The High Court at Calcutta has delivered a definitive ruling clarifying the evidentiary requirements for plaintiffs seeking specific performance of property agreements, underscoring that a Power of Attorney holder cannot act as a surrogate for a principal when testifying about matters of personal knowledge. In a judgment delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur and Justice Atarup Banerjee, the Court dismissed an appeal challenging a trial court decision that had rejected a suit for the specific performance of a contract, primarily due to the plaintiff’s failure to personally appear as a witness to establish his readiness and willingness to honor the agreement.

The case originated from an agreement dated March 17, 2004, involving the sale of a property situated in Ward No. 2, Bankura Municipality, for a consideration of ₹5,00,000. The plaintiff, Manoj Kumar Agarwala, initiated legal proceedings in 2007 after the original owner, Baibarta Debya, passed away and the defendants failed to vacate a shop located within the premises as allegedly agreed. Although the plaintiff argued that he had paid substantial sums toward the transaction, the trial court dismissed the suit in 2012. The lower court reasoned that because the plaintiff himself failed to enter the witness box to demonstrate his capacity and intent to perform the contract—choosing instead to rely on his brother acting as a Power of Attorney holder—the suit could not succeed.

Upon reviewing the appeal, the High Court emphasized that the evidentiary burden in a specific performance suit is rigorous and personal. Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a plaintiff is strictly required to both plead and prove that they have been and are currently ready and willing to perform their essential obligations under the contract. The Bench held that this burden cannot be outsourced to a representative who lacks the intimate knowledge of the principal’s financial capacity or the specific nature of their willingness to fulfill the bargain.

The Limits of Proxy Testimony

The Court’s decision centered on a critical interpretation of Order III, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. While these provisions permit a Power of Attorney holder to perform administrative or procedural acts on behalf of a principal, the High Court held that this authority does not extend to the courtroom as a substitute for the principal’s own voice on matters that only the principal can verify. Relying on established precedents, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani vs. IndusInd Bank Ltd. , the Bench clarified that while an agent can testify about acts they performed personally under the power of attorney, they cannot legally step into the shoes of the principal to testify about the principal’s own thoughts, intentions, or private financial status.

“Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance,” the Bench noted in its judgment. This continuous readiness must be maintained and demonstrated from the initial date of the contract execution all the way through to the final decree. By failing to personally testify, the plaintiff in this matter deprived the defendants of their fundamental right to cross-examine him regarding his financial readiness and his conduct throughout the transaction’s lifecycle.

The Court highlighted that "The authority to act on behalf of a party does not, by itself, entitle the attorney holder to substitute himself for the principal as a witness." The Bench further explained that the distinction between acting in a procedural sense and deposing as a witness is fundamental to the integrity of civil litigation. A Power of Attorney holder may provide evidence regarding actions they undertook specifically pursuant to their mandate; however, they cannot offer testimony on the principal’s personal motivations or the subjective elements of readiness and willingness that are central to a claim for specific performance .

Legal Standards for Contractual Fulfillment

The judgment underscores that specific performance is a discretionary, equitable relief that demands strict adherence to the standards set by the Specific Relief Act. The appellant had argued that his brother, serving as the Power of Attorney holder, was sufficiently acquainted with the facts to represent him, asserting that no adverse inference should be drawn against the appellant for his absence from the witness box. However, the High Court rejected this, maintaining that the law requires the plaintiff to establish their own commitment to the contract.

Financial capacity is a core component of "readiness," and the Court observed that a plaintiff is obligated to provide objective evidence regarding the availability of funds to satisfy the payment requirements of the agreement. When this testimony is provided by a third-party representative, it often lacks the requisite weight to meet the legal threshold for proving such a serious contractual commitment. In the present case, the evidence provided by the Power of Attorney holder was deemed insufficient to satisfy the evidentiary burden necessary to warrant the extraordinary relief of specific performance.

The Court’s analysis of the trial proceedings revealed that, beyond the failure to testify, the appellant had not adequately countered the documentary evidence presented by the defendants, which included an established probate of a Will concerning the property in question. The Bench found no legal infirmity or perversity in the trial court’s original reasoning, affirming that the plaintiff’s failure to appear made it impossible for the court to fully adjudicate his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.

Consequently, the High Court confirmed the dismissal of the suit, bringing a formal end to the protracted litigation. The Registry has been directed to return the records to the concerned Trial Court. The ruling serves as a stark reminder to litigants that in disputes of this nature, the personal presence of the party seeking relief is often indispensable, and the use of power of attorney substitutes for testimony is constrained by firm legal boundaries. As it stands, the decision solidifies the principle that personal participation remains a cornerstone of establishing the veracity and sincerity of a claim for specific performance in civil courts.