Pass-overs Are Courtesies, Not Rights: Delhi High Court Upholds Closure of Cross-Examination in Long-Pending Suit

In a stern message to legal practitioners, the Delhi High Court has clarified that court-provided professional accommodations, such as pass-overs and adjournments, are not absolute rights but discretionary courtesies. The ruling comes in the case of M/S EC Constructions P Ltd vs. Neeraj Zutshi and Anr , where the court upheld trial court orders that closed the petitioner's right to cross-examine a defense witness after years of procedural delays.

The Backdrop of a Nineteen-Year Wait

The underlying dispute originated in 2006, placing it among the category of high-vintage litigation. During the trial, the petitioner sought multiple consecutive adjournments to cross-examine the first defense witness (DW1). After several chances were exhausted, the trial court eventually shuttered the petitioner's opportunity to further examine the witness on August 1, 2025, due to unpaid costs and repeated non-appearance of the main counsel. A subsequent application for recall was dismissed on August 11, 2025, leading the petitioner to approach the High Court.

The Petitioner’s Stand vs. Reality

Counsel for the petitioner argued that the trial court had denied a reasonable request for a "pass-over" until 2:30 PM, suggesting this violated the principles of a fair trial. However, upon reviewing the trial court's record, Justice Girish Kathpalia found these claims to be inconsistent with the official proceedings.

The Court noted that the request was not for a standard pass-over, but an adjournment, often characterized by inconsistent justifications—including shifting from a claim of primary counsel’s illness to a statement regarding family exigency. The High Court described such behavior as a "falsehood" that is "deprecated."

The "Diary Maintenance" Mandate

In his order, Justice Kathpalia addressed the broader issue of professional responsibility: > "Adjournments and pass over are courtesies extended by the court to accommodate the counsel. But that cannot be allowed to make the opposite side suffer. It is for the counsel to maintain their diary so that the other side may not suffer."

The High Court emphasized that the petitioner had been "deliberately protracting the suit proceedings." The Court further noted that even when adjournments were granted, the petitioner often failed to comply with cost orders, showing a general lack of seriousness in moving the 2006 suit toward finality.

Legal Analysis and Precedents

Drawing upon the principles established in Manohar Singh vs. D.S. Sharma (2010) , the High Court clarified that under Section 35B of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), trial courts hold the power to completely prohibit a party from further participating in proceedings if they defaults on costs or procedural timelines. The Court observed that the trial court, in this instance, had actually exercised significant leniency by allowing the evidence of subsequent witnesses (DW2 and DW3) to proceed, despite the petitioner’s failure to cross-examine the primary witness.

Final Verdict: Costs Imposed

Finding "no infirmity, much less perversity" in the trial court’s decision-making, Justice Kathpalia upheld both the orders of August 1st and 11th. The petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was ordered to pay costs of Rs. 10,000 to the respondents within two weeks.

Key Observations

• "Adjournments and pass over are courtesies extended by the court to accommodate the counsel. But that cannot be allowed to make the opposite side suffer."
• "It is for the counsel to maintain their diary so that the other side may not suffer."
• "The learned trial court on 01.08.2025 was fully justified in closing further cross examination of DW1."
• "I do not find any infirmity, much less perversity in the impugned orders, so both the impugned orders are upheld and the present petition is dismissed."

This decision reinforces the judiciary's increasing intolerance for "calculated dilatory tactics" in civil suits, sending a clear reminder to the bar that procedural delays will no longer be overlooked in the interest of balancing judicial speed with fairness.