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1996(3) Supreme 443
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.M. Ahmadi, C.J.I., S.B. Majumdar and Sujata V. Manohar, JJ.
(Dr.) Haniraj L. Chulani -Appellant
versus
Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 6876 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20216 of 1993)
Decided on 8-4-1996
Held : The scheme of the Act thus lays down a complete code for regulating the legal education and professional equipments of an aspirant seeking entry to legal profession from the grassroot level where he is student of law till he equips himself with essential legal knowledge and seeks enrolment and even thereafter till he practices law and completes his professional career an advocate. Thus, from the preentry point to legal profession till the exit point from the legal profession, the Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils monitor the career of the legal practitioner. It is the entire scheme of the Act when considered in the light of the nature of the legal profession to which such entry is given which has to be kept in view while considering the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant that the power given to the State Bar Councils to regulate such entries by framing rules is a piece of excessive delegation of legislative power. It cannot be gainsaid that law is universally described as an honourable profession. An advocate is an officer of justice and friend of the court. A conduct, therefore. which is unworthy of him as an officer of justice cannot be justified by stating that he did it as the agent of his client. His status as an officer of justice does not mean that he is subordinate to the Judge. It only means that he is an integral part for the administration of justice, Legal profession is monopolistic in character and this monopoly itself inheres certain high traditions which its members are expected to upkeep and uphold. Members of the profession claimed that they are the leaders of thought and society. The central function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice. (Para 15)
Further held: Such rule-making power flows from Section 28(2)(d). Even though the aforesaid rule making power is couched in wide terms the said power entrusted to the State Bar Council cannot, be said to be unfettered or unhedged. The said rulemaking power draws its sustinence from the guidelines laid down by the Act itself which entrusts the duty to the concerned State Bar Council to regulate entry to the legal profession which has the aforesaid well established connotations and attributes. The entire edifice of the Act in this connection has to be kept in view for finding out the relevant guidelines for enlightening the path of State Bar Councils entrusted with the task of framing rules regulating entries of new aspirants who are to be permitted to enter the fold of legal profession. (Para 16)
The power conferred on the State Bar Councils to lay down further conditions for controlling the entries to the legal profession cannot be said to be an unguided power conferred on them. The conditions which the State Bar Councils can lay down by rules must be conditions which would be germane to the high and exacting standards of advocacy expected of the new entrants to the fold of the profession. Implicit in the conferment of such rule-making power is the guideline laid down by the legislature itself that the conditions must be commensurate with the fructification of the very purpose of the Act of putting the profession of advocates on a sound footing so that the concerned new entrant can well justify his role as an officer of the Court admitted to the fold of the noble profession to which he seeks his admission. Any conditions laid down by the State Bar Councils for fructifying this laudable object of legislature would remain germane to the exercise of this power and can well be said to be logically flowing from it. It cannot, therefore, be said that any unguided and unchartered power is handed over on a platter by the legislature to the concerned Bar Councils for regulating entry to the legal profession. Rule-making power conferred on the State Bar Councils is inherently hedged in with the obligation to frame only such rules regarding enrolment which would fructify the purpose of having efficient members of the Bar who can stand up to the expectation of the noble and learned profession to which they are to be given entry. Any rule which effectuates this purpose will be within the permissible field and will not fall foul on the alter of Article 14 and Article 19(l)(g) read .with Article 19(6). Any rule framed for enrolment which does not meet this yardstick wilt be a taboo. Hence it cannot be said that the rule making power entrusted to the State Bar Councils suffers from absence of any guidelines or exhibits effacement of legislative power. (Para 17)
(ii) Constitution of India-Articles 19(l)(g) and 19(6)-Advocates Act, 1961-Sections 28(2) and 24(l)(e)- Rule (1) framed by State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa-Validity of- Challenged as violative of Article 19(l)(g)-Whether Rule (1) is violative of Article 19(l)(g) and is not saved by sub-article (6) thereof ?- (No)
Held: It is true that the appellant as a citizen of India having obtained the qualification required for being enrolled as an advocate can legitimately aspire to be enrolled as an advocate but his aforesaid right is fettered by the impugned rule framed by the State Bar Council. We have to consider whether the said restriction. imposed by the rule is in any way unreasonable. Legal profession to which we have made detailed reference earlier the State Bar Council would be Justified in framing such a rule prohibiting the entry of a professional who insists on carrying on other profession simultaneously with the legal profession. As we have seen earlier legal profession requires full time attention and would not countenance an advocate riding two horses or more at a time. He has to be full time advocate or not at all. Consequently however equally dignified may be the profession of a doctor he cannot simultaneously be permitted to practise law which is a full time occupation. It is for ensuring the full time attention of legal practitioners towards their profession and with a view to bringing out their best so that they can fulfil their role as an officer of the court and can give their best in the administration of justice, that the impugned rule has been enacted by the State legislature. It, therefore, cannot be said that it is. in any way arbitrary or .that it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the new entrant to the profession who is told not to practise simultaneously any other profession and if he does so to deny to him entry to the legal profession. It is true as submitted by learned senior counsel for the appellant that the rule of Central Bar Council does not countenance an advocate simultaneously carrying on any business and it does not expressly frawn upon any simultaneous profession. But these are general rules of professional conduct. So far as regulating enrolment to the profession is concerned it is the task entrusted solely to the State Bar Councils by the Legislature as seen earlier while considering the scheme of the Act. While carrying on that task if the entry to the profession is restricted by the State Bar Council by enacting the impugned rule for not allowing any other professional to enter the Bar when he does not want to give up the other profession but wants to carry on the same simultaneously with legal practice, it cannot be said that the Bar Council has by enacting such a rule imposed any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the prospective practitioner who wants to enter the legal profession.(Para l8)
Further held : If such simultaneous practices of professionals who want to carry on more than one profession at a time are permitted, the unflinching devotion expected by the legal profession from Its members is bound to be adversely affected. If the peers being chosen representatives of the legal profession constituting the State Bar Council, in their wisdom, had thought it fit not to permit such entries of dual practitioners to the legal profession it cannot be said that they have done anything unreasonable or have framed an arbitrary or unreasonable rule. (Para 19)
(iii) Constitution of India-Articles 14 and 21-Advocates Act, 1961- Sections 28(2) and 24(l)(e)-Rule (1) framed by State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa-Validity of- Bar of simultaneous practices of professionals-Whether Rule (1) is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, violative of Articles 14 & 21 ?-(No).
