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DNA Report Not Mandatory for Rape Conviction If Evidence Is Clinching: Madhya Pradesh High Court
In a significant ruling that clarifies the evidentiary requirements in sexual offence trials, the has held that the absence of a DNA report does not automatically entitle a rape accused to acquittal, provided the remaining evidence is clinching and establishes guilt . The division bench of Justice G.S. Ahluwalia and Justice Anuradha Shukla , while partly allowing a criminal appeal, upheld the conviction of appellant Mukesh Jatav for the brutal kidnapping and rape of a two-year-old girl, modifying only the sentence from life imprisonment till natural death to a fixed term of 20 years of actual rigorous imprisonment with no remission.
A Night of Horror: The Kidnapping of a Toddler
The case dates back to , when the victim—barely two years old—was standing with her father outside their home. A motorcycle bearing registration number MP 07/MU 3300 was parked nearby with the key still in the ignition. The appellant, an acquaintance of the victim's father, arrived at the scene and, under the pretence of playing with the child, suddenly grabbed her, mounted the parked motorcycle, and sped away towards Gwalior.
Despite an immediate chase by the father and a neighbour named Indresh Batham, the appellant managed to elude capture. A frantic search yielded no results, and by 8 PM that same evening, the distraught father lodged an FIR at , leading to the registration of Crime No. 164/2014.
The child was recovered nearly nineteen hours later—at 1 PM on —from roadside bushes along A.B. Road near Nayagaon village, at a location far from her home. The recovery was made based on information provided by the appellant following his interrogation. Medical examination conducted by Dr. Achla Sahaya revealed that the toddler had been brutally raped and bore multiple bruises across her body. She had been abandoned in a ravaged state, left to die among the bushes through the night.
The Prosecution Edifice: Witnesses, Recovery, and Medical Proof
The trial before the , in Sessions Trial No. 530/2014, saw the prosecution build its case on a formidable foundation of evidence. The victim's father (PW-1) testified to witnessing the kidnapping firsthand. The mother (PW-2) corroborated the narrative conveyed to her by her husband. Crucially, two independent witnesses—Pradeep (PW-3) and Indresh Batham (PW-6)—confirmed seeing the appellant flee with the child on the motorcycle.
The medical report (Ex. P/12), proved by Dr. Achla Sahaya (PW-8), stood largely unchallenged by the defence and conclusively established that the two-year-old had been subjected to both physical violence and sexual assault. The recovery memo (Ex. P/10) documented the grim discovery of the child from the roadside bushes, and Investigating Officer Hemlata Agrawal (PW/10) testified regarding the recoveries made at the appellant's instance, including the victim's undergarment.
The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 366 (kidnapping), 376(2)(i) and (m) (), and 307 () of the , sentencing him to life imprisonment for the rape offence along with rigorous imprisonment and fines under the other heads.
The Defense's Twin Gambit: Enmity and Missing DNA
Before the High Court, , appearing for the appellant, mounted a two-pronged challenge. First, he contended that the entire case was a product of false implication stemming from a financial dispute between the appellant and the victim's father. Second—and more prominently—he argued that the prosecution had failed to conduct a DNA examination to conclusively link the appellant to the sexual assault, and had also inexplicably failed to examine the child victim as a witness for the purpose of identifying her predator.
The appellant claimed he had already served over twelve years in custody for a crime he did not commit, asserting that he himself had been injured in a road accident and was arrested on false grounds from his home.
, appearing for the State, countered by pointing to the named FIR lodged within two hours of the incident, the consistent testimony of multiple eyewitnesses, the unchallenged medical evidence, and the complete failure of the defence to adduce any proof of the alleged enmity.
The Court's Razor-Sharp Reasoning
Writing for the bench, Justice Anuradha Shukla dismantled the appellant's arguments with methodical precision.
On the question of enmity, the court noted that the appellant never disclosed the nature or quantum of the alleged financial dispute, never examined any defence witness, and crucially, never stepped into the witness box himself to state these facts on oath.
