Delhi High Court dismisses petition, affirms strict 45-day limit for written statements under RDBA Act

A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has firmly refused to condone a delay in filing a written statement beyond the 45-day statutory cap under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDBA). The Court dismissed a writ petition filed by Nikhil Poddar challenging a Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) order that had rejected his belated written statement in recovery proceedings initiated by Punjab National Bank.

Background of the case

The dispute arose from recovery proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal where Punjab National Bank sought to recover dues from Nikhil Poddar. On 6 September 2019, the complete paper-book of the original application was served on Poddar’s counsel. Under Section 19(5)(i) of the RDBA Act, a written statement must be filed within 30 days from service of summons, with a further grace period of up to 15 days allowed only in exceptional circumstances recorded in writing. This meant the written statement was due by 21 September 2019 at the latest. However, Poddar filed his written statement on 26 November 2019 – over two months after the maximum permissible period.

The DRAT refused to take the written statement on record, prompting Poddar to approach the High Court.

Petitioner’s arguments

Counsel for Poddar contended that the delay in filing the written statement was attributable to the bank’s failure to provide the paper-book in a timely manner. He urged that the limitation period should be counted only from the date the complete paper-book was supplied to him.

Court’s reasoning and critical legal question

The core legal question before the Court was whether it possesses the power to condone any delay beyond the maximum period of 45 days prescribed under Section 19(5)(i) of the RDBA Act.

The Court examined the statutory framework, noting that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits the application of Sections 4 to 24 of that Act to special or local laws only to the extent they are not expressly excluded. Since the RDBA Act provides its own complete limitation regime, the Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act – which empowers courts to condone delay – cannot be invoked.

" The RDBA Act is a special code in itself which provides for separate hierarchy of Tribunals as well as separate period of limitation and, therefore, Section 29 of the Limitation Act is squarely applicable to the present case and provisions under Section 5 cannot be resorted to by the Court to condone the delay, " the Bench observed.

Precedents cited

The Court relied on a series of Supreme Court judgments interpreting analogous provisions:

  • J.J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) – Under the Consumer Protection Act, the legislative mandate of a maximum 45 days for filing a version must be strictly adhered to.
  • Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) – Under the Arbitration Act, the phrase “but not thereafter” amounts to an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2008) – Under the Central Excise Act, the appellate authority has no power to condone delay beyond the prescribed extended period.
  • Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited (2009) – The scheme of a special law may exclude Limitation Act provisions even without express reference.
  • Druggists Association v. Kalyan Chowdhury (2018) – Under the Companies Act, a further period for filing an appeal is peremptory and cannot be further extended.
  • New India Assurance Company Limited v. Hili Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited (2020) – Under the Consumer Protection Act, no discretion exists to extend the period for filing a response beyond 45 days.
  • Anita Garg v. State Bank of India (2021, Delhi HC) – The bar set by Parliament for condoning delay in filing written statements under the RDBA Act is higher than mere “sufficient cause.”

Court’s observations on the facts

The Bench rejected Poddar’s argument regarding the bank’s delay, finding that the entire paper-book had been received by his counsel on 6 September 2019. Therefore, the limitation clock began running from that date.

" The delay beyond the maximum period 45 days prescribed under Section 19(5)(i) of the RDBA Act cannot be condoned by any Court, " the judgment stated.

The Court also emphasised that the RDBA Act is designed for expeditious recovery of public money, and strict adherence to timelines is essential to prevent locking up of funds.

Decision and implications

The writ petition was dismissed along with all pending applications. The ruling reinforces the inflexible nature of the 45-day deadline for filing written statements before Debts Recovery Tribunals, leaving no room for condonation beyond that period, even in extraordinary circumstances.

It is noteworthy that the Punjab and Haryana High Court earlier this year in March 2026 took a different view on the same issue, creating a divergence in judicial opinion that may ultimately require resolution by the Supreme Court.