Appointing Authority Wears Two Hats: Calcutta HC Greenlights Dismissal with Higher Appeal Backup

In a significant ruling for government service discipline, the Calcutta High Court's Circuit Bench at Port Blair has overturned a Central Administrative Tribunal decision, affirming that an appointing authority like the Chief Secretary can impose major penalties such as dismissal—even if designated as the appellate authority—provided a superior forum like the Lieutenant Governor exists for further appeal. The Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Smita Das De delivered the verdict in WP.CT/18/2026 on April 28, 2026, involving the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Administration against employee Dharam Raj.

From Transfer Order to Tribunal Battle: The Road to Dismissal

Dharam Raj, a Lower Division Clerk appointed in 1990, faced disciplinary action after repeatedly defying transfer orders to the Office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF) in 2016. Charges included failing to report for duty post-transfer (Order No. 1515 dated May 4, 2016), seeking unauthorized leave without documents, submitting false duty reports, and ignoring a High Court order from January 13, 2017, to rejoin as LDC. Despite public notices and memos, he abstained.

Two charge memos were issued in 2016-2017 by the Secretary (Personnel). An inquiry found him guilty, leading to dismissal by Chief Secretary on May 16, 2018, upheld on appeal August 7, 2018. The Tribunal quashed this in OA 351/1053/2018 (February 18, 2026), citing lack of separate appellate forum. Prior proceedings, including a 2022 Tribunal quash (remanded by High Court in 2023), set the stage for this writ.

Key questions: Was the Chief Secretary the appointing authority under CCS(CCA) Rules? Could he impose punishment despite the 2009 Gazette naming Secretary (Personnel) as such and Chief Secretary as appellate? Did this deny natural justice?

Petitioners' Defense: Hierarchy Trumps Designation

The Administration, via senior counsel Shatadru Chakraborty, argued Chief Secretary was the true appointing authority per 1990 and 2004 orders explicitly naming him, trumping the 2009 notification under CCS(CCA) Rule 2(a)'s "highest authority" clause. Article 311(1) bars only subordinates from dismissal, not the appointing authority itself ( Parshotam Lal Dhingra ).

They stressed Rule 14 allows Disciplinary Authority (Chief Secretary) to delegate inquiry/charge issuance to subordinates like Secretary (Personnel), as affirmed in State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 676). Appeal lay to Lieutenant Governor, a fact Raj himself used. No res judicata, as prior Tribunal order was effectively set aside on remand. Punishment fit repeated insubordination.

Respondent's Pushback: No Appeal, No Justice

Dharam Raj's counsel P.C. Das countered: 2009 Gazette made Secretary (Personnel) the authority; Chief Secretary's overreach denied appeal forum, violating natural justice. Dismissal was disproportionate for "minor" absence. Res judicata applied as prior Tribunal quash (July 25, 2022) wasn't explicitly overturned by 2023 High Court remand. Appointment letter signed by Secretary (Personnel) sealed it.

Decoding Authority: Highest Rank Rules, Precedents Seal It

The Bench meticulously parsed CCS(CCA) Rule 2(a): Appointing authority is the highest among possible ones—Chief Secretary over Secretary (Personnel), per 1990 appointment order. Article 311(1) safeguards against subordinates but empowers the appointer ( Parshotam Lal Dhingra , AIR 1958 SC 36; State of Jharkhand ).

Inquiry delegation valid under Rule 14(2)/(4); no need for appointer to micromanage ( State of Jharkhand ). On appeals, the Court parted ways with stricter views ( Chandrasekharan v. State of Kerala , AIR 1964 Ker 87), stressing livelihood stakes demand effective forums—but Lieutenant Governor filled the gap ( Monmatha Nath Ghosh , 1957 SCC OnLine Cal 232). Raj's own appeal to Lt Governor undercut his denial claim.

Merits intact: Tribunal affirmed specific charges, no procedural lapse, evidence robust (inquiry report detailed defiance). No perversity; judicial review limited ( B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , (1995) 6 SCC 749). Res judicata dismissed as remand implicitly vacated prior order.

As noted in legal circles, this aligns with the High Court's stance that "an appointing authority is not precluded from imposing the penalty of dismissal merely because it also functions as the appellate authority, so long as a higher forum of appeal is available."

Court's Sharp Insights

"out of the different authorities mentioned [in Rule 2(a)], whichever authority is the highest would be considered to be the Appointing Authority."

" Article 311(1) ... does not debar the Appointing Authority himself from [imposing punishment]."

"the Lieutenant Governor ... is by default the Appellate Authority against orders passed by all subordinate officials."

"the respondent himself, after having preferred an appeal before the Lieutenant Governor ... takes the point before this Court that he was deprived of an appellate forum."

Verdict Restores Discipline, Sets Service Precedent

The writ was partly allowed, quashing the Tribunal's order and upholding dismissal. No costs. This reinforces administrative hierarchy in Union Territories, clarifying that rigid designations yield to constitutional/ rule-based "highest authority" tests. Future cases may see fewer challenges to appointer-led punishments where superior appeals exist, streamlining discipline while preserving checks.