SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1996 Supreme(SC) 1718

1997(1) Supreme 145
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.
M/s. Anamallai Club -Appellant
versus
The Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 14549-50 of 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 10212-13       of 1996)
Decided on 23-10-1996
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Soli J. Sorabjee, Sr. Adv., V. Achuthan, Gopal Jain and Mukul Mudgal, Advocates.
For the Respondents : V. Krishnamurthy, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
After determination of the licence under the Government Grants Act, the Government is not entitled to resume possession unilaterally but notice in compliance of principles of natural justice should be given giving reasonable time of 10 or 15 days to vacate the premises.

Headnote:Government Grants Act, 1895-Section 3-Appellant was granted licence in respect of Government land for sports and recreation purposes-Notice terminating licence u/s 3 - Land was resumed and possession thereof was taken with assistance of police personnel-Writ petition-Whether resumption of possession unilaterally, after determination of grant, is valid in law ?-(No)-Notice in compliance of principles of natural justice should have been given giving reasonable time of 10 or 15 days to vacate premises-It is not necessary for State Government to nominate Estate Officer-No need for State to file a suit for eviction. (Para 9)

       

ORDER

Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave arises from the Division Bench Judgment of Madras High Court dated September 24, 1993 made in Writ Appeal No.1055 of 1992.

3. The undisputed facts are that the appellant was granted licence in respect of an extent of 28.70 acres of Government land in Anamallai, Valparai Taluk of Coimbatore District for sports and recreation purposes. Notice was issued on May 22, 1992 terminating the licence under Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (for short, the Act ) which was served on its Secretary on May 23, 1992; the land was resumed and the possession thereof was taken with the assistance of the police personnel on the even date. The appellant s writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge by his order dated August 17, 1992 in Writ Petition No. 7160/92 and giving directions therein. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent-State filed the appeal and the Division Bench in the impugned Judgment while upholding the termination of the licence under the Act, recorded a finding that "there is no legal impediment at all for resumption of possession of the lands by the Government, without seeking any aid of the provisions of the PPE Act, after the determination of the grant in the manner provided in the grant itself."

4. Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, contended that even assuming that the termination of the grant was in accordance with the grant itself, as found by the Division Bench of the High Court, resumption of the possession without giving an opportunity to the appellant and following the procedure prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Public Premises Act (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1975 (for short, the Eviction Act ) is unauthorised and unwarranted. The finding of the Division Bench is, therefore, clearly unsustainable in law. Shri Krishnamurthy, learned counsel for the State, contended that the right of the appellant flows from the grant under which they came into possession. After determination of the grant by issuance of the notice in terms of the grant itself, the appellants thereafter have no right to remain in possession. Therefore, the resumption of the possession by the respondents in terms of the grant is valid in law. In that situation, the need to take recourse to the provisions of the Eviction Act bears no relevance and need not be followed.

5. The question is : whether the resumption of possession unilaterally, after determination of the grant in the manner provided under the grant itself, is valid in law as was held by the High Court ? We think that the view taken by the High Court is not correct in law. In Bishan Das & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.1, a Constitution Bench of this Court had considered the question whether the Government would unilaterally take possession of the land after termination of the lease. One Ramjidas had built a dharamasala, a temple and shops appurtenant thereto, after having a licence of land from the State Government. The lease was terminated and thereafter when the persons in possession were sought to be dispossessed, without taking any recourse to law, they filed writ petition under Article 226 but remained unsuccessful. When writ petition under Article 32 was filed, this Court had considered the question whether the Government is entitled to resume the land with a minimum use of force for ejectment without recourse to law. It was contended therein that there was no dispute as the question of fact between the parties that the petitioners therein had no right and title to the subject matter in dispute. The writ petition under Article 226 was dismissed on the ground of the disputed question of fact which was upheld in appeal by the Division Bench. A writ petition under Article 32 was filed. The right to possession of land was a fundamental right at that time. It was contended that the Government terminated the lease, as thereafter they were trespassers and so they had no right to resist the Government s power















Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top