Bombay High Court rejects interim relief for EV charging licensees terminated by AAI

The Bombay High Court has dismissed Section 9 arbitration petitions filed by three EV charging station licensees against the Airports Authority of India (AAI), refusing to stay AAI's termination notices and declining permission to resume work on airport premises.

Justice Amit Borkar of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay delivered the common judgment on August 4, 2026, in four connected petitions arising from identical facts — licence agreements for EV charging stations at Juhu Airport and surrounding areas in Vile Parle, Mumbai.

When a tender becomes a battlefield

The dispute traces back to August 2024, when AAI issued e-tenders inviting bids for licences to supply, install, test, commission, operate and maintain EV charging stations at Juhu Airport, including Car Park I. In the lead matter, Vision Enterprises — the sole proprietorship of Satyavan Vishnu Agate — was declared the successful bidder. Letters of Intent followed on October 11, 2024, and formal Licence Agreements were executed on October 14, 2024, granting approximately 5,000 square metres of airport land for a ten-year term.

The licencee deposited ₹7.5 lakh as performance security, obtained layout approvals the day after the agreement was signed, and commenced construction after possession was handed over on October 26, 2024. The project appeared to be progressing smoothly — until December 31, 2024, when the Officiating Airport Director directed the petitioner to halt all work citing "administrative reasons."

When Vision Enterprises sought clarification and received none, it approached the High Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. During the pendency of those proceedings — and before the matter could be heard on March 25, 2025AAI issued termination notices dated March 22, 2025, alleging that the petitioner and its officers had altered certain clauses of the agreements, particularly Clauses 5(a) and 34(b).

The arbitrability question: two competing visions

The petitioners argued that the arbitration agreement survived termination and that the disputes — concerning the legality of the stop-work communication, the authority of AAI officers, alleged irregularities in the tender process, and the validity of termination — must be adjudicated by an Arbitral Tribunal. They relied on the Seven Judge Bench decision in Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Indian Stamp Act, 1899 , the subsequent judgment in Managing Director, Bihar State Food & Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. vs. Sanjay Kumar , and Escorts Heart Institute and Research Centre Ltd. vs. Delhi Development Authority , which held that where the validity of termination remains under adjudication, eviction proceedings should not be prematurely pursued.

AAI, led by Senior Advocate Pravin Samdani, countered that Chapter VA of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 constitutes a complete code for eviction and recovery of airport premises. Relying on HLV Limited and the coordinate bench decision in Survee Shidal vs. Airports Authority of India , AAI submitted that disputes relating to eviction are " excepted matters " under Clause 27.10 of the Licence Agreements, which expressly excludes from arbitration "matters for which eviction & recovery procedure is provided under Chapter-VA ."

Charting a middle path

Justice Borkar declined to accept either extreme. He held that disputes exclusively relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants and recovery of airport premises fall outside arbitration by virtue of Clause 27.10. However, he rejected AAI's broader contention that merely issuing a termination notice extinguishes the arbitration agreement for every dispute.

" Clause 27.10 may not be capable of such wide interpretation," the Court observed. "Words used by parties appear having considerable importance. Clause nowhere says that every dispute arising after termination shall stand excluded from arbitration... Exclusion appears much narrower. Parties agreed that arbitration shall not be available 'in matters for which eviction & recovery procedure is provided under Chapter-VA .'"

The Court harmonised the competing authorities, holding that each operates in its own field: the Seven Judge Bench governs the limited scope of judicial scrutiny at the referral stage; Escorts Heart Institute governs situations where validity of termination remains under adjudication; Edward alias Advard Paul Machado defines the limits of the Eviction Officer's jurisdiction; and HLV Limited and Survee Shidal govern disputes relating to eviction and recovery under Chapter VA.

"If every challenge to termination becomes non-arbitrable only because termination notice has been issued, then licensor may, by its own act of terminating agreement, become capable of putting end to arbitration agreement regarding every contractual dispute," the Court warned.

Why interim relief failed

Having established that arbitration survived, the Court nonetheless refused the interim reliefs. The petitioners sought withdrawal of the December 31 stop-work communication, stay of the termination notices, permission to restart the EV project, and an injunction restraining AAI from acting upon the termination notices.

"Petitioners do not merely seek preservation of existing position. They seek permission to restart work. They seek continuation of construction activities. They seek restoration of performance. Grant of such relief would change existing position instead of merely preserving it," Justice Borkar observed.

The Court reasoned that granting the reliefs as prayed would effectively continue the Licence Agreements throughout the pendency of arbitration, prevent AAI from treating the petitioners as unauthorised occupants, and keep the Chapter VA remedy in abeyance. In substance, the petitioners would receive the same commercial benefit they proposed to claim before the Arbitral Tribunal — a result that Section 9 does not contemplate without exceptional circumstances.

The final order

The Court rejected AAI's preliminary objection regarding complete absence of arbitral jurisdiction but dismissed the petitions. The operative directions were nuanced:

  • Disputes exclusively relating to eviction and recovery of airport premises are excepted matters not referable to arbitration;
  • The arbitration agreement does not stand extinguished merely because termination notices were issued;
  • Jurisdiction of the Eviction Officer under Chapter VA and remedies under the Arbitration Act operate in their respective fields;
  • Grant of the reliefs as prayed would amount to granting final relief and would restrain AAI from exercising powers under Chapter VA;
  • All contentions on merits — including the legality of the Licence Agreements, the termination notices, the authority of officers, and the maintainability of arbitral proceedings — remain open for adjudication before the appropriate forum.

The Court also rejected the petitioners' request to continue the ad-interim protection for four weeks, and made no order as to costs.

What this means for airport licences and public contracts

The judgment offers a principled framework for disputes involving statutory authorities and airport premises: termination of a licence does not automatically kill the arbitration clause, but interim relief will not be granted where its practical effect is to compel a public authority to continue a contractual relationship it has lawfully sought to end.

For EV charging infrastructure developers and other commercial licensees of AAI, the message is clear — pursue contractual remedies through arbitration, but do not expect Section 9 courts to restore performance under terminated agreements while the statutory eviction machinery under Chapter VA awaits. The petitioners retain the right to raise all defences before the Eviction Officer and may still invoke arbitration for disputes falling outside the eviction framework, but their interim battle at the Bombay High Court has come to a close.