1997(2) Supreme 550
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. Ramaswamy & S. Saghir Ahmad, JJ.
Union of India & Anr. -Appellants
versus
Sher Singh & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2183 of 1993
Decided on 7-2-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Wasim Qadri, Advocate for C.V.S. Rao, Advocate.
For the Respondents : M.C. Dhingra, Y.D. Nagar, L.C. Chechi and K.S. Rana, Advocates.
(ii) RES-JUDICATA-Dismissal of special leave petition without speaking order-Does not constitute res-judicata. (Para 3)
ORDER
This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, made on May 30, 1991 in R.F.A. No. 167/86.
2. The admitted facts are that notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1864 was published acquiring certain lands for public purpose. Therein rival claims came to be made by Gaon Sabha, Tekhand and the respondents claiming title to the compensation. Since the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector was unable to decide the title to receive the compensation on reference under Section 30 of the Act, the District Court by award and decree dated February 22, 1986 held that the land in question stood vested in the Gaon Sabha under Section 7 read with Section 154 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (for short, the Act ). Therefore, it is entitled to the compensation of the land acquired by the Union of India. Dissatisfied therewith, the respondents filed the above appeal. The High Court in the impugned judgment has held that "Gair Mumkin Pahar" is a cultivable land and, therefore, by operation of explanation to Section 7, it stands excluded from the vesting in the Gaon Sabha. Resultantly, the respondents being the owners of the property are entitled to the compensation. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
3. Initially, Shri M.C. Dhingra, learned counsel for some of the respondents, has brought to our notice that since this Court had dismissed similar special leave petitions, this appeal does not merit consideration. We find no force in the contention. This Court, by then, had already granted leave in this appeal, but, unfortunately, that was not brought to the notice of the respective Benches including the one presided over by one of us (K. Ramaswamy, J.), when the matters had come up. As a consequence, without any speaking order some special leave petitions came to be dismissed. In view of the settled legal position by a catena of decisions of this Court that the dismissal of special leave petition without speaking order does not constitute res judicata, the question of law is at large to be gone into. Accordingly, we reject the objection and we have heard the counsel on both sides on merits.
4. Shri Wasim A. Quadri, learned counsel for Union of India and Gaon Sabha, in a pains taking investigation and neat presentation, has brought to our notice the relevant provisions of the Act and the decision of this Court in Hatti v. Sunder Singh1 and contended that the object of the Act and the Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954 was to extinguish the pre-existing right, title and interest held by bhumidar, sirdar, tenant, proprietor etc. and conferment of new rights in them. It is also envisaged that all other lands shall stand vested in the Gaon Sabha by operation of Section 154 of the Act read with Section 7 of the Act. The respondents are not bhumidars. The land in question has been recorded in the revenue records as "gair mumkin pahar", in other words, it is an uncultivable waste land. It is not excluded from the definition of waste land as explained in explanation to Section 7 of the Act. A reading of the relevant provisions of Sections 5, 7, 11 and 154 of the Act read with the definitions of land defined in Section 3(13), holding defined in Section 3(11A), khudkhast defined in Section 3(12A) and proprietor under Section 3(17) of the Act, would clearly indicate that the respondents are not bhumidars in respect of gair mumkin pahar. As a consequence, the land stands vested in the Gaon Sabha under Section 7 read with Section 154 of the Act. On the other hand, Shri Dhingra and Shri L.C. Chechi, learned counsel for the respondents contended that by operation of the comprehensive definition of waste land in explanation to Section 7 of the Act read with the object of conferment of right under Section 11 read with Section 5 of the Act, the respondents are bhumidars. As a consequence, the land is a cultivable land which confers them title to the land under the Act. It is
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