Decoding The Reach Of Additional Terms In Insolvency

The transition from a committee-approved resolution plan to its actual implementation is often described by insolvency professionals as an “untidy” affair. While the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, provides a granular framework for the committee approval stage, the period immediately following approval remains fraught with ambiguity. Central to this uncertainty is the Letter of Intent (LoI), an instrument that serves as a bridge for the commercial bargain yet lacks clear statutory definition, regulation, or a defined boundary for its contents.

The recent Supreme Court judgment in Sanjay Dave v. Andhra Bank Ltd. (2026 INSC 580) brought this tenuous position into sharp relief. By ruling that a Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) could not challenge LoI conditions they had already acquiesced to through their conduct, the Court resolved a specific dispute but left a foundational question unanswered: what defines an “additional term” under the proviso to Clause 1.9.4 of the Request for Resolution Plan (RFRP)? As the dust settles on Sanjay Dave , legal practitioners are left to grapple with the potential for future litigation when a truly novel, non-consensual condition is imposed by a Committee of Creditors (CoC) post-approval.

The LoI: An Instrument of Ambiguity

The LoI acts as the bridge between approval by the CoC and the formal implementation of the commercial bargain. However, it exists in a legal vacuum. The IBC does not explicitly regulate what the LoI may contain. Consequently, when disputes arise—as they frequently do—it is here that the intersection of contractual law and insolvency processes becomes most adversarial. The challenge in Sanjay Dave was framed as an attack on the validity of certain conditions, suggesting they went beyond what the resolution plan itself contemplated.

The Court's decision to uphold the LoI was not, however, a blank check for creditors, but rather a reflection of the applicant's own journey through the resolution process.

The Anatomy of the Sanjay Dave Ruling

The temptation to read Sanjay Dave as a seminal judgment on the "conditional nature" of the LoI must be avoided. The Supreme Court did not reach its conclusion by parsing the validity of specific stipulations in a vacuum. Instead, it examined the conduct of the appellant, which proved fatal to their case.

The record revealed a trajectory of knowledge, participation, and acquiescence. The appellant was not an outsider to the resolution process; they entered it with eyes wide open to existing controversies. By attending CoC meetings where these stipulations were actively debated and by actively participating in the discussions, the appellant became inextricably linked to the resulting conditions. Crucially, the Court held that the appellant could not "approbate and reprobate"—that is, they could not benefit from the approval of the plan while simultaneously seeking to void the very stipulations that informed that approval. Thus, the case was decided through the lens of conduct rather than purely through the lens of contractual interpretation.

The Forgotten Proviso

Hidden within the standard RFRP—often overlooked by practitioners—is a vital safeguard: the proviso to Clause 1.9.4. This clause, which governs the forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD), explicitly protects an SRA who refuses to accept “additional terms” imposed by the CoC beyond the resolution plan.

The existence of this wording is significant. It implies a formal recognition that the CoC does not have unilateral power to rewrite the commercial bargain once it has been settled. However, because the Court in Sanjay Dave rested its judgment on the applicant's prior acquiescence, it never had to parse the definition of an “additional term.” This leaves the profession wondering: where does the line lie between implementing an existing bargain and creating a new one?

Categorizing LoI Stipulations

To navigate this void, insolvency practitioners may categorize LoI stipulations into four distinct buckets to assess their enforceability:

  1. Express Obligations: Provisions explicitly contained within the approved resolution plan. These are beyond dispute.
  2. Accepted Deliberations: Conditions discussed or accepted during the CIRP, even if missing from the final text.
  3. Implementation Necessities: Administrative or mechanical clauses (e.g., timelines, documentation exchanges) necessary to give effect to the plan.
  4. Fresh Substantive Obligations: New liabilities or risk allocations introduced post-approval that have no root in the resolution plan or the prior dialogue.

The fourth category is where the "forgotten proviso" finds its purpose. If an obligation derives its existence solely from the LoI, it risks being characterized as an unauthorized "additional term." If the obligation can be traced back to the original bargain, the enforceability argument is strengthened.

Impact on Legal Practice

For legal professionals and Resolution Professionals (RPs), the lessons from Sanjay Dave are clear. A defensible position in insolvency law is built upon a meticulous record. The outcome of a future dispute will likely depend not on abstract legal arguments about "conditional LoIs," but on the documentation of the resolution process.

RPs should ensure that the minutes of CoC meetings go beyond summary reporting. They must record not just the fact that a matter was discussed, but whether the SRA accepted, objected to, or sought clarification on each point. Likewise, SRAs should be vigilant. An objection raised in hindsight is far less credible than one raised contemporaneously and maintained consistently throughout the process.

Conclusion: Awaiting the Next Chapter

Sanjay Dave closes one chapter on the conduct of parties in insolvency, but the fundamental question of the proviso remains. Sooner or later, the courts will be faced with a case where the disputed stipulation cannot be traced to the plan, the addenda, or the minutes of the CoC. In that instance, the court will be forced to determine the outer limit of the CoC’s authority post-approval.

Until that time, the forgotten proviso remains in the wings, a quiet but potent safeguard. When the right case arises, it will likely hinge on a simple, clarifying question: was this term always part of the bargain, or did it become part of the bargain only after the deal was already struck? The answer will dictate the future of resolution viability in India.