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Dismisses Former Trustee Niket Mehta's Plea Over Procedure in Lilavati Trust Dispute
The has dismissed a writ petition filed by Niket V. Mehta, a former permanent trustee of the , which sought to compel the -I, Mumbai to adopt only a specific procedural provision while adjudicating his application for suspension and removal of ten individuals allegedly claiming to be trustees. The Division Bench of Justices A.S. Gadkari and Kamal Khata refused to direct the authority to follow only , observing that such insistence appeared “with a view to sabotage the functioning of the concerned adjudicating Authority.”
Background of the Trust Dispute
The was settled under a Trust Deed dated , by Kirtilal Manilal Mehta, the grandfather of the petitioner. The Trust manages and operates the renowned in Bandra, Mumbai. Mehta claimed that he served as a permanent trustee from , until , and relied on Clause 20 of the Trust Deed, which, according to his plea, required trustees to be appointed from the settlor's family.
The dispute arose when, according to Mehta, ten individuals—Charu K. Mehta, Prashant Mehta, Rajesh Mehta, Rajiv Mehta, Rakesh Khanna, Saurav Sharma, Kiran Shah, Sanjay Shroff, Mohit Mathur, and Tatyaba Palve—were appointed as trustees at meetings purportedly held on , and . Mehta alleged that these persons seized control of the Trust from , and subsequently filed proceedings before the under Sections 41D and 41A of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, read with , seeking their suspension and dismissal.
The Petitioner's Insistence on a Narrow Procedure
While his application before the was pending, Mehta approached the High Court under , seeking expeditious disposal and a direction that the Commissioner “follow the procedure particularly prescribed under Section 41D(2)(c) of the Trust Act instead of the entire procedure prescribed under Section 41D.” Section 41D of the Act deals with the powers of the to suspend or remove trustees, and subsection (2)(c) specifically addresses the procedure for such actions in certain circumstances.
The High Court initially indicated to Mehta's counsel that it was inclined to allow the petition in terms of prayers (a) and (b) for expeditious disposal, provided the phrase “(2)(c)” was deleted from the wording, thereby permitting the Commissioner to follow the full procedure under Section 41D rather than being confined to a sub-section. However, Mehta's counsel opposed this modification and insisted the petition be heard on merits.
Court Rebukes Attempt to Limit Authority's Discretion
The Division Bench declined to entertain the petition on its merits, holding that it could not direct the adjudicating authority to follow only a part of the statutory procedure. In its order, the Court stated: “We are unable to accept the insistence of the Petitioner that, this Court must direct the concerned adjudicating Authority to follow the procedure particularly prescribed under Section 41D(2)(c) of the Trust Act instead of the entire procedure prescribed under Section 41D.”
The Bench further observed that Mehta appeared to be seeking such a direction “with a view to sabotage the functioning of the concerned adjudicating Authority,” a strong condemnation of the litigation strategy. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition (at the threshold), deprecating the stand taken by the petitioner’s counsel.
No Interim Relief and Observations on Litigation Tactics
After dismissal, Mehta sought continuation of an for two weeks to enable him to approach the . The Bench refused this request, recording that it appeared to the Court that the petitioner “somehow wants to protract the litigation.” This observation came despite the Court having been inclined to grant substantive relief—namely, expeditious disposal—had the petitioner agreed to drop the restrictive clause. The Court’s frustration with the tactical approach was evident, as it noted that the insistence on a particular procedural route was designed to delay rather than advance the proceedings.
Legal Implications for Public Trust Proceedings
The judgment reinforces the principle that statutory authorities must follow the complete procedure prescribed under the law, and litigants cannot unilaterally dictate the manner in which bodies discharge their functions. By refusing to carve out a limited direction under Section 41D(2)(c), the High Court has affirmed the discretion of the to exercise all powers under Section 41D, which includes the ability to consider the entire factual matrix and apply appropriate procedural safeguards.
This ruling serves as a caution for trustees and parties involved in trust disputes who may attempt to micromanage proceedings through writ petitions. The Court’s observation regarding “sabotage” and “protraction” underscores the judiciary’s intolerance for litigation that seeks to obstruct rather than resolve. For legal practitioners, the case highlights the boundaries of Article 226 jurisdiction when interfering with pending proceedings before statutory authorities—particularly where the petitioner seeks to compel a specific procedural outcome that narrows the authority’s discretion.
The dispute is likely to continue before the , who will now proceed with the full procedure under Section 41D. Mehta has the option to challenge the High Court’s dismissal before the , though the denial of interim relief and the adverse remarks may temper any such move.
Conclusion
The ’s dismissal of Niket Mehta’s petition is a significant procedural ruling in the ongoing Lilavati Trust dispute. By refusing to direct the to follow only a subsection of Section 41D, the Court has upheld the integrity of the statutory framework and resisted an attempt to curtail the adjudicating authority’s powers. The case also serves as a reminder that writ courts will not be used to micro-manage proceedings or to endorse litigation tactics aimed at delay. The fate of the trust’s management now rests with the Commissioner, who will proceed under the full ambit of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act.
