CJP Member Gaurav Bharti Moves to Quash FIR Over Dilapidated School Video
A member of the has approached the seeking to quash a First Information Report lodged against him for recording and circulating a video that exposed the dilapidated condition of a Government Primary School in Farrukhabad district. The petition, filed by Gaurav Bharti @ Gaurav Kumar, argues that the FIR—registered under Sections 352 and 353 of the and —discloses no and that its continuation amounts to an . The matter is likely to be heard by the court next week.
Background: A Video, a Complaint, and a Criminal Case
The controversy began on , when Bharti entered the premises of the , on a day the school was closed. He recorded a video showing what he described as a "disused/dilapidated" building, with water accumulated inside, leaving children with no place to sit and resulting in holidays being given to them. Bharti, who claims a substantial social-media presence of approximately 2.5 lakh Instagram followers and 1.5 lakh Facebook followers, uploaded the video on social media to highlight the condition of the public educational institution.
Three days later, on August 19, a teacher filed a complaint alleging that Bharti had visited the school with an unidentified person who was under the influence of liquor and who spoke "अनर्गल बातें" (useless talks) to the teachers. Based on this complaint, the police registered an FIR under Sections 352 (intentional insult with intent to provoke a ) and 353 (statements conducing to ) of the BNS, and Section 66 of the IT Act (computer-related offences). The petitioner now contends that the FIR does not contain the of any of these provisions and that his actions were protected under the right to guaranteed by .
Petitioner's Challenge: A Section-by-Section Analysis
The heart of the petition is a meticulous dissection of the three penal provisions invoked against Bharti. The petitioner argues that even if the allegations in the FIR are accepted at face value, they fail to make out the offences charged.
Challenge to Section 66 of the IT Act: The petitioner contends that the invocation of this provision is " misconceived." Section 66 deals with computer-related offences and applies only if the accused has committed any of the acts enumerated under Section 43 of the IT Act, such as unauthorized access, copying or extraction of computer data, introduction of a computer contaminant, damage to or disruption of a computer system, or deletion or alteration of computer information. The FIR, however, contains no allegation of any such act. Merely recording a physical school building with a mobile phone and circulating the resulting video on social media, the petition argues, does not by itself constitute a computer-related offence. The provision is targeted at hacking and data tampering, not at the ordinary act of shooting a video and sharing it.
Challenge to Section 353 BNS (Statements Conducing to ):
Section 353 criminalizes statements that are intended or likely to cause fear or alarm to members of the armed forces, or to incite one class or community against another, or to promote enmity between groups. The petitioner points out that the FIR does not allege that the video was intended or likely to achieve any of these consequences. The only alleged consequence, according to the FIR, is that the
"image of that school was damaged."
The petition argues that reputational injury to a school does not satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 353. The provision is designed to prevent
of a specific kind—such as incitement to violence or communal disharmony—not to protect the reputation of a government institution.
Challenge to Section 352 BNS (Intentional Insult with Intent to Provoke Breach of Peace): Section 352 applies when a person intentionally insults someone with the knowledge that such insult is likely to provoke that person to break the public peace or commit an offence. The FIR merely uses the vague expression "अनर्गल बातें" without reproducing the actual words spoken, without specifying to whom they were directed, and without establishing the requisite intention or knowledge. Moreover, the FIR does not attribute any assault, criminal force, threat, obstruction, or other act of violence to the petitioner. The petition argues that the bare allegation of intemperate talk, without more, does not constitute the offence.
Free Speech and Public Interest: The Constitutional Dimension
Beyond the technical challenge to the penal provisions, the petition frames the case as one of fundamental rights. The petitioner argues that recording and communicating observations about the condition of a Government Primary School is a matter of legitimate public concern. The right to under Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to communicate views and information on such matters, subject only to the reasonable restrictions permitted by law. Relying on judgments on free speech, the petition contends that continuing a prosecution where the of the alleged offences are absent would itself amount to an .
The petition underscores that the video was made and published "" to highlight the condition of a public educational institution and matters concerning the welfare and facilities of children. It argues that the criminal process cannot be used to stifle criticism of public institutions or to deter citizens from voicing grievances about facilities that affect the community, especially when the criticism is factual and non-inflammatory.
Why This Case Matters for Legal Practice
The petition raises a question that recurs across the country: when does filming and posting a video about a public grievance cross from protected criticism into a criminal offence? The petitioner's argument is not that the facts are disputed but that, even accepting them, the sections invoked do not fit—a classic ground for quashing under the High Court's . Courts exercise this power where a prosecution is a clear abuse of process because the ingredients of the alleged offences are simply not present.
The challenge to Section 66 of the IT Act is the sharpest of the three and reflects a common criticism: that computer-offence provisions are sometimes invoked against ordinary social-media posts to which they have no application. Since the section targets specific acts of hacking and data tampering, its inclusion in a case involving a simple video recording is hard to sustain if the FIR contains none of the ingredients the provision requires. The arguments on the two BNS provisions are of a piece: both offences turn on a specific intent and a specific likely consequence. A bare, non-specific FIR that neither reproduces the words complained of nor pleads the requisite intent is vulnerable to the charge that it discloses no offence at all.
What gives the case its wider resonance is the subject of the video—the state of a government school. Highlighting the condition of public institutions is close to the core of what free-speech protection exists to safeguard. Courts have repeatedly cautioned against the use of the criminal process to deter citizens from voicing grievances about public facilities. However, none of this is settled here. The State will have its opportunity to defend the FIR, the factual allegation about the intoxicated companion and his conduct is yet to be examined, and the High Court has not yet expressed any view.
Conclusion: A Test of Boundaries
The petition squarely places before the the question whether this FIR, on its own terms, discloses any offence, and whether a video about a crumbling school can be met with a criminal case. The petitioner seeks quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings, as well as protection during the pendency of the matter. The applies, and the matter awaits hearing. Legal practitioners will be watching closely—not only for the outcome but for the court's reasoning on the interplay between free speech, public interest, and the precise boundaries of the criminal provisions invoked.
Case Title:
FIR: Lodged under Sections 352 and 353 BNS and Section 66 of the IT Act, 2000
Status: Petition filed; likely to be heard next week. Allegations untested; no opinion expressed by the court.