IMPORTANT POINT
Composite lease for the building, fittings, equipment and furniture was primarily of a "building" falling under Section 3(a) of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the lessees are entitled to protection of the Karnataka Rent Control Act thus suits for eviction filed in Civil Court was not maintainable.

Headnote:Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961-Section 3(a)-Definition of Building-Section 31-Exemption of non-residential building paying rent exceeding Rs. 500/- per month-Lease for the building, fittings and equipment and furniture paying more than Rs. 500/- per month-Suit for eviction filed in Civil Court-Pending suit, Section 31 struck down by Court-Still it was held by Court below that tenant was not entitled to protection under Section 21 of Act-Appeal to Supreme Court by special leave-Whether the lease of building within fittings, equipment and furniture for running a cinema theatre falls with the purview of Section 3(a) defining building in Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the tenant in entitled to avail the protection against eviction available under Section 21 of the Act ? (Yes)-Test of dominant intention of parties applied.
       Held : In view of the decisions of this Court in Uttamchand v. S.M. Lalwani (supra) and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf (supra) for the purpose of determining whether the lease in the present case is in respect of a building under Section 3(a) of the Act so as to fall within the ambit of expression "premises" as defined in Section 3(n) of the Act, we have to apply the test of the dominant intention of the parties. It is, therefore, necessary to find out what is the dominant purpose of the demise. The property covered by the lease is the cinema building, fittings and furniture and some equipment. The projectors, amplifiers, screen and speakers are, however, not included in the demise. In the lease deeds that were executed from time to time since 1944 the rent for the building and fittings and the hire for furniture and machinery etc. has been apportioned and that rent for the building is much more than to the hire for furniture and machinery etc., the ration being 2 : 1 appromimately. It cannot, therefore, be said that cinema equipment is more important part of the demise than the building. Having the apportionment of the rent for the building and the furniture and equipments it can be said that the dominant purpose of the demise is the building qua building and the fittings and other equipment only incidentally pass with the buildiing which has been constructed for being used as a cinema theatre. This is not a case where it can be said that the fittings and the equipment are the primary objects which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which they are located comes in incidentally. It must, therefore, be held that the dominant intention of the parties was to let out the building for being used as a cinema theatre and it cannot be said that the dominant intention was to let out the fittings, furnitures and equipment and the building playing a subsdiary role only. Moreover, in the absene of the projectors, amplifiers, screen and the speakers, which are the major part of the equipment required for exhibition of films it cannot be said that the lease was of a running cinema business or of a fully equipped running cinema theatre. On that view of the matter there is no escape from the conclusion that the lease in favour of the appellants is of a building as defined in Section 3(a) of the Act and it falls within the ambit of the expression "premises" as defined in Section 3(n) of the Act. This would mean that the appellants are entitled to the protection of the provisions of the Act in the matter of eviction and they can be evicted only in accordance with the provisions of the Act in proceedings initiated before the appropriate forums.
       (Para 15)
       Held thus since we are of the opinion that the lease was primarily of a building falling under Section 3(a) of the Act and the appellants are entitled to the protection of the Act in the mater of eviction, it must be held that the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for the eviction of the appellants in the Civil Court was not maintainable. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 22nd April, 1994 in Regular First Appeal No. 80 of 1989 as well as the judgment and decree of the IV Addl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore city dated January 7, 1989 in Original Suit No. 409 of 1980 are set aside and the said suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for the eviction of the appellants is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. (Para 16)

JUDGMENT

S.C. Agrawal, J.-Special leave granted.

2. The question that falls for consideration in this appeal arising out of a suit for eviction of the appellant-tenants is whether a lease of a building with fittings and furniture for running a cinema theatre falls within the purview of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) and the tenant is entitled to avail the protection against eviction available under Section 21 of the Act.

3. A Cinema Theatre known as Opera House bearing No. 24 (Old) (New No. 57) 101, Brigade road, Civil Station, Bangalore belonged to Mr. T.C.W. Skipp. After the death of Mr. Skipp on November 10, 1934, Mrs. Evelyn Elizebeth Holland Smith (Nee Skipp), one of his heirs, obtained the letters of administration in respect of the properties of Mr. Skipp including the Opera House , and she leased out the said property to one R. Phul Chand. Mrs. Evelyn Elizebeth Holland Smith (Nee Skipp) along with other heirs of Mr. Skipp sold the said property including furnitures, fixtures, fittings and machinery free of all encumbrances, except the leasehold rights of R. Phul Chand, to Shri C.S. Krishnaiah Chetty and his wife, Smt. Rangamma under a sale deed dated July 20, 1939. Shri C.S. Krishnaiah Chetty had 3/8th share in the property whille Smt. Rangamma had 5/8th share in the said property. By lease deed dated September 29, 1944 C.S. Krishnaiah Chetty and Smt. Rangamma leased out the premises of the Opera House including fittings, furnitures, machineries etc. to Sri Rao Sahib S.V. Govindrajan, the father of the appellants herein. Under the said lease deed the rent was Rs. 800/- per month and the hire for furnitures etc. was Rs. 300/-. The said lease was for a period of 69 months and it expired on June 29, 1950. Thereafter Sri Govindrajan became a tenant holding over and the landlords were receiving the rents from him. After the death of Sri Govindrajan in 1955, there was a family partition vide deed dated July 15, 1957 and the leasehold interest in the suit property was allotted to the appellants and the appellants were treated as tenants holding over by the landlords. Smt. Rangamma died on August 17, 1958 and after her death Sri C.S. Krishnaiah Chetty, as sole executor (as per her last will), sold her 5/8th share in the property to his son-in-law Shri K.R. Kanakarathnam Chetty, respondent No. 1 herein, by sale deed dated November 16, 1959. On the same day Shri C.S. Krishnaiah Chetty sold his own 3/8th share in the said property to his daughter, Smt. K. Yasodamma, respondent No. 2 herein. On the same day there was attornment of tenancy by the appellants in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2. On November 30, 1959 the appellants executed a lease deed in favour of the respondents No. 1 and 2 in respect of the building as well as furniture and fittings and all articles including machinery etc. The said lease was for a period of two years. The appellants continued to be tenants by executing from time to time lease deeds in favour of the respondents No. 1 and 2. Lease deed dated January 6, 1962 was executed for a period of 55 months from December 1, 1961. Under the said lease the rent was Rs. 950/- per month and the hire of furniture and machinery etc. was Rs. 550 per month. This lease was followed by lease deed dated August 11, 1966 for a further period of 55 months from July 1, 1966. Under this lease deed the rent was Rs. 1300 per month and hire of furniture and machinery etc. was Rs. 700/- per month. After the expiry of the said lease, the appellants executed two separate lease deeds dated January 28, 1971, one in favour of respondent No. 1 and the other in favour of respondent No. 2. Both the lease deeds were for a period of 55 months from February 1, 1971. Under the lease deed executed in favour of respondent No. 1 the monthly rent was Rs. 937.50 and the hire of furniture and machinery etc. was Rs. 468.75 per month. Under the lease deed executed in fav

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