The High Court of Delhi has ruled that the simultaneous recusal of all three members of an arbitral tribunal does not equate to the termination of the underlying arbitral proceedings . Delivering the verdict in a dispute between the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) and IRB Westcoast Tollway Limited , the court held that such a collective withdrawal merely results in the termination of the individual mandates of the arbitrators under Section 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , necessitating the appointment of substitute arbitrators rather than the conclusion of the entire reference.

The ruling, delivered by Justice Sachin Datta, clarifies a significant procedural ambiguity regarding the legal consequences of a full-bench recusal in high-stakes infrastructure disputes. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the Act is to facilitate the continuity of justice, ensuring that procedural hiccups, such as the withdrawal of arbitrators, do not derail the resolution of complex claims . By rejecting the argument that a mass recusal constitutes a termination of proceedings under Section 32, the court ensured that the parties remain bound by the existing arbitration agreement, maintaining the integrity of the claims process.

Clarifying the Scope of Arbitral Mandates

The dispute originated from a concession agreement dated March 25, 2013 , concerning the four-laning of the Goa-Karnataka border to the Kundapur section of National Highway 66. Over the years, the relationship between the NHAI and the concessionaire, IRB Westcoast Tollway Limited , deteriorated, leading to multiple sets of claims —most notably interim compensation claims for losses on account of site delays and bridge failures, totaling over ₹3,515 crore when consolidated. An arbitral tribunal was initially constituted in October 2024 to oversee these complex matters.

However, on July 16, 2025 , the proceedings reached an impasse when all three members of the tribunal recused themselves citing a disagreement regarding the quantum of their fees. The respondent, IRB Westcoast Tollway, subsequently argued that this mass recusal should be treated as a termination of the entire arbitration under Section 32(2)(c) of the Act . Relying on the recent Supreme Court judgment in Harshbir Singh Pannu & Anr. v. Jaswinder Singh , the respondents contended that the only remaining remedy was to seek a recall of the order before the erstwhile tribunal, effectively stalling any fresh appointment.

Justice Datta flatly rejected this characterization, distinguishing the current situation from the precedent cited by the respondents. The court noted that in the Harshbir Singh Pannu case, there was an express order of termination issued by the arbitrator following non-payment of fees. In contrast, the order of July 16, 2025 , was a simple recusal . The court observed, "The two events i.e. withdrawal from office and consequent substitution, and termination, are quite distinct." By distinguishing between the termination of a mandate and the termination of a reference, the High Court clarified that while an arbitrator’s mandate ends upon withdrawal, the legal reference remains alive and active.

Procedural History and Continued Recourse

The court’s reasoning was further bolstered by the conduct of the parties themselves, who had previously proceeded on the understanding that the arbitration remained active. Following the initial recusal , both NHAI and the IRB entities had independently nominated replacement arbitrators, and the respondents had even approached the High Court in a previous petition to seek the appointment of a presiding arbitrator . Justice Datta pointedly observed that a party cannot selectively invoke the court’s jurisdiction for one purpose while later challenging the existence of the very reference they sought to invigorate.

Addressing the legislative framework, the court clarified that Section 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is a self-sufficient provision for the substitution of arbitrators. When an arbitrator withdraws from office, the statute mandates that a substitute must be appointed using the same procedure applied during the initial constitution of the tribunal. There is no requirement under the Act for a "recall" of a withdrawal, nor does the law empower a court to compel an arbitrator to resume an office they have voluntarily relinquished.

"Nothing in the A&C Act suggests that three withdrawals occurring simultaneously undergo a transmutation into a deemed order under Section 32(2)(c) of the A&C Act," the court remarked. This observation reinforced the holding that the plurality of withdrawals does not alter the nature of the event; it merely scales the requirement for substitution.

Final Order and Future Proceedings

In light of these findings, the court proceeded to appoint former Supreme Court judge, Justice Rajesh Bindal, as the new Presiding Arbitrator . He will serve alongside the party-nominated arbitrators, Justice (Retd.) Sakha Ram Singh and Justice (Retd.) Virendrasingh Gyansingh Bisht, to adjudicate the disputes arising from the 2013 concession agreement .

The court mandated that the arbitration proceedings shall resume from the stage they occupied on July 16, 2025 , leaving it to the discretion of the new tribunal to determine if any previously held hearings need to be repeated. Furthermore, the court clarified that its current order, insofar as the inclusion of the promoters— IRB Infrastructure Trust and IRB Infrastructure Developers —is concerned, remains subject to the final outcome of a pending appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act .

This decision marks a definitive resolution for the parties involved, clearing the legal path for the tribunal to begin addressing the multibillion-rupee claims . The registry has been directed to communicate the appointment to Justice Bindal immediately, subject to his formal declaration under Section 12 of the Act , ensuring that the adjudication process regains momentum without further procedural delay. All claims , counterclaims , and defenses remain open for the newly constituted tribunal to decide in accordance with the law.