Courthouse Doors Must Remain Open: Delhi High Court Strikes Down Administrative Bar on Filings

In a significant ruling concerning the intersection of administrative policy and judicial access, the Delhi High Court has clarified that the Registry of a court cannot unilaterally refuse to accept filings based on pecuniary jurisdiction thresholds. The judgment, delivered by Justices C. Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla, effectively sets aside an administrative order that had barred the acceptance of execution petitions for values of ₹2 crores or less.

The Backdrop: A Administrative Roadblock

The dispute originated from an administrative order issued on November 17, 2016, following the Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2015. The amendment had raised the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court’s Original Side from ₹20 lakhs to ₹2 crores.

Attempting to streamline the transition, the Registry began blocking new execution petitions involving sums under ₹2 crores, directing them instead to the District Courts, and even moving to transfer existing files. The Asian Patent Attorneys Association (Indian Group) challenged this move, arguing that the Registry lacked the authority to gatekeep the courthouse based on a pre-emptive interpretation of jurisdiction.

The Core Legal Debate

The petitioner contested the administrative bar, arguing that the Code of Civil Procedure ( CPC ) , specifically Section 37 and its Explanation, creates a concurrent scenario where the court that passed the decree does not automatically lose jurisdiction just because pecuniary limits have evolved.

The Respondent, however, maintained that the administrative order was a necessary mechanical step to align Registry functions with the new statutory framework inaugurated by the Amendment Act.

Reasoning: Access to Justice vs. Judicial Convenience

The Delhi High Court anchored its reasoning on a fundamental distinction: the difference between filing a proceeding and entertaining a proceeding.

Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works Ltd v. CST , the Bench noted that "entertaining" a case pertains to the time of hearing, not the moment of submission. The Court held that:

> "There is a fundamental difference between the filing of a proceeding and entertainment of a proceeding... The issue of whether to entertain the petition... vests with the Court which hears it on the judicial side."

The Court further relied on precedents such as Gulab Chand Sharma v. Smt. Saraswati Devi , clarifying that a court only "ceases to exist" for jurisdictional purposes if it is formally abolished, not merely when its pecuniary threshold is adjusted by statute.

Key Observations

The judgment provides a stern reminder of the judiciary's role as a public forum:

• "It was not open to this Court, even with the approval of Hon’ble the Chief Justice, to impose a threshold bar on parties filing execution petitions in the Registry."
• "No litigant can be prevented from filing a proceeding in the Registry of a Court. It is open to the Registry to raise an objection, if it is of the view that the proceeding is without jurisdiction."
• "If the Registry and the litigant are not able to arrive at a consensus regarding the maintainability of the proceeding, the Registry would have to place the matter before the Court to take a view."
• "There can never be any threshold bar to a party filing a matter before the Registry of a Court."

The Verdict and Its Impact

The High Court allowed the petition in part, striking down the specific directive that prevented the Registry from accepting execution petitions below the ₹2 crore threshold.

What this means for litigants: The Registry may still flag an objection to jurisdiction, but it no longer holds the power to reject a filing at the door. If a conflict arises between the Registry’s assessment and the petitioner’s claim, the matter must now be listed before a judge rather than being dismissed administratively. This ensures that the question of jurisdiction is decided by the court itself on the judicial side, upholding the constitutional requirement of unhindered access to justice.