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Dayanidhi Maran Case: Sets Aside Madras HC Order on Telecom Secretary Witness
The on Friday set aside a order that directed the trial court to summon the Union Telecom Secretary as a in the criminal case against DMK MP and former Union Telecom Minister Dayanidhi Maran. The bench, however, permitted Maran to examine the Secretary as a if he so chooses, restoring the trial court’s earlier rejection of the plea.
The ruling, delivered by a bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli, stemmed from a filed by the challenging the High Court’s order. The High Court had allowed Maran’s application to summon the Telecom Secretary under , which corresponds to , to depose as a . The trial court, by its order dated , had rejected that prayer, holding that such a summoning was not warranted.
Background: The ‘Illegal’ Telephone Exchange Allegations
The case dates back to , when Maran served as the Union Minister for Communications and Information Technology in the UPA-1 government. The CBI alleges that Maran, in conspiracy with senior officials and individuals associated with , dishonestly procured and continued to use a vast array of telecom facilities at his residences in Chennai and New Delhi under the “Service Category.” These facilities allegedly included hundreds of telephone lines, ISDN connections, broadband and internet leased circuits, mobile connections, optical fibre connectivity, and video conferencing systems—all of which were purportedly used for the operational needs of .
The prosecution further claims that officials manipulated records by showing authorities as subscribers while installing connections at private premises, converted private connections into service-category connections, and failed to raise bills or maintain records of subsequently cancelled bills. The alleged conduct resulted in a wrongful loss estimated at about ₹1.78 crore to public sector telecom entities, including and , with corresponding wrongful gain to . The invokes offences under Sections 120B (), 409 (), 467 (), 471 (), and 477A () of the , along with Sections 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d), and 13(2) of the .
The High Court’s Reasoning and the Trial Court’s Rejection
The , in its March 25 order, held that the Telecom Secretary’s evidence was relevant to determining whether Maran, as the Minister heading the , was entitled to service-category telecom connections during the relevant period. The High Court noted that a prosecution witness, Rita Achary, had spoken about the general policy applicable to Union Ministers but had not specifically addressed the administrative privileges applicable to the Minister heading the concerned department. It concluded that the Telecom Secretary, as the senior-most executive authority in the , was best placed to clarify the applicable administrative framework.
The High Court also referred to statements recorded under and replies issued pursuant to them, which had been approved by the Telecom Secretary. It highlighted a communication dated , in which the Secretary had referred to the existence of an inordinately high number of telecom connections. The High Court held that Section 348 BNSS is not intended to allow either party to fill in its case, but that the provision enables the court to summon a person as a where that person’s evidence may have a bearing on the issues arising for determination and may be necessary to arrive at the truth.
The trial court, however, had taken a contrary view, finding no justification for summoning the Secretary as a . It appears to have considered that Maran could examine the Secretary as a if he so desired, and that summoning him as a would improperly assist the defence.
’s Decision: Restoring the Trial Court’s Order
The CBI approached the challenging the High Court’s order. When the matter was first heard on , the bench asked the CBI whether it would object to the Telecom Secretary being examined as a . Additional Solicitor General , appearing for the CBI, stated on instructions that the CBI would not object to such a course. However, Senior Advocate , representing Maran, objected to treating the Secretary as a , arguing that “He is a court’s witness, which would be appropriate, as the court can put to him what is the procedure and what is the norm and come to a determination. It would be very onerous on me.”
The was unpersuaded. On August 21, the bench pronounced: “Now that we are inclined to restore the order of the trial court, we permit the respondent to summon the Secretary Telecom as a as indicated in our August 10 order. We set aside the High Court’s order and restore the Trial Court’s order. We permit the respondent to have the option to summon the Secretary, Telecom, as a , if he so desires.”
The bench observed that there was no justification for interfering with the trial court’s considered decision to decline summoning the Secretary as a . By restoring the trial court order, the effectively upheld the principle that a should not be summoned merely to assist a party’s case, especially when the option of examining the witness as a remains available.
Legal Analysis: vs. Under BNSS
The distinction between a and a is significant under criminal procedure. Section 348 BNSS (corresponding to Section 311 CrPC) empowers the court to summon any person as a witness at any stage of the inquiry, trial, or other proceeding, if such evidence is essential to the . A is summoned by the court on its own motion, and the court retains control over the examination. The witness’s evidence is considered part of the court’s record, and both sides may cross-examine.
A , on the other hand, is called by the accused. The accused bears the responsibility of presenting that witness’s evidence and faces the risk of adverse inferences if the witness’s testimony is unfavourable. The burden of examination lies entirely on the defence.
In this case, Maran’s counsel argued that summoning the Telecom Secretary as a would allow the court to elicit impartial testimony about the administrative framework, without the defence having to bear the onus of establishing the Secretary’s credibility or dealing with potential hostility. The , however, sided with the trial court’s view that there was no exceptional reason to treat the Secretary as a . The bench noted that Maran could still call the Secretary as a and that the CBI had no objection to that course.
Implications for Criminal Trials
The ’s decision reinforces that the power to summon a under Section 348 BNSS is not to be used lightly. Courts must be satisfied that the witness’s evidence is “essential” to the , and not merely convenient for one party. The ruling also underscores that the accused’s desire to avoid the procedural burden of examining a witness does not, by itself, justify converting that witness into a .
For legal practitioners, the judgment clarifies that the distinction between court witnesses and defence witnesses is not merely procedural but substantive. Accused persons who believe a particular official’s testimony is critical should consider calling that person as a , especially if the prosecution does not object. The decision may have a chilling effect on applications to summon high-ranking government officials as court witnesses in criminal trials, particularly where the accused could have examined them independently.
The case also highlights the delicate balance between the court’s duty to and the . While Section 348 BNSS allows the court to step in when necessary, the has made it clear that the provision should not be used to relieve a party of its own evidentiary responsibilities.
Conclusion: Trial to Proceed
The ’s order clears the way for the trial to continue before the . The High Court had earlier directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings, noting that the allegations relate to and that the trial had already progressed substantially, with 98 witnesses examined and 418 exhibits marked. Maran’s option to summon the Telecom Secretary as a remains open, and the trial court will now have to determine the admissibility and relevance of that evidence.
The case continues to attract significant attention, given the political stature of the accused and the magnitude of the alleged fraud. For now, the has drawn a clear line: the power to summon a is not a tool to assist the defence, and the accused must take responsibility for presenting his own evidence.
