Bombay High Court Rules Section 482(4) BNSS Bar On Pre-Arrest Bail Is Not Absolute

Justice Nerlikar clarifies that despite the statutory embargo, a narrow window exists for accused to challenge anticipatory bail applications when prima facie ingredients of the offence are not disclosed.

In a significant ruling on the scope of Section 482(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), the Bombay High Court at Nagpur has held that the provision does not create an absolute bar against anticipatory bail. The Court ruled that applications remain maintainable for the limited purpose of examining whether the statutory ingredients of Sections 65 or 70(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) are prima facie satisfied. If they are not, pre-arrest bail may still be granted.

Justice M. M. Nerlikar delivered the common order on October 6, 2026, rejecting two separate anticipatory bail applications after finding that the prima facie ingredients of Section 65(1) BNS — rape of a woman under 16 years — were clearly made out in both cases.

A Tale of Two Victims

The first application (Criminal Application No. 794/2026) involved Kasif Sahabuddin Khan, accused of repeatedly raping a 15-year-old girl in Desaiganj, Gadchiroli. The victim, who became pregnant, initially implicated another person under threat from the accused but later identified Khan in her statement recorded under Section 183 BNSS. The FIR alleged offences under Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 64(2)(i), 64(2)(m), and 65(1) BNS.

The second application (Criminal Application No. 771/2026) concerned Ajay Ganesh Ade, accused of raping a 14-year-old girl in Barshi Takli, Akola. The victim initially told police she had accompanied Ade voluntarily, but in a supplementary statement she alleged he had sexually assaulted her after threatening to make her obscene photographs and videos viral. The case was registered under Section 137(2) BNS.

The Core Legal Question

Both applications raised the same preliminary issue: whether Section 482(4) BNSS — which states that “nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence under section 65 and sub-section (2) of section 70 of the BNSS”— completely ousts the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain anticipatory bail.

The applicants argued that the bar was not absolute, relying on Supreme Court interpretations of similar provisions in the SC/ST Act, TADA, and UAPA. They contended that the Court could consider whether a prima facie case under the specified sections existed, and if not, could grant relief.

The State and the victims’ counsel countered that the legislative intent behind the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2018—which introduced the bar—demanded strict interpretation. They submitted that once the ingredients of Section 65 or 70(2) were made out, the application was non-maintainable regardless of other grounds such as false implication or inconsistent statements.

A Small Window, Not a Closed Door

Justice Nerlikar began by scrutinizing the plain language of Section 482(4). Citing the well-settled principle that unambiguous statutory language requires no further interpretation, the Court observed that the provision uses the phrase “accusation of having committed,” which implies that a victim’s claim must be accepted at face value for prima facie satisfaction.

However, drawing on precedents from the Supreme Court—particularly Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India (2020) 4 SCC 727 and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 5 SCC 1—the Court distinguished between an absolute bar and a conditional one.

“Section 482(4) does not impose an absolute bar. It only applies when prima facie allegations under Section 65 or Section 70(2) exist. … Therefore, a very small window is open for the accused persons to claim anticipatory bail under Section 482 of BNSS.”

The Court clarified that this window is narrow: the judge may examine only whether the statutory ingredients are prima facie disclosed. Any deeper analysis into evidentiary inconsistencies, false implication claims, or medical evidence would defeat the legislative purpose of protecting minor victims.

“If the Courts start enlarging the scope by entertaining the applications on merits by examining all the grounds available in ordinary anticipatory bail applications, then the very purpose of introduction of said provision would be frustrated.”

Test Applied, Both Applications Fall

Applying the test to the facts, the Court noted the undisputed ages of the victims: 15 years and 5 months in the first case, and 14 years and 4 months in the second. Both victims had alleged rape. In the first case, the pregnancy corroborated the allegation. In the second, despite an initial contradictory statement, the supplementary statement clearly alleged sexual assault under threat.

“Section 65(1) has been invoked and therefore, the two ingredients which ought to be satisfied are (i) rape is committed on a woman, and (ii) the woman is under 16 years of age. Prima facie the allegations are made out,” the Court observed.

“Therefore, the applications filed by the applicants are not maintainable, and the bar provided under Section 482(4) would operate.” Both applications were rejected.

Implications for Future Cases

The decision provides crucial clarity for litigants and lower courts grappling with the new BNSS provision. While accused persons charged with rape of minors under 16 can still petition for anticipatory bail, they must first overcome the preliminary hurdle of demonstrating that the statutory ingredients are not prima facie made out. If the allegations on their face satisfy the elements of Section 65 or 70(2) BNS, the application will be dismissed at the threshold without consideration of other grounds.

Justice Nerlikar further directed that the fees of appointed counsel for the victims be determined and paid as per rules. The order was signed and dated October 6, 2026.