Calcutta High Court Upholds POCSO Conviction, Refuses Romeo-Juliet Clause Benefit to 24-Year-Old

The Calcutta High Court’s Circuit Bench at Port Blair has upheld the conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment of a 24-year-old man under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, emphasizing that the consent of a minor cannot be treated as a mitigating factor. The court also declined to apply the "Romeo-Juliet clause"—a principle recently discussed by the Supreme Court for adolescent relationships—finding that the victim had since married another man and had a child, making its application inappropriate.

A Love Affair That Crossed Legal Lines

The case stems from a relationship that began in 2022 when the victim, then aged 17 years and 10 months, met appellant Rupesh Beck at a relative’s wedding. Their acquaintance blossomed into friendship, attraction, and eventually a love affair. Without informing her family, the victim moved into a rented house with Beck in the Kadamtala area, where they lived together for several months.

The couple engaged in a physical relationship starting in December 2022, which continued uninterrupted. When the victim began experiencing health problems, she visited the Primary Health Centre in Kadamtala and discovered she was pregnant. The Medical Officer reported the matter to the police, leading to the registration of an FIR on May 22, 2023.

After investigation, Beck was tried and convicted by the Special POCSO Court in April 2024 for offences under Section 5(j)(ii) and 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Actaggravated penetrative sexual assault. He was sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

Arguments on Appeal: Consent and Contradictions

Before the High Court, Beck’s counsel argued that the victim had never independently lodged a complaint; the FIR was initiated by medical authorities. It was also contended that the victim’s statement was recorded without a female police officer present, that there were contradictions in her evidence, and that the FIR suffered from an unexplained delay. Crucially, the defence highlighted that the victim had consented to the relationship and now had no objection to Beck’s acquittal.

The prosecution, however, maintained that the victim’s testimony was clear and unequivocal: she admitted to cohabiting with Beck and engaging in sexual intercourse, which caused her pregnancy. The victim’s mother, who was also examined, corroborated the sequence of events. Both witnesses were not cross-examined by the defence, leading the court to deem their evidence admitted.

Statutory Presumption and the Irrelevance of Consent

The Division Bench, comprising Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj and Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra, applied the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act. This provision reverses the burden of proof, requiring the accused to demonstrate that he did not commit the offence. The court noted that Beck made no effort to rebut the evidence of the relationship or the sexual intercourse.

“Thus, the factum of the love affair, physical intimacy and sexual intercourse between the victim girl and appellant stands uncontroverted,” the judgment stated.

The court rejected the argument that consent could mitigate the offence, observing that treating a minor’s consent as a defence would defeat the very purpose of the POCSO Act. The Bench held:

“The consent of a minor cannot be treated as a mitigating factor.”

The Romeo-Juliet Clause: Not for This Case

The judgment devoted significant attention to the “Romeo-Juliet clause,” a concept suggested by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Another (2026) to protect adolescent love and intimacy from the rigid application of the POCSO Act. The High Court acknowledged that such a clause exists to prevent parents from misusing POCSO to deter inter-caste relationships.

However, the court distinguished the present case, noting that the victim—now a married woman with a child—had entered into a separate matrimonial relationship. Applying the Romeo-Juliet principle to discharge Beck, the court reasoned, would risk disturbing the victim’s peaceful family life.

“To apply the parameters of the ‘Romeo Juliet’ clause to this case would mean that the appellant is discharged of his crime not to start a life anew with the victim girl, but with a possibility of disturbing the peaceful life of the victim girl with her present husband and a child,” the Bench observed.

No Relief, Appeal Dismissed

The High Court found no perversity in the Special Court’s findings and dismissed the appeal in its entirety. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. The court also directed that copies of the judgment be forwarded to the trial court and the superintendent of the correctional home.

The decision reinforces the principle that under POCSO, the consent of a minor is no defence, and that statutory presumptions place a heavy burden on the accused to disprove allegations of sexual assault. While the Romeo-Juliet clause may offer protection in some adolescent relationships, its application remains fact-specific—and in this case, it did not provide a path to acquittal.