Bombay High Court Upholds IBBI Regulatory Fee Under Regulation 31A on Resolution Plans

In a significant verdict that reinforces the regulatory framework of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), the Bombay High Court has upheld the constitutional validity of Regulation 31A of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. The provision imposes a 0.25% regulatory fee on the realisable value to creditors under a resolution plan approved by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).

A Division Bench of Justices Manish Pitale and Shreeram V. Shirsat dismissed four petitions challenging the regulation, holding that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) acted within its powers under Section 196(1)(c) read with Section 240(2)(d) of the IBC. The court rejected arguments that the fee was a tax disguised as a levy, arbitrary, or retrospective in operation.

The Genesis of the Challenge

The lead petition was filed by Hazel Mercantile Limited, a successful resolution applicant for Reliance Naval and Engineering Limited. The Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved their plan on 17 March 2022 with a 94.86% vote share, but the NCLT approval came only on 23 December 2022—after Regulation 31A came into effect on 1 October 2022. The IBBI then demanded payment.

Similar circumstances arose for Suraksha Realty Limited, whose resolution plan for Jaypee Infratech Limited was approved by the CoC on 10 June 2021 but sanctioned by the NCLT on 7 March 2023. The other two petitions were filed by depositor Vineet Shrivastava and homebuyer Yadubir Singh Sajwan, who argued the fee would undermine the IBC's objectives.

Arguments From Both Sides

Senior Counsel Vikram Nankani, appearing for Hazel Mercantile, contended that the IBBI’s regulatory role is limited to insolvency professionals, professional agencies, and information utilities. He argued that the Board provides no direct service to resolution applicants or the CoC, making the levy a tax without quid pro quo. He also invoked the principle of ejusdem generis to argue that Section 5(13)(e) could not be read to include a fee on approved plans.

Senior Counsel Ravi Kadam, for Suraksha Realty, submitted that the fee violated the IBC’s object of maximising asset value and reviving corporate debtors. He argued that the fee, being part of CIRP costs, made resolution plans more expensive and could push debtors into liquidation.

Senior Counsel Darius Khambata, representing the IBBI, countered that the Board performs executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative functions throughout the resolution process. He emphasised that regulatory fees require only a broad correlation with services, not mathematical exactitude. He also highlighted the need for the Board’s financial self-sufficiency, citing the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC) report and a study by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER).

Court’s Analysis: A Broad and Integral Regulatory Role

The court extensively reviewed the provisions of the IBC and the BLRC report to delineate the IBBI’s role. It observed that the Board “performs executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions under the provisions of the IBC” and that limiting its role to the three specified entities would be “not in consonance with the scheme of the IBC.”

The Bench noted that the IBBI frames regulations on matters such as voting procedures, information memorandum, meeting conduct, and insolvency resolution process costs—all integral to the CIRP. By regulating these, the Board provides “a conducive ‘eco-system’ for efficient completion of CIRP.”

Tax versus Fee: The Quid Pro Quo Test

Applying evolving jurisprudence, the court held that a regulatory fee does not require strict proof of direct service to each payer. Citing B.S.E. Brokers’ Forum v. SEBI , the court stated that “for a regulatory fee, the requirement of quid pro quo recedes to the background.” The court found a sufficient general nexus between the fee and the Board’s services, noting that the IBBI provides “wide-ranging general service and quid pro quo in the process of CIRP to all the stakeholders, including the petitioners.”

The court also rejected the argument that the fee was excessive. It observed that mere surplus in the Board’s accounts after the levy was introduced did not amount to disproportionality. Financial independence of a regulator, the court noted, was a “sine qua non” for effective performance.

Retrospectivity Rejected: Role of NCLT Not Ministerial

One of the key challenges was that the proviso to Regulation 31A operated retrospectively. The petitioners argued that once the CoC approved a plan, it was “cast in stone” and could not be altered. The court disagreed, holding that the NCLT, as an adjudicatory authority, “cannot be reduced to a body performing a ministerial act.” It held that the fee applied prospectively from 1 October 2022 and that the resolution plan’s approval by the CoC did not prevent the regulation from applying to plans pending before the NCLT.

The Bench also noted that the petitioners themselves had agreed in their resolution plans to bear CIRP costs as per amendments to the IBC and regulations. “The petitioners cannot be permitted to wriggle out of the said obligation by raising the argument of retrospectivity,” the court stated.

Precedents Cited and Distinguished

The petitioners relied on Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar and State of Rajasthan v. Rajasthan Chemists Association to argue that the levy was a tax. The court distinguished these as cases where there was no service at all, unlike the present case where the IBBI performs a wide range of functions.

The court also relied on State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited to note that “availability of indirect benefit and a general nexus between the persons bearing the burden of levy of fee and the services rendered out of the fee collected is enough to uphold the validity.”

On retrospectivity, the court distinguished Ebix Singapore v. CoC of Educomp Solutions , holding that the NCLT’s role is not confined to a ministerial checklist. It cited Essar Steel India Committee of Creditors v. Satish Kumar Gupta to show that the adjudicatory authority can send a plan back for limited modifications.

Key Observations from the Judgment

The court made several pivotal observations:

“The provisions of the IBC, particularly after the amendments that have been introduced from time to time, indicate that the legislature itself has indicated that the role of the Board, as a regulator, is broad-based, far-reaching and has a crucial bearing on achieving the object of enactment of IBC.”

“It is no longer necessary for the authority imposing a fee, particularly a regulatory fee, to strictly demonstrate the exact service rendered as quid pro quo for the fee charged from certain entities.”

“The Courts have been relying on the respondent Board as a statutory regulator for various aspects of CIRP… the respondent Board is justified in claiming that it provides a conducive ‘eco-system’ for efficient completion of CIRP, in order to meet the goals for which the IBC has been enacted.”

“If the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners with regard to the role of the NCLT as an adjudicatory authority under Section 31 of the IBC are to be accepted, it would reduce the NCLT to being a body merely performing ministerial acts.”

Conclusion and Implications

The court dismissed all four petitions, upholding Regulation 31A in its entirety. It held that the regulation is neither ultra vires the IBC nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The ruling provides clarity on the scope of the IBBI’s regulatory power and affirms that a regulatory fee need not be directly tied to a specific service. For the insolvency ecosystem, this means that resolution applicants and creditors must factor the 0.25% fee into their financial calculations from the outset. The decision also reinforces the NCLT’s adjudicatory flexibility, allowing it to ensure compliance with changing regulatory requirements even after CoC approval.

The judgment is likely to have far-reaching implications for ongoing and future resolution processes, cementing the IBBI’s role as a financially self-sufficient regulator capable of maintaining the IBC’s integrity.