Delhi High Court Denies Bail To Tasleem Ahmed Citing Delay In UAPA Trial Proceedings - 2025-09-02

Delhi High Court Denies Bail To Tasleem Ahmed Citing Delay In UAPA Trial Proceedings

In a significant ruling, the High Court of Delhi has dismissed the appeal filed by Tasleem Ahmed, who sought bail in connection with the 2020 Delhi riots case registered under FIR No. 59/2020. The Division Bench, led by Justice Subramonium Prasad and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, underscored that extended incarceration, while concerning, does not automatically override the statutory bars on bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) when the delay is, in part, attributable to the conduct of the accused.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from large-scale protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in North-East Delhi in February 2020. Tasleem Ahmed was arrested on June 24, 2020, and has been in judicial custody ever since. He faces charges under numerous sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Arms Act, and the UAPA. Following the dismissal of his third bail application by the Additional Sessions Judge-03 at Karkardooma Courts, Ahmed moved the High Court, primarily arguing that the lack of progress in trial and his five-year imprisonment entitled him to relief under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Contentions of the Parties

Counsel for the appellant, Mehmood Pracha, contended that the appellant had been assigned the role of a conspirator without specific material evidence. He argued that since the charges were not yet framed and the trial was not proceeding on a day-to-day basis, the appellant’s fundamental right to a speedy trial was being violated. Conversely, the Special Public Prosecutor for the state argued that the interim bail application was procedurally flawed for being filed directly in the High Court rather than the Special Court. Furthermore, the State maintained that the rigours of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA—which require the court to be satisfied that accusations are not prima facie true—cannot be bypassed solely due to trial delays.

Legal Analysis and Judicial Reasoning

The High Court emphasized that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA establishes a distinct, restrictive regime for bail compared to ordinary penal laws. Drawing upon Supreme Court precedents like Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali , the Bench clarified that the court must assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the accusations are prima facie true before considering bail.

Crucially, the Court observed that the records indicated reluctance by the accused to advance arguments on charges, with many adjournments being sought by co-accused. The Court noted that while speedy trial is a fundamental facet of liberty, systemic delays created by the accused cannot be used as a strategic tool to secure bail while simultaneously stalling proceedings.

Key Observations

• "The rigours of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail... But the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time."
• "Factors such as long incarceration or delay in trial cannot be taken as sole factors for the grant of bail without considering the gravity of the offence or the role played by the accused."
• "Undoubtedly, speedy trial is a concomitant and a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, to ask for bail after there has been a systematic delay in trial on the part of the accused, is not acceptable."
• "The Court must look at the contents of the document and take such document into account as it is."

Final Order and Implications

The High Court dismissed the appeal and the accompanying interim bail application, holding that the appellant failed to justify why he should be granted bail in light of the prima facie evidence against him. The ruling clarifies that constitutional courts will not allow the UAPA’s bail limitations to be circumvented by creating delays in the trial process. This decision reinforces the necessity for accused persons to proactively participate in trial proceedings if they intend to later argue that the judicial process has been unreasonably sluggish.