Held : The rule carves out a well defined class of professionals carrying on other professions and denies to members of this well defined class entry to the legal profession so long as they insist on carrying on any other profession simultaneously with the legal profession. The said classification has a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved, namely, the efficiency of advocates belonging to the legal profession and the better administration of justice for which the legal profession is a partner with the judiciary. The challenge mounted on the rule in the light of Article 14, therefore, has to fail. (Para 20)
The appellant is not denied his right to livelihood. He is already a professional carrying on the profession of a medical practitioner. He wants to have a-second string to his bow. He wants simultaneously to be permitted to practise law with a view to earn additional or more livelihood. So far as his aforesaid demand is concerned the impugned rule requires that unless he gives up that other practice and joins wholeheartedly the legal profession he cannot be permitted to enter the legal profession. That rule cannot be said to be laying down a procedure not established by law. On the contrary that procedure has been found to be well sustained under Article, 19(l)(g) read with Article 19(6), Once that conclusion is reached the absolute requirement of Article 21 would be out of the way. Appellant cannot be said to have been deprived of his right to livelihood by pursuing two professions. contrary to any established procedure of law. Consequently the impugned rule cannot be faulted on the touchstone of Article 21. (Para 21).
(iv) Advocates Act, 1961- Sections 28(2) and 24(1)(e) Rule (1) framed by State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa-Validity or Challenged on ground that enactment of this rule imposes a disqualification for enrolment-Rule falls within parameters of rule making power-It cannot be held that such disqualification cannot be legitimately Imposed by State Bar Council. (Para 22)
JUDGMENT
S.B. Majumdar, J.-Leave granted.
2. A short but an interesting question falls for determination in the present case. It runs as under :
"Whether the respondent-State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa was justified in refusing enrolment of the appellant as an advocate under .the Advocates Act, 1961 as he is a medical practitioner who does not want to give up his medical practice but wants
simultaneously to practice law.
In order to appreciate the contours of controversy centering round this question, a few relevant facts leading to these proceedings are required to be noted at the outset.
3. The appellant is a permanent resident of Bombay. He is a medical practitioner (colorectal surgeon) since 1970. During the continuance of his said profession as a medical practitioner, the appellant joined LL.B. Degree Course and obtained Degree of Bachelor of Laws on 4th March 1991. Thereafter the appellant applied to the respondent State Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa for being enrolled as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). This application was moved by the appellant on 26th July 1991. The appellant insisted that even though he is a medical practitioner he is entitled to simultaneously carry on the profession as an advocate. The Enrolment Committee of the respondent State Bar Council rejected his request for being enrolled as an advocate simultaneously with his carrying on his medical practice as a surgeon. The appellant was ultimately informed on 16th November, 1992 that his application for enrolment as an advocate was rejected. He was also supplied a copy of the reasons for refusal for grant of a sanad . The appellant feeling aggrieved by the said refusal filed writ petition No. 2584 of 1992 in the High Court of Bombay. After hearing the petitioner a Division Bench of the High Court summarily dismissed his writ petition-on 14th December 1992. It is thereafter that .the appellant moved the present proceedings by way of special leave petition. By an order dated 30th November 1993 delay in filing the special leave petition was condoned and notice was ordered to be issued to the Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa with a direction that the notice will state that the matter will be disposed of at the notice stage itself Subsequently after hearing the learned senior counsel for the appellant by an order dated 21st September 1995 notice was ordered to be issued to Bar Council of India as well as the Medical Council of India.
Rival Contentions
4. We have heard the learned senior advocate for the appellant as well as the learned advocates for the respondents in support of their respective stands. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that Rule (1) framed by the respondent-Bar Council of Maharashtra under Sections 28(2) and 24(l)(e) of the Act was ultra vires and illegal. In this connection she submitted that in so far as the said rule prohibits a person who is otherwise qualified to be admitted as an advocate from being enrolled as an advocate if he is carrying on any other profession like medical profession in the present case, it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and even otherwise the said rule is unconstitutional being violative of Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution and is not saved by sub-article (6) thereof as it imposes unreasonable restriction on the right of a citizen to pursue any profession of his choice and that the rule is equally violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as it seeks to deprive right of livelihood to the appellant in a most unreasonable manner. It was contended that there was nothing obnoxious or illegal in a practicing doctor insisting on being enrolled as an advocate and in carrying on practice both as a medical practitioner as well as an adovcate. As the medical profession cannot be said to be in any way less dignified profession and once the appellant is found to be qualified to be enrolled a
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