1997(2) Supreme 683
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.S. Anand and S.B. Majmudar, JJ.
Rajendra Kumar Gupta & Anr. -Appellants
versus
State of U.P. & Ors. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 373 of 1987
Decided on 10-2-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Kapil Sibal, Sr. Advocate, Ranjeet Kumar, Ramesh Singh, Ms. Bina Gupta and Ms. Rakhi S. Ray, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, K.J. John, R.C. Verma and R.B. Misra, Advocates.
Held; the impugned order cannot be supported under Section 23. If requisition order is said to have been justifiably issued by the second respondent for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community it must be shown that but for passing of such an order the community would be deprived of essential supplies and services and its very life would get adversely affected. Even if the third respondent-Corporation does not run any showroom for exhibition handloom wares manufactured by rural weavers, all that may perhaps happen is that the weavers may not be able to get their goods easily sold in the market or may not have a good deal of customers. But that would not mean that community or any part of it would be deprived of essential supplies and services. It cannot be urged with any emphasis that if the goods manufactured by rural weavers are not properly marketed the community as a whole would be deprived of essential supplies and services. Without the use of such goods manufactured by rural weavers the community can comfortably exist and survive or in any case its existence would not come in any jeopardy. (Para 7)
Section 23 is not enacted for guaranteeing or providing any continuously lucrative market for the handloom wares manufactured by rural weavers. The impugned order has to be judged in the light of the express provisions of Section 23 and not dehors them. (Para 7)
(ii) Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971-Section 23-Orders of requisition of immovable properties under-These must necessarily be not of permanent nature but must be of limited duration commensurate with emergent situations and needs-Order of 1976-Unjustified-Such indefinite requisition of premises is contrary to very scheme of Section 23.
(iii) REQUISITION-Locus standi to challenge order of-Nazul lands-Date on which requisition order was passed, leases were current-Original lessee had sufficient interest which could be validly transferred to appellants-Appellants had locus standi to challenge order.
(iv) Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971-Section 23-Order of requisition under-Prolonged duration-Whether an emergency order of requisition can be permitted to continue indefinitely?-(No)-Such requisition amounts to acquisition-Claim of benefit of Section 30. (Paras 12 and 13)
JUDGMENT
S.B. Majmudar, J.-The appellants in this appeal by special leave have brought in challenge the order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing the writ petition moved by the appellants before that Court. The appellants had challenged an order dated 29th October 1976 passed by the second respondent, District Magistrate-cum-Competent Authority, Kanpur, requisitioning 777 sq. yards and 7-1/3 sq. ft. of lands comprising of plot Nos. 36 and 36-A situated on the Mall, Kanpur in exercise of the powers of the second respondent under Section 23 of Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The impugned order of second respondent merely mentioned that the said order of requisition was issued as it was necessary and expedient to requisition the property in question for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. The appellants were called upon by the said order to deliver by 15th November 1976 possession of the said immovable property to the Director, Handlooms and Managing Director of U.P. State Handloom and Powerloom Finance and Development Corporation Ltd., Kanpur, U.P., respondent No. 3 herein. During the writ proceedings it transpired that the said requisition order was issued with a view to seeing that the concerned respondent-Corporation could construct shops and showrooms in the land in question for exhibiting its handloom products which were manufactured by handloom weavers. The appellants contended before the High Court that the aforesaid purpose of requisition was de hors the provisions of Section 23 of the Act. It was next submitted that as it was a permanent purpose power of requisition under the Act would not be invoked for fructifying the said purpose and in any case such a requisition order could not continue indefinitely and hence the continued enforcement of the said order resulted in unreasonable exercise of power on the part of the second respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court was not persuaded to accept the aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of the appellants and dismissed the writ petition. That is how the appellants are before us in this appeal.
Rival Contentions
2. Shri Sibal, learned senior counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that the Act itself was a temporary Statute having the limited existence being enacted during emergency, both external and internal, and had already ceased to operate since long and that the purpose for which the requisition was resorted to was de hors the provisions of Section 23 of the Act as providing a showroom for exhibiting the wares manufactured by weavers could not be said to have any nexus with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community. He also submitted that in any case the purpose being of a permanent nature could not have been made the subject-matter of an order requisition under Section 23 of the Act.
3. He lastly submitted that in any view of the matter the continued enforcement of the impugned order for all these years till date had become totally unreasonable and even on that ground the requisition order which had outlived its existence and legal efficacy deserves to be quashed.
On the other hand learned counsel for respondent No. 2 and Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for respondent No. 3 contended that the impugned requisition order was within the forecorners of Section 23 of the Act and that it was not as if the requisition could be resorted to only for a limited period or only for a temporary purpose. That requisition can be made for subserving even a permanent purpose.
It was next contended that the lands under requisition belonged to the State. They were Nazul lands. They were earlier leased out by two separate Lease Deeds in favour of one J.N. Mehrotra in the years 1920 and 1932 respectively. That the initial period of 30 years in respect of each of the leases had
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