Quashes Police Constable's Dismissal, Acting as Violates
BILASPUR – In a significant ruling that reinforces the boundaries of , the has set aside the dismissal of a police constable, holding that when an abandons impartiality to act as the department’s , the entire disciplinary proceeding is .
Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal, presiding over a single bench, quashed the removal order of Surendra Singh Kachhawah, a constable in the , and directed his reinstatement with consequential benefits, excluding back wages.
The Case: A Second Marriage and a Dismissal
Kachhawah faced departmental proceedings on the charge that he married Sunita Singh during the lifetime of his first wife, Neelam Singh, without obtaining prior permission from the department, thereby violating . The disciplinary authority initially imposed a penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. However, on appeal, the enhanced the punishment to dismissal from service in January 2004.
Kachhawah challenged this enhancement in an earlier writ petition (WP No. 2075/2004), which the High Court allowed and directed a fresh hearing of the appeal. The appellate authority again dismissed the appeal in December 2018, prompting the present petition.
The Core Legal Issue: as Judge and
The central argument advanced by Kachhawah was that the had violated the by acting as the in the absence of a . He contended that the , applied to his case and that Rule 14(5)(c) of those rules, which allows for the appointment of a , was not followed. In the absence of such an officer, the himself cross-examined key witnesses—including Kachhawah and his second wife, Sunita Singh—by putting that effectively advanced the department’s case.
The State, represented by Panel Lawyer , argued that the petitioner had clearly violated conduct rules by entering into a second marriage without permission, and both wives had supported the department’s version. The dismissal, the State contended, was proportionate and warranted no interference under .
Court's Legal Analysis: The Fine Line Between Clarification and Prosecution
The court first examined whether the 1966 CCA Rules apply to subordinate police personnel. Relying on the decisions in and , it held that these rules apply to police constables by virtue of , operating alongside the Police Regulations.
Turning to the role of the , the court cited the landmark judgment of the in Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma (2018) 7 SCC 670, which endorsed the principles laid down by the MP High Court in Union of India v. Naseem Siddiqui (2004). The court observed that while non-appointment of a does not automatically vitiate an enquiry, the must remain an and cannot assume the role of a .
Justice Agrawal noted:
“The is required to maintain complete impartiality and cannot assume the role of the . While he may put questions to witnesses for clarification or to ascertain the truth, he cannot conduct the examination or in a manner that advances or establishes the Department's case, including by putting leading or suggestive questions to the witnesses.”
Applying this principle to the facts, the court found that the had indeed crossed the line. He had cross-examined material witnesses—Kachhawah (PW-7) and Sunita Singh (PW-8)—using aimed at eliciting evidence in support of the charges. This conduct went beyond mere clarification and amounted to assuming the , compromising the officer’s position as an and giving rise to a clear .
Key Observations from the Judgment
The court made several pointed observations that underscore the importance of in disciplinary proceedings:
“Where, in the absence of a , the assumes the role of the Department's by cross-examining material witnesses and putting leading or suggestive questions to elicit evidence in support of the charges, he ceases to remain an impartial adjudicator. Such conduct amounts to an impermissible assumption of the , resulting in and denial of a , and consequently vitiates the disciplinary proceedings.”
“The disciplinary proceedings are and the is in the position of an and is obliged to act fairly, impartially.”
The Final Decision
The court quashed the dismissal order dated , and the appellate order dated . It directed that Kachhawah be reinstated in service if he had not reached the age of superannuation, and that he be entitled to all consequential benefits except back wages. On the question of back wages, the court granted him liberty to make a representation before the competent authority within six weeks, which would be considered expeditiously in accordance with law.
However, the court left it open to the respondents to conduct the disciplinary enquiry afresh from the stage of evidence, in compliance with the and without repeating the same procedural infirmities.
The writ petition was allowed to the extent indicated, with no order as to costs.
Implications of the Ruling
This judgment serves as a strong reminder to departmental authorities that the must maintain strict impartiality and cannot become a , even when a is not appointed. The decision reinforces the sacrosanct principle that no person shall be a , and that the right to a extends to disciplinary proceedings as much as to judicial trials.