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Rejects Reddy Pharma Review in 'REDDY' Trademark Dispute With DRL
A Division Bench of the has firmly closed the door on 's attempt to revive its use of the “REDDY” trademark, dismissing a that challenged the May 2026 judgment upholding a against the company.
Justices C. Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla, in an order dated , held that the company's arguments failed to disclose any “ ” — the narrow ground required for a review under .
A Decade-Long Battle Over a Surname
The dispute traces back to , when (DRL) sued (RPL) over the latter's use of the expression “REDDY” in the pharmaceutical trade. DRL sought an injunction against , alongside reliefs for and . A learned Single Judge granted a in DRL's favour on , which RPL appealed.
While the appeal was pending, DRL also succeeded before the (IPAB), which on ordered the removal of RPL's registered “REDDY” mark from the Register of Trade Marks under . RPL challenged that order in a writ petition.
The Common Judgment Under Fire
The Division Bench heard both matters together and, on , delivered a common judgment dismissing RPL's writ petition — upholding the IPAB's removal order — and also dismissing the appeal, thereby affirming the . RPL then sought review, arguing that the judgment suffered from several "errors apparent."
RPL's Grounds for Review
Senior Counsel Mr. , appearing for RPL, raised three principal contentions:
- Reliance on the IPAB Order: RPL argued that the court erroneously treated the IPAB's order as evidence of DRL's in the passing-off action.
- and Prior Use: RPL contended that the finding of was based solely on an Agency Agreement between the parties, contrary to the 's ruling in Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana (2024). It also claimed that a invoice could not establish prior use since RPL had adopted the mark in .
- Reliance on Interim Orders and Erroneous Legal Basis: RPL argued the court cited an as the foundation for its final decision and wrongly invoked , which the IPAB had not considered.
Court's Response: No Grounds for Review
The Bench systematically dismantled each contention, emphasizing that the review petitioner was essentially seeking a rehearing of the case.
The IPAB Order Was a Separate Proceeding
The court clarified that it had not used the IPAB order as evidence of in the passing-off action. It explained that the writ petition challenging the IPAB's order was examined first on its own merits, and the appeal was then decided independently on . The reference to IPAB proceedings was merely contextual.
“The reference to the IPAB proceedings in the judgment, therefore, cannot be construed as treating the IPAB's order as the only evidence of in the action. The review petitioner may disagree with the manner in which the two proceedings have been dealt with, but such disagreement does not disclose an .”
Established Through a Mosaic of Evidence
The court rejected the claim that was founded solely on the Agency Agreement. It pointed to paragraphs 100–117 of the impugned judgment, which discussed the unequivocal admission of DRL's own witness (DW-1) acknowledging DRL's reputation, alongside newspaper publications, sales invoices, advertisement invoices, and a review of DRL's company in Business Line — all of which remained unchallenged in cross-examination.
“The Agency Agreement thereafter was considered not as the source of RPL's , but as a material corroborating the admission of DRL's own witness and demonstrating DRL's knowledge of RPL's area / line of business and market presence.”
The court also clarified that the invoice was not the sole basis for prior use; the finding emerged from a holistic assessment of the entire evidence.
Brihan Karan Distinguished, Not Disregarded
On the Brihan Karan precedent, the court noted that it had distinguished the case on facts. In Brihan Karan , the plaintiff relied on unproved CA-certified summaries, whereas in the present case, DRL placed primary, contemporaneous evidence of trade, sales, and advertising that remained unchallenged.
No Undue Reliance on
The final findings of the judgment did not rest on the dated . A reference to an , the court held, cannot be treated as an error apparent.
Sections 9 and 11 Properly Invoked
Regarding the invocation of Sections 9 and 11, the court explained that while the IPAB had not expressly referred to those sections, its findings on confusion, , , and absence of addressed the grounds contemplated under those provisions. Under Section 57, a mark may be removed if it was wrongly remaining on the Register, and the court held that the IPAB's fact-specific conclusions independently justified removal.
“The IPAB's findings regarding confusion, , and absence of independently justified removal of the mark from the Register.”
Final Decision
Finding no , the Division Bench dismissed the . The only relief granted was the correction of a in paragraph 201 of the original judgment, where a different writ petition number had been mistakenly typed. The court also directed that a separate application under , be listed before the appropriate bench.
The ruling reinforces the high threshold for obtaining a review and affirms the earlier judgment that RPL's adoption and use of the “REDDY” mark was “ ,” effectively ending this long-running trademark battle.
