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Commercial Courts Act Applies to Pre-2015 Suits Even If Renumbered Later:
A three-judge Bench of the has held that the governs commercial suits that were already pending when the Act came into force on — even if the suit was formally converted or renumbered as a only years later. The ruling means litigants in such cases cannot rely on the wider appeal rights that existed under the earlier regime.
The Bench — comprising Justice V. Kameswar Rao, Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha and Justice Amit Mahajan — was answering a reference caused by conflicting Division Bench decisions in and over whether Section 13 of the Act applies to pre-Act suits.
The Bank-Lending Dispute Behind the Reference
The reference arose from an appeal by against an order allowing to amend its plaint. Modi Rubber filed CS(OS) 2481/2014 in seeking recovery of approximately ₹33.13 crore with interest and damages from Yes Bank. The dispute stemmed from credit facilities that Yes Bank extended from — initially ₹100 crore, later increased to ₹130 crore — for a proposed joint venture between Modi Rubber's wholly owned subsidiary and . When acquired the subsidiary in , Yes Bank debited ₹7.16 crore towards facility structuring and advisory fees, which Modi Rubber challenged.
The suit was pending when the Commercial Courts Act came into force. In , Modi Rubber applied under to amend the plaint. The Single Judge allowed that application on . Yes Bank appealed under Section 10 of the Act, 1966. In , the Division Bench directed that the suit be renumbered as a and the appeal as FAO(OS)(COMM) 31/2020.
The Legal Crossroads: Does Section 13 Catch an Old Suit?
An order allowing a plaint amendment under Order VI Rule 17 is not among the orders specifically enumerated in . Since the permits appeals only from orders enumerated in , and , Yes Bank's appeal could survive only if the Commercial Courts Act did not govern the suit.
Yes Bank argued that the right of appeal had vested when the suit was instituted in 2014. Relying on and , it contended that a subsequent enactment cannot extinguish a unless it does so expressly or by .
Modi Rubber countered that mandates transfer of all pending commercial disputes of specified value to the Commercial Division. The failure of the Registry to renumber the suit promptly was only a and could not decide the applicable legal regime. The , , supported this view, pointing to as evidence that the Act was intended to override earlier appeal routes.
Majority: Nomenclature Is Ministerial, Legislative Intent Is Overriding
The majority rejected the argument that the Act's applicability depended on formal transfer. Section 15 uses the mandatory words "shall be transferred." The Court observed that if the operation of the Act were contingent on renumbering, two identical commercial suits pending on could be governed by different appeal regimes merely because one was renumbered later.
The majority also held that a right of appeal is statutory, not natural or inherent. Such a right can be taken away by a later statute where the intent is clear. Reading together, the Court found that intent plain.
Notably, the Bench turned
Videocon International
on its head. The
in that case had itself recognised that a
continues
"subject to an amendment expressly or impliedly providing to the contrary."
The Commercial Courts Act, the majority held, was exactly such an amendment.
Separate Opinion: A District Court Caveat
Justice Amit Mahajan agreed that Yes Bank's appeal was but adopted a narrower path. Drawing on the 's decision in , he reasoned that where the judge who passed the was also vested with commercial jurisdiction, the absence of formal renumbering is immaterial. That was the case before the High Court, so Section 13 applied.
But he added a caveat: where a continues before an ordinary Civil Judge without commercial jurisdiction, orders passed before the actual transfer would not automatically become subject to Section 13 merely because the suit is later transferred. Such a distinction could matter in district courts, where ordinary civil suits and commercial suits are handled by different Benches.
Key Observations
The majority set out its core holding in these words:
"Hence, it must be held that from
, in respect of a suit instituted prior to the operation of the Commercial Courts Act, the provisions of the Act, including Section 13, would apply, notwithstanding the date on which the suit was converted or re-numbered into a
."
It also observed:
"Any suit (or application) which entails a
as defined under
shall be regulated by the provisions of the Commercial Courts from the date of operation of the Act, irrespective of whether they have been formally transferred to the
by changing the nomenclature of such suit (or application) or its number."
And on the conflicting precedent:
"we are of the view that Brahmos Aerospace (supra) is not a good law, to the extent that it holds is not applicable to suits which were pending at the time of commencement of the Act and were re-numbered as commercial suits at a later date."
What Happens Next
The reference was answered in favour of the Samsung Leasing view. The appeal itself was not decided on merits; the Court directed that FAO(OS)(COMM) 31/2020 be listed before the appropriate Roster Bench on for further proceedings. The immediate effect is that an order permitting amendment of a plaint in a will not be open to a standalone appeal under , unless it falls within the narrow categories preserved by the Act.