"Thus enmity was only of a colour of hypothesis in this case and was never established as a fact,"
the judgment observed. More damagingly, the independent witnesses Pradeep and Indresh—against whom no enmity was even alleged—had corroborated the prosecution's version of the kidnapping without any material contradiction.
Regarding the non-examination of the child victim, the court invoked , which mandates that a child shall not be exposed to the accused at the time of testifying, and permits recording of evidence through video conferencing, single visibility mirrors, or curtains. Relying on the 's decision in
Sakshi v. Union of India
(2004) 5 SCC 518, the bench underscored that
by a child victim of such tender years—barely two years old, with
"only limited words in her vocabulary"
—was neither legally required nor practically feasible.
Why DNA Isn't Always Necessary
On the most significant legal question—whether the absence of a DNA report was fatal to the prosecution—the High Court delivered a pronouncement of considerable precedential value:
"Although it is argued that the DNA report has not been proved by prosecution, but no settled law could be cited to show that in every case of rape, the DNA report should compulsorily be proved. In a case, where facts of crime have been proved otherwise, the accused cannot claim acquittal only for the reason that DNA report was not proved."
The bench drew support from the 's ruling in Sunil v. State of M.P. (2017) 4 SCC 393, which held that despite non-holding of a DNA test, conviction may still be possible based on remaining evidence, provided it is clinching in nature. The court further noted that if the DNA report were potentially , nothing prevented the appellant from requesting the trial court to summon it—yet the order sheets revealed that no such prayer was ever made.
The and the Burden Under Section 106
The court placed considerable weight on the "last seen" doctrine, read in conjunction with . Since the appellant was the last person seen with the child—having kidnapped her in the presence of multiple witnesses—and since the child was recovered nineteen hours later in a ravaged and abandoned state based on his own disclosure, the burden shifted to him to explain the circumstances under which he parted company with the child and what her physical condition was at that time.
Citing
Teja v. State of U.P.
(1956) 1 SCC 481 and
Ravasaheb alias Ravasahebgouda v. State of Karnataka
(2023) 5 SCC 391, the bench reiterated the settled principle that
"explanation on the part of accused becomes necessary under section 106 of Evidence Act when the
is coupled with other factors such as recovery of items... at the behest of accused, the proximity of time to the recovery, etc."
The appellant's complete silence on these crucial facts sealed the chain of
against him.
The court further observed that the appellant's conduct—fleeing despite resistance, failing to inform the guardians about the child's whereabouts, and abandoning her in roadside bushes with grievous injuries during the night—demonstrated not only the motive to sexually ravish the child but also the intention to facilitate her death by exposing her to the elements and other predators, thereby justifying the conviction under Section 307 IPC for .
Sentence Modified: Life Becomes Twenty Years
While upholding the convictions under Sections 366, 376(2)(i) and (m), and 307 IPC in their entirety, the bench turned a compassionate eye towards the quantum of sentence for the
offence. Noting that Section 376(2)(i) IPC also admits a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a definite term, and that no criminal antecedents of the appellant were proved, the court converted the life imprisonment till natural death to
"a fix term sentence of 20 years of actual rigorous imprisonment with no remission."
The sentences for the other offences—10 years rigorous imprisonment each under Sections 366 and 307 IPC—were left undisturbed, with all substantive sentences directed to run concurrently.
Implications: A Precedent on DNA Evidence in Rape Trials
This judgment serves as an important reminder that while forensic evidence such as DNA profiling can be a powerful tool in sexual offence cases, its absence does not create an automatic presumption of innocence. Where the prosecution establishes a coherent and credible chain of circumstances—eyewitness testimony, prompt FIR, medical corroboration, and recoveries at the instance of the accused—a conviction can safely rest on such evidence alone. The ruling reinforces the principle that procedural sophistication cannot be allowed to trump substantive justice, particularly in cases involving the most vulnerable victims.
