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: Denying Married Daughters but Not Married Sons Violates
In a significant ruling reinforcing constitutional equality, the has held that denying to married daughters while granting it to married sons under the same scheme is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of of the . A Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal directed the to appoint two married daughters whose applications were rejected solely due to their marital status.
The Case: Two Women Denied Appointment After Marrying
The appellants, Sheena David and Ankita Mishra, are the elder married daughters of deceased employees of the bank. Their fathers—Noel Shailendra Kumar Johns, a Branch Manager, and Madan Kumar Panda, an Office Assistant—died in harness in and respectively. At the time of their deaths, the bank had no scheme; only was paid. In , the bank adopted a scheme, and through a retrospective circular in , extended its benefits to employees who died on or after .
When the daughters applied, their claims were rejected in on the ground that they were married and therefore not "dependent family members" under the scheme. The bank argued that a married daughter is presumed to be part of her husband's family and hence not dependent on the deceased employee.
The Bank's Discriminatory Practice Exposed
The Division Bench noted that the bank’s scheme defined "" to include a "wholly dependent son" and "wholly dependent daughter" without any distinction based on marital status. However, the bank had been granting compassionate appointments to married sons while denying the same to married daughters. When confronted, the bank’s explanation was that a married son ordinarily continues to maintain the family of the deceased, whereas a married daughter is presumed to become part of her matrimonial family.
The Court firmly rejected this reasoning, observing that such social assumptions cannot justify constitutional discrimination.
"Constitutional guarantees of equality under do not permit such stereotypical assumptions to become the basis of administrative decision-making. If marriage does not by itself disqualify a son from being treated as a , the same standard must necessarily apply while considering the case of a daughter."
No Presumption Against Married Daughters
The bank relied on the ’s decision in , which held that after marriage a daughter is presumed to be financially supported by her husband unless proven otherwise. The High Court distinguished the case, noting that it arose under the in the context of loss of dependency for compensation and cannot be mechanically transplanted into a scheme.
The Court clarified that the itself recognized the presumption as rebuttable. In the present case, the appellants had pleaded that they continued to support their widowed mothers and had filed affidavits from family members. The bank conducted no inquiry to ascertain actual dependency.
"Dependency is essentially a question of fact and cannot be concluded merely by drawing a presumption from the marital status of the appellants."
Delay Caused by Employer, Not Applicants
Another reason given by the trial court for dismissing the petitions was that the families had survived for years after the death, frustrating the purpose of . The Division Bench rejected this, pointing out that the delay was not due to the applicants' inaction but because no scheme existed until and the retrospective benefit was extended only in 2023. The bank could not use its own delay to deny relief.
Final Decision: Appointment Within 90 Days
The Court set aside the common judgment of the single judge and the rejection orders dated , , and . It directed the bank to issue orders of to both appellants on suitable posts commensurate with their educational qualifications, within 90 days from receipt of the order. The marital status of the daughters shall not be treated as a disqualification.
The ruling sends a strong message that gender-neutral application of welfare schemes is a constitutional imperative, and denying benefits based on patriarchal assumptions will not withstand judicial scrutiny.
