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Dismisses PIL Against Sonam Wangchuk’s Removal, Advises Recourse to BNSS Provisions
The on Wednesday dismissed a that sought to declare the removal of climate activist Sonam Wangchuk from Jantar Mantar illegal and demanded registration of an against the . A division bench of Chief Justice DK Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia refused to entertain the petition, observing that Wangchuk’s wife had already obtained relief through a separate legal proceeding and that the petitioner had under the newly enacted . The verdict underscores the judiciary’s insistence on before resorting to PILs in matters that primarily affect an identifiable aggrieved person.
The Protest and Forcible Removal
Sonam Wangchuk, an education reformist and Ramon Magsaysay awardee, was on an indefinite hunger strike at the iconic Jantar Mantar protest site in New Delhi, in solidarity with the Cockroach Janta Party and students agitating against an alleged NEET paper leak. On , the 21st day of his fast, personnel descended on the stage where Wangchuk was lying in a weakened state. According to the petitioner Shakeel Ahmed, the police acted “like goons,” without uniforms or visible identification, and beat those who tried to intervene before forcibly whisking Wangchuk away and admitting him to Safdarjung Hospital.
The incident sparked immediate legal action. Wangchuk’s wife, Dr. Gitanjali Angmo, rushed to the High Court seeking his transfer to a private hospital, Medanta in Gurugram. While a single judge initially declined to interfere with the ongoing treatment at the government hospital, a division bench overturned that order on , permitting the shift. This parallel proceeding would prove decisive in the subsequent PIL filed by Ahmed.
The PIL and Its Demands
The PIL, titled , made sweeping prayers. It sought a declaration that the removal of Wangchuk was illegal and violative of the fundamental . It demanded an against all police personnel involved in what it called “”—use of unlawful force, , , , and . Additionally, the plea asked for an headed by a retired High Court judge, preservation of all CCTV footage and body‑worn camera recordings, and an assurance that other protesters at Jantar Mantar would not be harassed or unlawfully detained.
Representing the petitioner, argued that the incident was not a private matter but a public issue affecting the right to dissent. He contended that the police had behaved as if they were taking away a terrorist or an anti‑national, and that the protest was a legitimate exercise of democratic speech. “We are demanding for good quality education,” the counsel submitted, emphasising the larger context of the demonstration.
Wife’s Parallel Legal Battle
The bench, however, immediately focused on the fact that Dr. Angmo had already approached the court regarding the same solitary incident. The judges noted that her writ petition and subsequent appeal had been disposed of to her satisfaction on , when the court ordered the transfer of Wangchuk to Medanta Hospital. “This very incident, his wife instituted a petition. Appeal also was filed. Matter was disposed of as per their satisfaction. If you are still aggrieved, approach authorities,” the bench orally remarked.
The court saw no reason to relitigate the events of July 18 through a fresh PIL when the person directly affected—Wangchuk himself—had not lodged any complaint and his wife’s legal avenues had already been exhausted. The bench also rejected the petitioner’s plea for a wider probe into the alleged police excesses against other protesters, holding that the PIL was “confined to a solitary incident” concerning Wangchuk.
Court’s Reasoning and Dismissal
Dismissing the PIL, the court directed the petitioner to adopt the procedures available under the BNSS. The central prayer for registration of an , the court observed, could be pursued by filing a complaint under , which provides for a by the police before converting a complaint into an . If the police refuse to act, the complainant can approach a magistrate under , just as was possible under the old Criminal Procedure Code. The bench stated: “Under new Code if you lodge a complaint, before it is converted into , some kind of inquiry is there by police. Section 173 of BNSS. … So far as other prayers for lodging and preservation of records, since sought to be lodged is in relation to reportedly solitary incident, it is always open to petitioner to take recourse to provisions of BNSS.”
The court also rejected the demand for an , noting unequivocally that “ will be constituted only after the registration of .” Without a criminal case on file, the extraordinary measure of a high‑powered investigation could not be ordered. The bench made it clear that it had not expressed any view on the merits, leaving the door open for the petitioner to pursue his remedies in the appropriate forum.
Opposing the PIL, was blunt. He argued that no cognizable offence was disclosed in the petition and that “if at all any cognizable offence is committed, he (petitioner) can move court under section 154(3).” Dubbing the PIL a “publicity seeking petition,” Dixit contended that neither Wangchuk nor any other protester had filed a complaint, rendering the demand for an untenable. The bench did not expressly endorse the charge of a publicity stunt, but its refusal to entertain the matter echoed the sentiment that the jurisdictional prerequisites for a PIL had not been met.
Legal Analysis: BNSS and
The judgment is one of the early pronouncements interpreting the BNSS, which replaced the . corresponds roughly to the old Section 154, requiring the police to conduct a in certain cases before registering an . The court’s reference to —which allows a complainant to approach a magistrate if the police refuse to record the first information—underscores that the legislature intended a complete code of remedies for an aggrieved person.
For legal professionals, the ruling reinforces the principle that a PIL cannot be used as a shortcut when statutory mechanisms exist. The court’s insistence that an can follow only after an is a reminder that the hierarchy of criminal investigation cannot be circumvented through . Furthermore, the bench’s reliance on the wife’s earlier petition as a bar to a fresh PIL on the same facts illustrates the doctrine of ’s persuasive influence, even in public interest cases. If the person directly aggrieved has already sought and obtained relief, third‑party litigants will struggle to reopen the matter under the guise of public interest.
The judgment also highlights a critical nuance: the is constitutionally protected, but its breach must be asserted through proper legal channels. The court did not pronounce on the legality of Wangchuk’s removal; it merely shut the door on a PIL that failed to exhaust . In doing so, it left protesters and activists with the message that while the courts are available, they must first follow the procedural ladder crafted by Parliament.
Implications for Public Interest Litigation
The dismissal is likely to resonate beyond this single protest. PILs have long been a double‑edged sword in Indian jurisprudence—a powerful tool for social justice, yet susceptible to abuse by those seeking publicity or vindication of personal grievances. The ’s handling of this case affirms a recurring judicial caution: PIL jurisdiction is not meant to bypass the ordinary legal process, especially when a private injury has already been addressed.
For activists and legal aid groups, the ruling may require a strategic shift. Before filing a PIL over alleged police excesses during protests, they must ensure that the individuals directly harmed have first approached the police or magistrate. The decision aligns with the ’s repeated advisories that writ courts should not convert themselves into investigating agencies. It also serves as a warning that the courts will scrutinise whether the petitioner has by establishing a genuine public interest that cannot be met through private litigation.
On the flip side, critics might argue that the court’s approach could discourage third‑party intervention in cases where victims are too intimidated to file complaints. However, the bench expressly stated that its order did not touch the merits, leaving the petitioner free to pursue any available legal remedy. The true import, then, is that the PIL was dismissed on procedural grounds—not because the allegations lacked substance, but because the forum and timing were incorrect.
Conclusion
The ’s refusal to entertain the PIL over Sonam Wangchuk’s removal from Jantar Mantar underscores the judiciary’s insistence on procedural discipline. While the activist’s hunger strike and the police action that followed raised serious questions about the right to protest, the court chose to channel the grievance through the established machinery of the BNSS rather than accede to the demand for an extraordinary and judicial declaration. For the legal community, the judgment is a crisp restatement of the limits of PIL jurisdiction and a clear directive to litigate through the statutory code before invoking . As Sonam Wangchuk recovers in a private hospital and the larger NEET protest simmers, the case stands as a procedural road map for future disputes at the intersection of civil liberties and criminal procedure.
