The Delhi High Court has established that a defendant in an infringement suit does not require permission from a trial court to initiate rectification proceedings against a registered trademark. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav ruled that the legislative intent behind Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, does not condition the filing of a rectification petition upon the leave of a civil court. This clarification comes as the court addressed a dispute between J.R. Rice India Pvt. Ltd. and Pawan Kumar Mittal, proprietor of Shree Salasar Dev Basmati House, concerning the use of terms associated with premium rice products.

The underlying conflict began on June 23, 2025, when J.R. Rice India Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit before the Commercial Court at Tis Hazari, Delhi, alleging that Mittal’s use of the marks “KESAR KHAZANA” and “KITCHEN KHAZANA” infringed upon its registered trademarks “KHAZANA” and “KESARIA.” The respondent claimed long-standing usage of its marks, dating back to 1995 and 2009 respectively. In his defense, Mittal contested the validity of these registrations, arguing that the terms were descriptive, laudatory, and common to the rice trade, effectively rendering them publici juris. He contended that other industry participants had used these expressions, sometimes even preceding the respondent’s own usage, and further alleged that the registrations were obtained without disclosing material facts regarding their lack of bona fide use.

Navigating the Statutory Hurdles

Following his response to the suit, Mittal filed an application under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking to stay the proceedings in the commercial court while he pursued formal rectification actions to challenge the validity of the respondent’s registrations. On October 6, 2026, the Commercial Court dismissed his request. According to the petitioner’s submission, the court reasoned that the challenges regarding the descriptive nature of the marks and their common usage should have been raised during the initial registration process, rather than as a defensive measure once an infringement lawsuit was initiated.

Dissatisfied with this order, Mittal approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. During the hearing, Justice Kaurav emphasized the distinction between the filing of a rectification petition and the subsequent request for a stay of a pending infringement suit. The court clarified that the statute does not contemplate a gatekeeping role for civil courts regarding the mere act of filing a rectification challenge.

As the court noted in its order: “The satisfaction of the court trying the suit as to the prima facie tenability of the plea of invalidity is, therefore, not a permission to file a rectification petition. It is the condition upon which the plea of invalidity can be pursued so as to eventually have a bearing on the pending civil suit, and upon which the suit is to be stayed.”

Defining the Scope of Judicial Discretion

The court’s reasoning leaned heavily on established precedents, including the Supreme Court’s interpretation in the matter of Patel Field Marshal Agencies and Anr. v. P.M. Diesels Ltd. and Ors. , which underscored that issues connected to the validity of trademark registrations must ultimately be determined by the statutory tribunal, not the civil court. The Delhi High Court further referenced the decision in Amrish Aggarwal Trading as M/s Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. , which confirmed that the obligation of a trial judge to examine the plea of invalidity on a prima facie basis persists even after the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board.

Justice Kaurav highlighted that the right to seek rectification is an independent statutory right provided under the law, and that Section 124 of the Act is intended to regulate the impact of such proceedings on ongoing litigation, rather than to serve as an authorization mechanism for parties to approach the registrar.

“Section 111 of the 1958 Act and the corresponding Section 124 of the 1999 Act nowhere contemplates grant of permission by the civil court to move the High Court or the IPAB, as may be, for rectification,” the court observed, reiterating that the judicial function at this stage is limited to determining whether an issue of invalidity should be framed to warrant a stay of the civil trial.

Resolution of Procedural Challenges

Since the petitioner had not yet formally instituted the rectification petitions at the time of the hearing, the court determined that the application essentially functioned as an unnecessary request for "leave" to move the authority. Consequently, the court found that the question of permission did not arise, as the rectification petitions could be initiated independently of the civil proceedings.

In light of these findings, counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the current petitions before the High Court, reserving the right to raise all issues at an appropriate stage during the ongoing litigation. The court granted this request, allowing the withdrawal while simultaneously clarifying that the dismissal of the earlier Section 124 application should not serve as an automatic bar against future efforts by the petitioner to secure a stay.

Should the petitioner file fresh applications for rectification or a new request to stay the suit, the Commercial Court is directed to evaluate those filings based on their own merits and in accordance with established legal principles. By maintaining neutrality, the High Court did not offer a final determination on the prima facie tenability of the invalidity plea, the actual validity of the respondent's registered trademarks, or the broader claims of infringement and passing off. The parties remain free to pursue their respective claims as the legal proceedings continue in the lower court, with the substantive issue of trademark validity effectively deferred to the appropriate statutory forum. The suit before the Commercial Court remains active, pending further developments as the parties navigate the procedural requirements clarified by the High Court.