Delhi High Court Rules DNA Evidence Proves Intercourse, Not Lack of Consent in Rape Case

The Delhi High Court has delivered a significant ruling on the limits of scientific evidence in sexual offence cases, holding that a DNA report—while conclusive on paternity and the fact of intercourse—cannot by itself establish whether the relationship was consensual. Justice Madhu Jain dismissed an appeal filed by a woman against the acquittal of a man charged with repeatedly raping her, administering an intoxicant, and committing unnatural sexual acts.

The judgment underscores that the gravity of an accusation cannot replace the standard of proof required in a criminal trial, and that the sole testimony of a prosecutrix, though valuable, must still inspire confidence and withstand judicial scrutiny.

The Allegations and the Trial

The case arose from an FIR registered in March 2021 at Dwarka North police station. The prosecutrix, a married woman whose husband had suffered a 75% disability following a fall, alleged that the accused—known to her family—had been forcing physical relations on her since 2017 through threats and inducements. She claimed that on one occasion he mixed an intoxicant in her milk, after which she became drowsy and was sexually assaulted. The prosecutrix became pregnant and gave birth in June 2019. A DNA test conducted during investigation confirmed the accused as the biological father.

During trial, the accused admitted to having sexual relations but asserted they were consensual and that the husband was aware. The trial court acquitted him in October 2024, citing material inconsistencies in the prosecutrix’s testimony, delay in reporting, and lack of corroboration for allegations of threats and nude photographs. The prosecutrix then appealed to the High Court.

Arguments on Appeal

The appellant’s counsel argued that the trial court had erred by disregarding the DNA report, which was the most clinching form of scientific evidence. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court rulings holding that the sole testimony of a prosecutrix, if credible, is sufficient for conviction. It was further contended that the accused’s plea of consent was inherently improbable—no prudent husband would consent to such conduct—and that the trial court had given undue weight to minor contradictions.

The State supported the trial court’s findings, submitting that the judgment did not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference.

The Court’s Analysis: DNA and the Limits of Science

Justice Jain began by reiterating the settled principles governing appeals against acquittal. An appellate court can interfere only if the trial court’s view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or based on a misreading of material evidence. If two reasonable conclusions are possible, the acquittal must stand.

On the DNA evidence, the court made a critical distinction:

“The said evidence is undoubtedly significant as it establishes the fact of sexual intercourse between the parties. However, the DNA report by itself does not establish the circumstances in which such intercourse took place, nor does it determine whether the relationship was consensual or non-consensual.”

The court noted that while Section 114A of the Evidence Act raises a presumption of absence of consent when intercourse is proved and the woman states she did not consent, this presumption does not render her testimony immune from scrutiny. The trial court had examined the prosecutrix’s evidence in light of her earlier statements and found material inconsistencies.

Inconsistencies That Proved Fatal

The High Court catalogued several discrepancies that the trial court had rightly identified:

  • The intoxicant incident: In her complaint, the prosecutrix said the accused mixed something in milk consumed by both her and her husband. In her deposition, she introduced a new detail about leaving the kitchen and returning to find the accused coming out. Her state of consciousness also varied—in the complaint she said she could see but not move, while in court she initially claimed to remember nothing until the next day, later agreeing she was conscious but paralysed.

  • Pregnancy and disclosure: The prosecutrix’s account of when her husband doubted paternity shifted between her Section 164 statement and her deposition. Her husband (PW-2) did not support her version that he had quarrelled or questioned paternity before the child’s birth.

  • The police call: The prosecutrix and her husband gave conflicting accounts of how a 100-number call was made after the husband allegedly saw her with the accused.

  • Nude photographs and videos: The prosecutrix alleged the accused took and threatened to circulate intimate images, but no such material was recovered from forensic examination of his mobile phone, and she could not confirm their existence during cross-examination.

The court observed that these were not peripheral matters but went to the core of the prosecution’s narrative.

Stereotypes and the Burden of Proof

Justice Jain cautioned against judging a prosecutrix’s conduct through stereotypical notions of how a victim ought to behave. At the same time, she clarified that conduct and surrounding circumstances remain relevant when assessing competing versions.

The court also rejected the argument that the prosecutrix had no motive to falsely implicate the accused due to social stigma:

“Such an argument, however, cannot substitute proof. The Court is required to decide the criminal charge on the evidence led before it and not on an assumption regarding the reasons which may or may not motivate a person to lodge a complaint.”

The Verdict: Acquittal Upheld

Finding no perversity or illegality in the trial court’s judgment, the High Court dismissed the appeal. The court held that the trial court had examined the evidence cumulatively and arrived at a reasonably possible conclusion. The strengthened presumption of innocence that attaches after an acquittal operated in the accused’s favour.

The decision serves as a reminder that while DNA evidence is a powerful tool, it does not answer every question in a sexual offence trial—particularly the crucial question of consent. As the court put it, “the gravity of the accusation cannot substitute the standard of proof required in a criminal trial.”