The has formally rejected a filed by M.M. Dhonchak, the former Presiding Officer of the in Chandigarh, effectively upholding the court’s previous decisions that ratified his suspension from service. The Division Bench, comprising Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Tejas Karia, concluded that the appellant failed to demonstrate any , characterizing the petition as an attempt to re-argue the case on its merits under the guise of a review.
The legal battle stems from a series of events beginning in , when M.M. Dhonchak was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the . His tenure was marked by significant friction with the local legal community. Members of the , leveled multiple complaints against the judge, citing alleged misconduct and the habit of granting inordinately long adjournments, which effectively paralyzed the tribunal’s functions. The situation deteriorated to the point where the Bar Association took the step of abstaining from work and filing a in the , claiming that the Presiding Officer was passing against legal practitioners without proper justification.
By , the internal conflict had reached a critical threshold. The acknowledged the strained relationship between the judge and the members of the Bar, eventually issuing a directive that restrained the Presiding Officer from passing further in pending matters. The matter subsequently traveled to the , which left the resolution of the administrative grievances in the hands of the Chairperson of the in Delhi. Following a preliminary investigation in , a was constituted, which ultimately recommended a formal inquiry to be conducted by the former Chief Justice of the , Virender Singh.
Administrative Consequences and Disciplinary Action
In light of these developments, the issued a suspension order on . This suspension was subsequently subjected to multiple extensions by the . The appellant challenged these administrative orders through a series of writ petitions before the , arguing that the procedural initiation of the inquiry was flawed and that the extension of his suspension was not legally tenable.
The legal saga took a decisive turn when the concluded, resulting in the issuance of a removal order on . This order brought an end to the appellant's service and significantly altered the landscape of the ongoing litigation. In the initial appeal regarding the suspension, the held that the challenges to the suspension and its subsequent extensions had become effectively upon the issuance of the final removal order. The court reasoned that the suspension was merely an interim measure designed to facilitate the unhindered conduct of the inquiry. Once the inquiry culminated in a final order, the suspension ceased to possess any independent legal life, shifting the focus of the judicial inquiry toward the legality of the removal itself.
The Limits of Judicial Review
In the recent , the appellant argued that the High Court had failed to consider material pleadings, particularly regarding his entitlement to an enhanced , which he claimed should have been increased from 50% to 75% after the initial 90-day period. He further contended that the court had ignored the potential impact of his removal on the legitimacy of the inquiry process and failed to properly evaluate the grounds challenging the initial , which he alleged were tainted by and dishonesty.
The Division Bench, in its
judgment, systematically addressed these contentions. Regarding the claim for enhanced subsistence, the court observed that the appellant had failed to formally seek this specific relief in his initial
. As the primary challenge to the extension orders was deemed
following the final removal, the secondary, incidental claim for allowance was dismissed alongside it. The Bench reiterated the fundamental scope of its jurisdiction, stating,
"An error apparent must be self-evident and discernible without elaborate reasoning. Review is not an
and cannot be invoked to reassess the merits or substitute one possible view for another."
Furthermore, the court clarified its stance on the earlier procedural requests made by the appellant, noting that an order recorded in November 2025—which the appellant believed strengthened his case—was merely a administrative record of his request for an early hearing. It did not, as the appellant contended, imply that his challenges to the suspension were to be treated as surviving the termination of his service. The judges emphasized that the merits of the allegations leading to his removal remain a subject for separate . Specifically, the court noted that the validity of the final removal order is currently being contested in before the .
Finality of Proceedings
The High Court observed that the appellant's attempt to revisit the findings of the lower court was impermissible. The court concluded,
"The Appellant has failed to establish any
or any other ground for review. The
merely seeks reconsideration of findings already rendered in the Judgment, which is impermissible."
By dismissing the , the has upheld its stance that administrative actions taken during the cannot be retrospectively challenged once the substantive final order—the removal from service—has been passed. The legal controversy surrounding the conduct of the former Presiding Officer now rests entirely with the , where the legality of the removal remains the central point of contention for the parties involved. For the time being, the administrative suspension of the officer is viewed as a closed chapter in the ongoing process, with the courts maintaining that no further intervention is warranted at this stage.
disciplinary proceedings - judicial review
