1996(7) Supreme 594
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and B.L. Hansaria, JJ.
Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur -Appellant
versus
Daulat Mal Jain etc. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 12370 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20857 of 1993)
with
Civil Appeal Nos. 12371, 12373 & 12372 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 20936/93, 2492/90 and SLP (C) No. 17355/96) (CC - 25107/94)
Decided on 20-9-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Sr. Advocate and S.K. Bhattacharya, Advocate.
For the Respondents : G.L. Sanghi and S.M. Jain, Sr. Advocates, S.K. Jain, A.P. Dhamija, S. Ganesh, Advocates.
Held : The Government has empowered the Collector to allot "any other land in lieu of money compensation only when the land acquired belongs to a person having "limited interest in the land", like widow s estate of minor s estate, Mutawali etc. In that behalf, Rule 31 amplifies the exercise of the power by the authorised LAO. It says that "the Collector cannot force a party to take land in lieu of cash. Where, however, the interest of the party is so limited, as in the case of a trustee of a wakf property or a Hindu widow, as to make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at an adequate cash estimate of its value of where, from the circumstances of a case, it is impossible to place the parties concerned by case compensation in the same or nearly the same position as before acquisition, sub- section (3) enables the Collector to arrange to award land (subject to the same limitation of interest) in lieu of cash. In Radhey Sham s case the scope of sub-section (3) of Section 31 has been considered and explained in extenso. Rule 31 is only to elongate the discretion which the LAO is expected to exercise in awarding land in lieu of cash consideration and the circumstances in which it would be done. (Para 19)
Further held : There was no policy laid by the Government and it cannot be laid contrary to the aforestated rules and no such power was given to individual Minister by executive action, as the land was already notified conclusively under Section 6(1) for public purpose, namely, earmarked scheme. Since the persons whose land was acquired were not owners having limited interest therein, qua the owners having lost right, title and interest therein, the sub-awardees or nominees, after the acquisition under Section 4(1), would acquire no title to the land nor such ultra vires acts of the Minister would bind the Government. The actions, therefore, taken by the Minister-cum-Chairman of the appellate authority and bureaucrats for obvious reasons would not clothe the respondents with any vestige of right to allotment. (Para 22)
The allotment has benefited only a specified class, namely, the awardees, sub-awardees or nominees and none else. The decision by the Minister or the actions of the beaurocrats was limited to the above class which included the respondents. Legitimacy was given to the void acts of Chottey Lal, the erstwhile owner as well as the LAO. Directions were given by the Minister and the bureaucrats acted to allot the land under the very void acts. They are ultra vires the power. These acts are in utter disregard of the statute and the rules. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said to have the stamp of public policy; rather it is a policy to feed corruption and to deflect the public purpose and to confer benefits on a specified category. (Para 23)
Consequently held that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents. (Para 26)
There is, however, force in the contention of Shri Sanghi that if allotments would to be cancelled by this Court, it would be virtually impossible for the respondents to acquire residential plots any where now in a city like Jaipur in view of the great increase in prices of land in the meantime. We have not been able to overlook or ignore this facet of the case; more so, because it may be that the respondents herein had not obtained the allotments by taking recourse to any illegal means. So, we have felt persuaded to agree with Shri Sanghi that we may not invoke our power under article 136 to undo the impugned order of the high Court, even if the same be illegal, according to us. (Para 28)
So, we have decided not to disturb the direction of the High Court, as a very special case. We would, however, modify the same in two respects. First, the respondents would be given allotment in some other scheme. Secondly, the area of the land to be allotted would be uniform. It similar cases, this Court has favoured uniformity as regards the area. As the plot would be needed for residential purpose, we think an area of 250 sq. yds. would be enough and proper. We, therefore, order for an allotment of plot measuring about 250 sq. yds. to each of the two respondents in some other scheme of the JDA. This would, however, be at the rate which was prevailing when the allotments were first made to them. (Para 29)
(ii) Constitution of India-Art. 14-Doctrine of equality-Can one illegality be compounded by permitting similar illegal or illegitimate or ultra vires acts?-(No)-Rational relationship and legal back up are foundations to invoke the doctrine in case of persons similarly situated.
Held : Article 14 proceeds on the premise that a citizen has legal and valid right enforceable at law and persons having similar right and persons similarly circumstanced, cannot be denied of the benefit thereof. Such person cannot be discriminated to deny the same benefit. The rational relationship and legal back up are the foundations to invoke the doctrine of equality in case of persons similarly situated. If some persons derived benefit by illegality and had escaped from the clutches of law, similar persons cannot plead, nor court can countenance that benefit had from infraction of law must be allowed to be retained. Can one illegality be compounded by permitting similar illegal or illegitimate or ultra vires acts ? Answer is obviously no. (Para 24)
(iii) ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE-Government actions-Intention to further public welfare and national interest-Public policies-Limitations of public policies are kept along with public interest to prevent exploitation or misuse/abuse of office-Corruption-Remedies for.
