation and child-rearing as hallmarks of commitment. The ruling invoked Section 482 CrPC sparingly, quashing only where proceedings are frivolous; here, the child's birth and maintenance orders indicated a triable issue. Allegations of forced abortion invoked economic/emotional abuse under Sections 3 and 4 of the DV Act, while the SC/ST Act and IPC rape charges (involving consent deception) ran parallel without barring DV relief.

This analysis reinforces the judiciary's progressive stance: the DV Act's "liberal interpretation" (as urged by respondents) extends to non-formalized unions with familial elements, countering patriarchal norms that deny live-in partners spousal-like safeguards. It distinguishes quashing from compounding—here, no settlement justified dismissal—and prioritizes evidence over threshold denials, especially where children are involved.

Key Observations

The judgment features several pivotal excerpts that encapsulate the court's reasoning, drawn directly from Justice Nerlikar's oral order:

1. On the relationship's nature: "Prima facie, it could be gathered that Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.1 were having a relationship in the nature of marriage, as they were in relationship for long time and out of the said relationship, a child was born."

2. Applying Indra Sarma guidelines: "Considering the above, prima facie... the guidelines laid down in D. Velusamy (supra) are also satisfied. Not only that, even the trial court while granting interim maintenance has [found] that the relationship between the applicant no.1 and non-applicant no.1 is akin to relationship in the nature of marriage."

3. On quashing restraint: "I am not inclined to quash the complaint at this threshold where the fact has emerged that out of the relationship a female child was born. I am of considered opinion that evidence is required to be led by the parties so as to make an informed decision in the interest of justice."

4. Prioritizing timeline: "Further, prima facie the alleged date of marriage which is 06.07.2022, demonstrates that the relationship between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.1 was first in point of time."

5. Relief to family: "Admittedly there are no allegations against Petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 in the entire complaint so as to invoke the provisions of the D.V. Act."

These observations highlight the court's evidence-based approach, blending factual chronology with legal benchmarks to affirm DV Act's protective ambit.

Court's Decision

The Bombay High Court partly allowed the petition, dismissing it as to Petitioner No.1 (the man) while quashing the DV proceedings against Petitioners Nos. 2 to 4 (parents and wife). The complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act against the man stands, requiring him to face trial before the JMFC, Chamorshi, where evidence on cohabitation, paternity (via pending DNA), and abuse will be adjudicated. No stay was granted on the order, ensuring continuity of interim maintenance (Rs. 5,000 to the woman, Rs. 2,000 to the child) pending final resolution.

Practically, this mandates the man to comply with maintenance and defend against violence claims, potentially leading to residence rights or compensation if proven. For his family, quashing averts unwarranted involvement, narrowing the case to direct perpetrators.

The implications are profound for future cases. By affirming Indra Sarma 's factors—duration, intimacy, and children—as DV Act litmus tests, the ruling empowers women in live-in relationships to seek redress without formal wedlock, particularly where offspring bind parties. It discourages using subsequent marriages to evade liability, promoting equity in evolving social norms. Lower courts may now more readily deny quashing where child birth evidences commitment, reducing misuse while curbing blanket dismissals.

Societally, this bolsters women's autonomy in informal unions, addressing gaps in traditional family laws amid rising live-in prevalence (per NCRB data on unreported violence). However, it cautions against overreach—casual ties remain unprotected, preserving the Act's focus on genuine domestic spheres. For legal practitioners, the decision signals robust precedent for interim relief applications, urging thorough Velusamy-Indra Sarma application in quashing bids. Ultimately, it advances the DV Act's ethos: violence in marriage-like bonds warrants swift, compassionate justice, fostering safer relational landscapes for Indian women.