Delhi High Court Quashes Lockdown FIR Against Anupam Sahu, Cites Lack of Promulgation Proof - 2026-07-21

Delhi High Court Quashes Lockdown FIR Against Anupam Sahu, Cites Lack of Promulgation Proof

A Walk That Became a Six-Year Legal Ordeal

In a judgment that underscores the limits of prosecutorial overreach during public health emergencies, the Delhi High Court has quashed a COVID-19 lockdown FIR registered against Anupam Sahu, a Kishangarh resident arrested in March 2020 for stepping onto a public road. Justice Madhu Jain held that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational ingredients of Section 188 IPC — most critically, whether the lockdown order was duly promulgated and whether Sahu possessed knowledge of it.

The Incident That Triggered the FIR

On March 28, 2020, merely four days into India's unprecedented nationwide lockdown, police personnel at a picket in Kishangarh stopped Sahu and questioned why he was outside. He disclosed his identity and explained he had simply come out for a walk because he was unable to pass time at home. On that statement alone — with no further inquiry — the investigating officer registered an FIR under Section 188 IPC, arrested Sahu the same evening, and released him on police bail.

The chargesheet subsequently added Sections 269, 270, and 336 IPC, but rested entirely on the statements of three police officials. No public witness was examined, no medical examination was conducted, and crucially, the alleged lockdown order dated 24.03.2020 was never annexed to the chargesheet.

'Medical Follow-Up, Not an Idle Stroll'

Sahu's defence painted a different picture entirely. He was not out for recreation but was proceeding for a medical follow-up, having long suffered from severe back pain radiating to both lower limbs. A medical certificate dated 21.03.2020 from Dr. Prakash Kumar Mishra of Neuron Physiotherapy & Rehabilitation Centre corroborated his condition — and the State, upon the Court's directions, verified the certificate as genuine.

Critically, even under the MHA guidelines in force at the relevant time, movement for essential purposes including medical needs was never prohibited. The lockdown regime did not impose a blanket restriction on movement, and Sahu's explanation fell squarely within the exception.

The Hinge of the Offence: Knowledge

The Court meticulously dissected Section 188 IPC, identifying five essential ingredients: (i) an order promulgated by a lawfully empowered public servant; (ii) knowledge of that order; (iii) disobedience; (iv) obstruction, annoyance, or injury caused or risked; and (v) danger to human life, health, or safety. While the Explanation to the provision dispenses with intention to cause harm, it does not dispense with knowledge.

Drawing on Bhoop Singh Tyagi v. State (2002), the Court reiterated that the FIR must at least "furnish an inkling" that the accused had knowledge of the order and knowingly disobeyed it. Examining the record, the Court found nothing: neither the FIR, nor the chargesheet, nor the witness statements contained a single averment that the order was promulgated by proclamation, publication, or any other public mode, or that Sahu knew of it.

"Knowledge cannot be presumed in a vacuum, least of all on the fourth day of an unprecedented nationwide lockdown," the Court declared.

The consequence requirement also failed. Sahu was a solitary pedestrian; there was no allegation that his conduct caused or risked any obstruction, annoyance, or injury to anyone. "Mere presence on a public road, unaccompanied by any circumstance capable of attracting the consequences envisaged under Section 188 IPC, does not constitute an offence under the provision," the Court observed.

No Test, No Infection, No Offence

Turning to Sections 269 and 270 IPC, the Court noted that both provisions presuppose an infected person acting with some degree of knowledge. Sahu was never tested for COVID-19 — not at the picket, not at the police station, not at any point thereafter. The prosecution did not even allege that he was infected, suspected of being infected, or symptomatic. "In the absence of any material or allegation to establish that the petitioner was carrying an infectious disease, the very foundation for invoking Sections 269 and 270 IPC is absent," the judgment stated.

Section 336 IPC, which penalises rash or negligent acts endangering human life or personal safety, fared no better. The chargesheet failed to identify a single individual whose safety was allegedly endangered. The invocation, the Court held, was "wholly misconceived."

A Prosecution That Could Not Stand

The Court found the case fell squarely within State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal categories, where the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of any offence. "The continuation of such a prosecution, more than six years after the incident, would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court," Justice Jain concluded, exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

The Court quashed FIR No. 105/2020 dated 28.03.2020, registered at Police Station Kishangarh, along with all consequential proceedings before the trial court. The judgment declines to opine on the Section 195 CrPC bar, as the prosecution failed at the anterior stage itself — the establishment of the offence.

The case stands as a reminder that knowledge and promulgation remain the existential pillars of Section 188 IPC, particularly when ordinary citizens navigate extraordinary circumstances.