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Rules ICC's of POSH Complaint Appealable Under Section 18
In a significant ruling that reinforces the protective framework of the (), the has held that an ’s decision to reject a complaint at the threshold on the ground that it lacks a ‘sexual element’ is nonetheless a ‘’ under Section 13(2) of the Act and can be challenged by way of an appeal under Section 18 before the Industrial Court. The judgment, delivered by Justice Sandeep V. Marne on , closes a potential loophole that would have left complainants remediless when ICCs short‑circuit the inquiry process.
Background: The Maple Infra Dispute
The case arose from a complaint filed by a female employee of against a senior colleague. After she objected to a member of the ICC, the complaint was referred to an external member. On , the external ICC member communicated that the committee had deliberated upon the allegations and concluded that they “did not contain a sexual element” and therefore fell outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. No formal inquiry under was conducted.
The complainant appealed this communication under before the . Three employees of Maple Infra – Anup Vikal, Chandrani Sen and Rohit Anand – challenged the of that appeal, arguing that the ICC’s email was not a “” because no inquiry had been held. The Industrial Court, by a judgment dated , not only rejected the objection but also set aside the ICC’s communication and remanded the complaint for a fresh inquiry.
Dissatisfied, the three employees approached the . However, the High Court partly allowed their petitions – upholding the of the appeal while setting aside the Industrial Court’s .
Is a ‘’
The central legal question was whether an ICC communication refusing to conduct an inquiry on the ground that the complaint lacks any element of sexual harassment qualifies as a “” under , and consequently as an under Section 18.
The petitioners argued that Section 18 creates only a limited right of appeal against specific recommendations made after completion of a formal inquiry under Section 11. They contended that a preliminary refusal to entertain a complaint because it does not involve sexual harassment is not a but a that can only be challenged under .
Justice Marne rejected this narrow construction. Drawing on the language of Sections 9, 11, 13 and 18, he held that once a complaint alleging sexual harassment is made, the employer forwards it to the ICC, the ICC takes cognizance, deliberates upon the allegations, and concludes that the complaint contains no sexual element, that conclusion is in substance a decision upon the complaint. It “assumes characteristic of a made under .”
The Court observed:
“If the Internal Committee does not conduct inquiry in the manner prescribed under Section 11, the same may vitiate its decision/. However, mere non-conduct of inquiry in respect of complaint of sexual harassment by the Internal Committee would not save its decision from the ambit of the expression ‘’ under .”
The judge illustrated the point by analogy: if an ICC, without holding an inquiry, writes to the employer to terminate the respondent’s services, such a course of action would clearly be a “.” The vice of non-conduct of inquiry does not strip the decision of its character as a . On the same logic, a ruling that the complaint does not constitute sexual harassment is equally a .
Critically, the Court emphasised that the is that must be interpreted liberally in favour of the class it is meant to protect. A strict interpretation would render an aggrieved woman remediless when the ICC itself fails to comply with the mandatory inquiry procedure.
“In my view therefore, provisions of must not only be interpreted liberally but in the event of any difficulty, the same must be interpreted in favour of class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted.”
Distinguishing Precedents
The petitioners relied on several High Court decisions, including and , for the proposition that an ICC’s jurisdiction arises only when there is a complaint of sexual harassment. The accepted that proposition but emphasised that it does not answer the separate question whether the ICC’s own determination that the jurisdictional predicate is absent can be appealed.
The Court also distinguished its earlier decision in , which dealt with an ICC refusing to discharge its statutory duty. Here, the ICC had taken a decision and communicated a final outcome. The present case, the Court noted, involved an allegation that the ICC’s decision itself violated .
Support for a broader appellate remedy was drawn from the Division Bench ruling in and the ’s judgment in , both of which recognised the appealability of ICC decisions that effectively close a complaint.
Industrial Court’s Misstep: Premature
While upholding the of the appeal, the was sharply critical of the Industrial Court’s handling of the proceedings. The Industrial Court had taken up only the applications for hearing but then proceeded to examine the substance of the complaint, concluded that the complainant had worked in an “unhealthy and uncomfortable environment,” set aside the ICC’s communication, and ordered a fresh inquiry. The High Court found this approach “perfunctory” and contrary to law.
Justice Marne clarified that the appellate forum’s task at this stage is not to decide whether sexual harassment actually occurred, but whether the complaint contains allegations capable of attracting the . If the complaint does not even contain an element of sexual harassment, the Industrial Court may dismiss the appeal. Conversely, if it finds such an element, it may direct the ICC to conduct the statutory inquiry.
Accordingly, the High Court set aside the Industrial Court’s judgment insofar as it decided the merits and remanded the appeal for fresh adjudication. The Industrial Court has been directed to decide the limited substantive question – whether the complainant’s allegations disclose an element of sexual harassment warranting an inquiry – preferably within four months.
Impact on Practice
This ruling has immediate practical consequences for employers and Internal Complaints Committees across India. ICCs can no longer shield their threshold dismissals from appellate scrutiny by simply refusing to hold a formal inquiry. Any decision taken by an ICC after considering a complaint – even a summary rejection for lack of a “sexual element” – will be treated as a under Section 13(2) and can be appealed under Section 18.
The judgment also reinforces the principle that the ’s procedural safeguards are not optional. If an ICC fails to conduct an inquiry as mandated by Section 11, that failure may vitiate its decision but does not immunise the decision from appeal. The appellate forum, in turn, must first determine whether the complaint contains any element of sexual harassment before ordering a fresh inquiry – a limited merits examination that prevents unnecessary remands.
For aggrieved women, the decision ensures a statutory remedy against ICC decisions that prematurely close complaints. It prevents employers and committees from defeating the object of the Act by categorising every grievance as non‑sexual without any inquiry.
Conclusion
The has struck a careful balance. It has upheld the right to appeal against threshold rejections while cautioning appellate courts against jumping to conclusions on the ultimate question of harassment. The case has been remanded to the Industrial Court with clear instructions: decide only whether the complaint contains an element of sexual harassment.
The judgment – Mr. Anup Vikal v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Writ Petition No. 7430 of 2026) – is a benchmark for the interpretation of Sections 13 and 18 of the . It affirms that must be read broadly to protect its beneficiaries, and that procedural infirmities by the ICC cannot be used to defeat statutory remedies.
