1996(6) Supreme 551
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
Ratan Kumar Tandon & Ors. -Appellants
versus
State of Uttar Pradesh -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 10786 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2384 of 1993)
Decided on 1-8-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Satish Chandra, Sr. Advocate, Rajesh Tandon and E.C. Vidya Sagar, Advocates.
For the Respondent : D.V. Sehgal, Sr. Advocate, Ashok Kr. Srivastava, Advocate.
Held : It is well settled law that when land and building are acquired by a notification, the claimant is not entitled to separate valuation of the building and the land. They are entitled to the compensation on either of the two methods but not both. If the building is assessed, it is settled law that the measure of assessment be based on either the rent received from the property with suitable multiplier or the value of the building is the proper method of valuation. In this case, since the land is separately valued, the building cannot again be separately assessed and compensation awarded except the value of debris. (Para 6)
(ii) LAND ACQUISITIONS-Compensation claim-Determination of value of land-Either a vendor or vendee of a sale deed should be examined in proof of circumstances in which sale deed came to be executed-Paper cutting as to publication of prices in local newspapers is not evidence.
Held : It is settled law that either the vendor or vendee of a sale deed should be examined in proof of the circumstances in which the sale deed came to be executed and the consideration passed thereunder and in respect of the value etc. The said sale deed is a free-hold small piece of land as compared to encumbered lease-hold land of 4 acres and odd. The vendor of the sale deed by name Jai Prakash Singh was not examined. Therefore, the sale deed cannot be relied upon as proof of valuation prevailing in the area. The High Court has relied upon that document and granted the compensation @ Rs. 423/- per sq. yd. Since the State had not come up in appeal, nor filed cross-objections, we need not go into the correctness of the award of compensation on that rate. The paper cutting as to the publication of the prices in the local newspapers is not evidence and the reference Court, therefore, committed clear error in relying upon those transactions and in proof of document of the sale deed executed by Jai Prakash Singh. (Para 7)
(iii) LAND ACQUISITIONS-Compensation-Lands situated in urban agglomeration-Whether Land Acquisition Officer is enjoined to pass award in respect to excess land?-(No)-Ceiling Act being a special Act-Compensation shall be paid only as per Section 11(6) of the Ceiling Act-Claimant had lease of land for 50 years-What is the proportion in which the claimants and State are entitled to the compensation for the land within ceiling limit ?-Considering facts and circumstances, compensation should be apportioned for extent of land within the limit in ratio of 50 : 50 to the State and appellants.
Held : that since the State had acquired the property before the expiry of the first renewal, we are constrained to go into the language used in the first lease. It expressly mentions that lease initially was granted for a period of 50 years and a right of another renewal for another 50 years, i.e., upto September 30, 1992. Before its expiry, the Government have already acquired the lands for public pose and taken possession. The question of further renewal would not arise in this case. Under these circumstances, residuary period of lease is hardly 7 years. (Para 12)
Further held : As seen, the appellants have got hardly 7 years lease-hold right in the land and thereafter the lands would stand revested to the State. Thereafter, the State would be entitled to resume the land after ejectment of the appellants. Under those circumstances, they are not entitled to the full compensation. The High Court directed that compensation should be apportioned for the extent of land within the limit in the ratio of 50:50 to the State and the appellants. It is also to be seen that the State has not questioned at least the apportionment granted by the High Court. Considered from this perspective, we hold that it is not a fit case to reserve the judgment. (Para 13)
ORDER
Leave granted.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties in extenso.
2. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the Act ) was published in the State Gazette on February 14, 1986 acquiring an extent of 4 acres 2 rods 21 poles equivalent to 22,528 sq. yd. situated in Allahabad city for public purpose, namely, planned development of the urban area. The Land Acquisition Officer determined by his award under Section 11 on October 28, 1987 a total compensation of Rs. 4,57,750.88. Dissatisfied therewith, the appellants sought reference. The Additional District Judge by his award and decree dated July 20, 1989 determined compensation @ Rs. 500/- per sq. yd. He also awarded Rs. 50,000/- towards the value of trees, Rs. 8,33,700/- towards the value of the building together with the statutory solatium and interest. On appeal, the High Court reversed the valuation of the trees and confirmed the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, namely, Rs. 23,219.97. High Court also confirmed the value of the building as awarded by the reference Court but as regards the value of the land the High Court disagreed and determined market value @ Rs. 423/- per sq. yd. by the impugned judgment dated October 22, 1992 in First Appeal No. 149 of 1990. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
3. Shri Satish Chandra, learned senior counsel, contended that though the value of the trees given by the appellants was Rs. 1,40,000/-, the reference Court on appreciation of evidence determined compensation therefor @ Rs. 50,000/-. The Land Acquisition Officer relied upon the valuation report given by the Forest Department, OPW-I examined on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer admitted that the valuation report did not bear the seal of the office of Forest Department nor it was signed in his presence. None of the officers who prepared the valuation report was examined for its proof. Therefore, the valuation report is inadmissible. The High Court, therefore, was not right in reversing the decree of the reference Court in that behalf. He next contended that when the building consists of more than 17 rooms situated in a posh locality in the heart of Allahabad city, determination of the compensation @ Rs. 500/- per sq. yd. by the reference Court is not arbitrary. The view of the High Court in determining compensation at Rs. 423/- per sq. yd. is based on no evidence. Therefore, the High Court was not right in reversing the decree. As regards the value of the building, it is contended that the appellants had valued it at Rs. 25,00,000 (Rupees twenty five lacs only). The Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. 3,18,429. The District Judge and the High Court were not right in confining the valuation to Rs. 8 lacs and odd, as referred to earlier. The appellants, therefore, are entitled to higher compensation on proper consideration.
He further contended that the direction to the appellants given by the learned Judges to file returns under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, the Ceiling Act ) is illegal. Since the possession of the land was already taken from the appellants dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, after their dispossession and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances, the appellants did not have possession of excess vacant land. The entire land having been acquired under the Act, the appellants are entitled to compensation @ Rs. 500/-, as determined by the reference Court. Though the State pleaded in the written statement filed before the reference Court that the Ceiling Act would be applicable to the lands in question, neither an issue was raised nor a finding recorded by the reference Court nor there appears to be a ground taken in the grounds of appeal in the High Court nor the standing counsel for the State argued in that behalf. The High Court, therefore, was not right to go into that question.
4. He further contended that the Gover
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