Delhi High Court Upholds Summoning of Meenal Agarwal and Another for Supreme Court Assault Video

Justice Madhu Jain dismisses petition seeking to quash summoning order, finding no illegality in trial court's decision to proceed against the accused for assault and circulating video on Instagram.

The Delhi High Court has dismissed a petition filed by Meenal Agarwal and another accused seeking quashing of a summoning order in a case alleging they assaulted and abused a man within the Supreme Court premises and subsequently circulated a video of the incident on Instagram.

Justice Madhu Jain, presiding over the single-judge bench, ruled that the petitioners' contentions did not warrant interference under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, as the trial court had duly considered the material before passing the summoning order.

Background of the Case

According to the complaint filed by the respondent, on January 30, 2026, the petitioners allegedly assaulted and abused him inside the Supreme Court premises. The complainant further alleged that the petitioners then circulated a video of the incident on Instagram.

Following the complaint, an NCR (Non-Cognizable Report) was registered at Police Station Tilak Marg. Subsequently, the learned Additional Sessions Judge-05, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, took cognizance of offences under Sections 115(2), 131, 133, 351(2), 352 and 356 read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, as well as Sections 66C, 66D and 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Notably, the trial court declined to proceed under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, indicating a considered assessment of the material.

The petitioners had previously challenged the same summoning order in W.P.(CRL) 2454/2026, which was withdrawn with liberty to file afresh, leading to the present petition.

Arguments Presented

Petitioners' Submission:
Counsel for the petitioners argued that the incident arose from a long-standing personal dispute between petitioner No. 1 and the complainant. It was submitted that the petitioners approached the complainant after he allegedly contacted the school-going son of petitioner No. 1 and made certain statements concerning his mother. The petitioners contended there was insufficient material to summon them, emphasising that the alleged Instagram account had not been directly linked to petitioner No. 1, and the impugned order itself left the question of its authorship open for trial. They also pointed to a separate complaint filed by petitioner No. 1 against the complainant, in which a closure report was filed.

Respondent's Opposition:
Counsel for respondent No. 2 argued that the impugned order was amenable to revision, and the petitioners ought to have availed the statutory remedy instead of directly invoking the writ jurisdiction. The respondent maintained that the trial court had correctly taken cognizance based on the material available.

Court's Legal Analysis

Justice Madhu Jain observed that at the stage of summoning, the court is not required to determine whether the allegations would ultimately result in conviction. The limited question is whether the material discloses sufficient ground to proceed against the accused.

The court noted that the learned ASJ had considered both the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence before passing the order. The fact that the trial court declined to proceed under the SC/ST Act while taking cognizance under the BNS and IT Act demonstrated that the material was independently assessed and not mechanically accepted.

Rejecting the petitioners' reliance on the previous dispute, the court held that the existence of past disagreements cannot, by itself, be a ground to quash proceedings. Similarly, the closure report in the petitioner's separate complaint pertained to a different matter and could not be treated as determinative of the current allegations.

Addressing the Instagram account issue, the court noted that the impugned order had left the question of authorship and attribution open for determination in accordance with law. The court stated that whether the electronic material can ultimately be attributed to petitioner No. 1 and its evidentiary value are matters that cannot be conclusively adjudicated through a detailed appreciation of evidence at this stage.

Key Observations

The court made the following pivotal observations:

"Such an exercise is neither warranted nor permissible while examining a summoning order in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction ."

"Whether the electronic material can ultimately be attributed to petitioner No. 1 and the evidentiary value thereof are matters which cannot be conclusively adjudicated by undertaking a detailed appreciation of the evidence in proceedings under the currently invoked jurisdiction."

"The existence of previous disputes between the parties, by itself, cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings."

Court's Decision

The High Court dismissed the petition, finding no manifest illegality, perversity, or abuse of process warranting interference with the impugned order. The court clarified that nothing in the order shall be construed as an expression on the merits of the case.

The trial court will now proceed with the case, with the summoning order remaining effective. The decision reinforces that under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court will not re-appreciate evidence at the summoning stage unless there is a clear error of law or abuse of process.