Judgment

KRISHNA IYER, J.:- The rent control law has been a rich source of lengthy litigation in the country and the present appeal by certificate under Art, 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution at the instance of the appellant-landlord, is illustrative of one reason for such proliferation of cases, namely, the lack of clarity in legislative drafting and dovetailing of amendments which have the potential for creating interpretative confusion.

2. The facts are few and may be stated briefly, although, at a later stage, further details may have to be mentioned at relevant places to illumine the arguments advanced on both sides by counsel, Shri R. K. Garg (for the appellant) and Shri V. M. Tarkunde (for the respondent). Shortly put, the legal issues are only three: (A) Is a cinema theatre, equipped with projectors and other fittings and ready to be launched as an entertainment house, an accommodation as defined in Section 2 (1) (d) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. Act III of 1947) for short, the Act) ? (B) If it is an accommodation as so defined what is the impact of the proviso brought in by amendment in 1954 (Act XVII of 1954) (for short, the Amending Act)? (C) If the Act barricades eviction by the landlord because the premises let constitutes an accommodation , does the repeal of the Act and exclusion of cinema houses altogether from the operation of the 1972 Act (U. P. Act 13 of 1972) (for short, the later Act) rescue the right of the appellant-landlord to eject the tenant-respondent?

3. The building covered by the suit is admittedly one built and adapted for screening films. The plaintiff had been carrying on a cinema business in this theatre for a long number of years but, when he discontinued, the defendant approached him in January 1952 for the grant of a lease of the building with all the equipment and fittings and furniture necessary for his operating the cinema. The necessary certificates, sanctions and permissions, preliminary to the conduct of cinema shows, stood in the name of the plaintiff, including water-pipe connection, electricity supply and structural fitness. Before commencement of cinema shows, a licence is necessary under the U. P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act and this licence has to be taken out by the actual operator of the cinema and not by the landlord of the theatre and equipments. Therefore, once the lease for the entire building and cinema projector, accessories and the like was finalised, the deed of demise was actually executed, it being provided that the commencement of the lease would synchronize with the inaugural cinema show on March 25, 1953. It was provided in the lease deeds that the rent for the building, simpliciter, may be shown separately from that attributable to the costly equipments, for the purposes of property tax and other taxes. By this apportionment, the building, as such, was to bear a burden of Rupees 400/- per mensem by way of rent and a monthly sum of Rs. 1,000/- was fixed for the projector and all other items fixed in the building. The leases were renewed from time to time till 1959. The suit for eviction was based on these leases which formed the foundation of the action.

4. At this stage it may be noticed that the learned counsel for the defendant-tenant did not dispute that running a cinema business did constitute an industrial purpose so that the accommodation was used for an industrial purpose . Another significant fact admitted by the defendant s counsel before the High Court was that for the purpose of this case, in spite of there being separate documents of lease in respect of the demised properties as referred to above, these sets of contracts may be treated as a single transaction each time . On these facts and circumstances, we have to decide whether the subject matter of the demise is an accommodation within the meaning of the Act. After settling this issue, the other two points adverted to above may have to be considered. While