Held : The so-called public policy cannot be a camouflage for abuse of the power and trust entrusted with a public authority or public servant for the performance of public duties. Misuse implies doing of something improper. The essence of impropriety is replacement of a public motive for a private one. When satisfaction sought in the performance of duties is for mutual personal gain, the misuse is usually termed as corruption. The holder of a public office is said to have misused his position when in pursuit of a private satisfaction, as distinguished from public interest, he has done something which he ought not to have done. The most elementary qualification demanded of a Minister is honesty and incorruptibility. He should not only possess these qualifications but should also appear to possess the same. (Para 14)
Corruption has dangerous consequences for politics. Although political corruption is more widespread in non-democratic regimes, it is particularly dangerous for democracy because it undermines two of the major principles on which democracies are based ; the equality of citizens rights and the transparency of the political decision-making process. Bribes open the way for access to the State for those who are willing to pay and can afford the price. The situation may leave non-corrupt citizens with the belief that one "counts" only if one has the right personal contacts with those who hold power. Because of its illegal nature, corruption increases the range of public decisions that are made in secrecy. It was suggested that internal controls on public bureaucracies through administrative controls and accounting procedures as well as ombudsman systems for public complaints, are remedies to control political corruption. The rules of Code of Conduct for political executives public servants and private enterpreneurs, emphasising merit and regulated system of appointment in state bureaucracy and stimulating pride in public service, would generate remedies for political corruption. (Para 15)
The public policy under the Act is that the acquired land should be used only for public purpose declared under Section 6(1) of the Act or any other public purpose and, under no circumstances, for any private purpose. The limited relaxation of public power entrusted with the LAO is to allot any other land, if available to the owner with limited interest or remission of land revenue when limited interest is acquired for public purpose. (Para 18)
JUDGMENT
K. Ramaswamy, J.-The facts of these cases expose the blatant misuse of public office by Minister of Urban Development, Government of Rajasthan as Chairman of the appellant authority; they, in particular demonstrate the danger involved in entrusting unbridled dual powers in a single individual leading to abuse of office on account of lack of counter check. It would be appropriate to extract from the enquiry report dated November 12, 1992 of the Lokayukta of Rajasthan under Section 10 of the Rajasthan Lokayukta and Uplokayukta Act, 1973 as under :
"In view of what has been stated above, it is prima facie established that Smt. Kamala, the then Hon ble Minister, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan-cum-Chairman, J.D.A. Jaipur, Shri M.D. Kaurani, IAS, the then Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority and Shri Subhebhan Mitra, the then Zonal Officer, Lal Kothi Scheme, J.D.A. Jaipur have blatantly misused their official position to favour a few influential and highly placed individuals and have also thereby caused wrongful gain to them and wrongful loss to the Jaipur Development Authority and the public at large. But Smt. Kamala, the then Hon ble Minister, Urban Development and Housing Department-cum-Chairman, J.D.A. is not now a public servant as defined in Section 2(1) of the Rajasthan Lokayukta and Up-Lokayukta Act, 1973 (for short, the Act ) because she has ceased to be a Minister, so investigation is not being commenced against her but the investigation deserves to be commenced against S/Shri M.D. Kaurani, IAS and Subhebhan Mitra under Section 1 of the Act, and I order accordingly."
2. Edmund Burke as early as in 1780 had lamented the corroding influence of corruption thus : "Corrupt influence, which is itself the perennial spring of all prodigality, and of all disorder, which loads us, more than millions of debt; which takes away from our arms wisdom from our councils, and every shadow of authority and credit from the most venerable parts of our constitution."
3. The facts in nutshell in these cases are as under:
Notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short, the Act ) was published in the State Gazette on June 29, 1960 acquiring land in Bhojpura and Chuck Sudershanpura, Tehsil Jaipur, popularly known as Lal Kothi Scheme, which is adjacent to the Jaipur City for urban development, viz., for multipurpose project of Constructing Legislative Assembly M.L.A. quarters etc. After following the procedure, an award was passed on January 9, 1964 and possession taken later on. Therein, apart from awarding compensation to the owners, the Land Acquisition Officer granted plots ranging between 2000 sq. yds. to 1000 sq. yds. to owners, sub-awardees or nominees in the scheme itself. The Court in Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam & Ors1, known as Radhey Shyam s case, had held that the Land Acquisition Officer [LAO] was devoid of the power and jurisdiction under Section 11 to allot part of the acquired land or any land to the land owners etc. in determining compensation under Section 23(1). It was, therefore, held that the award alloting land was void ab initio and it conferred no right on an erstwhile khatedar/owner to claim possession of the land in execution of the award. The award, confirmed in the decree under Section 26, though had become final, being a nullity, it could be questioned at any stage, when it is sought to be executed/enforced. It was, therefore, held that the execution of such a decree and delivery of the possession in furtherance of the award was invalid, void and inexecutable. These cases spring from the same foul source being part of the same Scheme and same award, are governed by the above judgment. The Khatedar (owner) in these case is one Chhote Lal whose 14 bighas of land had come to be acquired. The LAO awarded 2000 sq. yards to him. He entered into agreements with respondents Daulat Mal and Raj Kumari to sell 1000, 500, 250 sq
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