Can Completed Trial Be Remanded Without Prejudice ? Supreme Court Rules in NI Act Case

The Supreme Court has firmly held that a completed trial under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be remanded to the trial court merely on the ground of a procedural lapse in the manner of recording defence evidence , especially when the accused has not pleaded or proved any prejudice . A bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran set aside a Kerala High Court order that had remanded the matter for a fresh trial from the stage of defence evidence , observing that the High Court had erroneously accepted a contention raised "by reason of the ingenuity of the lawyer" without any foundation of prejudice .

The Dispute and the Remand

The case arose from a complaint filed by Sanu Varghese (the appellant) against Shoukkathali (the respondent) under Section 138 of the NI Act for dishonour of a cheque for ₹30 lakhs. The accused claimed that he had given a signed blank cheque as security for a loan of ₹10 lakhs, and that the complainant was not even present in the city when the alleged loan of ₹20 lakhs was handed over and the cheque was issued. However, the accused produced no substantive evidence—such as Call Data Records of the complainant—to substantiate his claim of the complainant’s absence.

The trial proceeded, and the accused was examined as DW-1. After the trial was completed, the accused never raised any plea of prejudice before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court . Nevertheless, in revision, the Kerala High Court relied on the Supreme Court ’s decision in M/s Mandvi Cooperative Bank Limited v. Nimesh B. Thakore (2010) 3 SCC 83 and remanded the matter for a fresh trial from the stage of defence evidence , holding that the procedure under Section 145 of the NI Act had not been properly followed.

The Supreme Court ’s Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the scope of Mandvi Cooperative Bank , which interpreted Section 145 of the NI Act . That decision held that while the complainant’s evidence can be given on affidavit under sub-section (1), the accused cannot be permitted to give evidence on affidavit under sub-section (2) in the same manner. However, the Court stressed that this dictum must be applied with reference to the prejudice caused to the accused in a completed trial.

The bench noted that in the present case, the accused had admitted his signature on the cheque, and the statutory presumption under the NI Act had not been rebutted . The accused had ample opportunity to lead evidence, including by seeking to examine the complainant in person, but did not do so. No prejudice was alleged at any stage before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court . The High Court’s order, the Supreme Court observed, was based on a contention that was "merely by reason of the ingenuity of the lawyer."

Key Observations

The Court made pointed observations on the absence of prejudice :

"The accused never alleged a prejudice before the Trial Court or before the First Appellate Court . The signature was admitted and the presumption applies squarely which has not been rebutted ...Before the High Court, the accused has merely by reason of the ingenuity of the lawyer, taken a contention which was erroneously accepted by the learned Single Judge, according to us. The plea of prejudice looms large and is stark in the above case by its absence."

The bench further clarified that the principle from Mandvi Cooperative Bank must be applied in a criminal case "specifically with reference to the prejudice caused to the accused in a completed trial." Since no prejudice was demonstrated, there was no basis for remanding a completed trial merely for a procedural irregularity .

The Final Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Kerala High Court , and restored Criminal Revision Petition No. 715 of 2023 to the High Court’s file for consideration on its merits. The Court also directed that if the Trial Court had subsequently examined the accused in person, that evidence shall be eschewed, and only the evidence led at the initial trial shall be considered.

The ruling reaffirms that procedural technicalities cannot be used to reopen a concluded trial unless the accused can show actual prejudice . It underscores the importance of the statutory presumption under the NI Act and the heavy burden on the accused to rebut it with concrete evidence.