Can Procedural Errors Invalidate Pardon? Karnataka High Court Quashes Order in Darshan Case

In a significant ruling that underscores the importance of strict procedural compliance in criminal proceedings, the Karnataka High Court on Tuesday set aside a trial court’s order granting conditional pardon to accused-turned-approver Pradosh S. Rao in the high-profile Renukaswamy murder case. The case, which has drawn intense public attention due to the involvement of Kannada actor Darshan as accused No. 2, saw the High Court’s single-judge bench of Justice M Nagaprasanna hold that the procedure adopted by the LVIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Court suffered from “procedural aberrations.” The court remitted the matter back to the trial court for a fresh order, clarifying that no further hearing is required—only a fresh order in accordance with law.

Background of the Renukaswamy Murder Case

The Renukaswamy murder case, registered in Bengaluru, involves the alleged murder of one Renukaswamy, with Kannada film actor Darshan named as accused No. 2. Darshan has been in judicial custody since his arrest, and the case has progressed through various procedural stages. In August 2026, co-accused Pradosh S. Rao applied to the trial court for a conditional pardon under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), with an offer to become an approver and testify against the other accused. The trial court, presided over by Judge S.M. Sambrani, initially called for a report from the Probation Officer and later, on August 25, 2026, granted the pardon and declared Rao an approver.

The Procedural Challenge

Actor Darshan, through his legal team, challenged the trial court’s orders in two separate petitions before the Karnataka High Court. The first challenge was against the trial court’s refusal to allow Darshan to file objections to Rao’s application to turn approver. On August 13, the High Court dismissed that petition, holding that at the stage of considering an approver application, only the accused seeking pardon, the prosecution, and the court are concerned—the co-accused have no right to participate. However, the second petition—filed after the grant of pardon—raised more fundamental procedural concerns.

Darshan’s counsel argued that the trial court had committed errors in the manner in which it decided the pardon application. Specifically, the petitioner contended that the trial court had called for a report from the Probation Officer without following the prescribed procedure under Section 307 CrPC and had subsequently passed the order granting pardon without affording any opportunity to the co-accused to be heard, despite the fact that the co-accused had already been denied participation at the initial stage.

High Court’s Observations on Procedural Aberrations

Justice M Nagaprasanna, after hearing arguments from both sides, found merit in Darshan’s challenge. The court noted that the trial court’s actions were marked by “procedural aberrations” that vitiated the entire process. While the High Court did not go into the merits of whether the pardon itself was valid, it emphasized that the procedure adopted was flawed and required correction.

The court stated, “In light of the procedural aberrations, Criminal Petition is allowed in part. The orders dated 20 August 2026 and 25 August 2026 stand obliterated. The matter is remitted back to the concerned Court to pass an order afresh on the application filed under Section 307 of Cr.P.C and regulate its procedure… taking the issue to its logical conclusion. While so doing, the Court shall bear in mind the observations made in the course of this order.”

The High Court made it clear that the remand was not for a fresh hearing or de novo consideration. Instead, the trial court was directed to pass a fresh order on the existing application, taking into account the procedural deficiencies identified by the High Court. The bench orally clarified, “No further hearing, only passing an order afresh.”

Implications for Approver Proceedings

The ruling has significant implications for how trial courts handle pardon applications under Section 307 CrPC. The provision grants the court the discretion to pardon an accused who is willing to make a full and true disclosure of the circumstances of the offence, with the objective of securing the evidence of such person as a witness for the prosecution. However, the High Court’s decision underscores that the discretion must be exercised in a procedurally sound manner.

Legal experts note that while co-accused have no right to participate at the stage of considering the pardon application (as affirmed by the High Court’s earlier order), the court itself must follow the correct procedure. This includes properly calling for a report—if required—and ensuring that the application is decided after due application of mind. The High Court’s observation that the procedure suffered from “aberrations” suggests that the trial court may have acted hastily or without proper basis.

Timeline of Events Post-Pardon

After Rao was granted pardon on August 25, he immediately urged the trial court to record his statement, claiming that the co-accused were exerting pressure on him. The trial court on August 28 directed that Rao be examined as a prosecution witness on September 2. However, Darshan sought an adjournment, informing the court that he was filing an appeal against the pardon order. The trial court then directed issuance of witness summons to Rao and intimation to jail authorities and the Kamakshipalya Police Station to produce him physically.

On September 2, the recording of Rao’s evidence was deferred pending the High Court’s decision on Darshan’s challenge. With the High Court now quashing the pardon order, the entire process is reset. The trial court must pass a fresh order on the pardon application, and only after that can Rao’s examination proceed.

Impact on the Renukaswamy Trial

The murder trial, which had been moving forward with Rao as a key prosecution witness, now faces a setback. The remand order means that the trial court will have to independently reconsider whether to grant pardon to Rao. If the court passes a fresh order in accordance with law, it could again grant the pardon, potentially leading to the same outcome but with proper procedure. Alternatively, the court may decide differently based on the High Court’s observations.

For actor Darshan, the ruling is a tactical victory as it delays the recording of the approver’s evidence. However, the High Court’s earlier rejection of his right to participate in the pardon stage means that he may not have a direct say in the fresh proceedings. The trial court will now have to ensure that its order is procedurally sound to avoid further challenges.

Broader Legal Lessons on Procedural Compliance

This case serves as a cautionary tale for trial courts handling pardon applications. The Karnataka High Court’s insistence on procedural rectitude reinforces the principle that even when the substantive law allows discretion, the manner in which it is exercised must be beyond reproach. In the context of high-stakes criminal trials, any procedural slip can lead to delays and appeals, ultimately affecting the timely delivery of justice.

The judgment also highlights the delicate balance between the prosecution’s need for an approver’s testimony and the rights of co-accused. While the law clearly excludes co-accused from participation at the pardon stage, the court itself must act with caution and clarity. The High Court’s order to “regulate its procedure” suggests that the trial court may need to record reasons and follow the steps mandated by Section 307 CrPC more meticulously.

Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court’s decision to quash the pardon order for Pradosh S. Rao in the Renukaswamy murder case is a reminder that procedural integrity is non-negotiable in criminal law. By remitting the matter for a fresh order, the court has given the trial court an opportunity to correct its errors without derailing the prosecution entirely. For legal professionals, the case illustrates the critical importance of adhering to procedural norms, especially when dealing with provisions that involve significant discretion, such as the grant of pardon to approvers. As the matter returns to the trial court, all eyes will be on how the proceedings unfold and whether the approver’s evidence can eventually be recorded without further procedural hiccups.