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1997 Supreme(SC) 206

1997(4) Supreme 197
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B.P. Jeevan Reddy and K.S. Paripoornan, JJ.
Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd. -Appellant
versus
Commissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur -Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 685 of 1980
With
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10840 of 1980)
Decided on 5.2.1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : R.K. Mehta and Ms. Mnika Mehta, Advocates.
For the Respondent : S. Rajappa, Adv. for S.N. Terdol, Advocate.

Headnote:(i) TAXATION-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922-Sections 34(1)(a) and 34(1)(b)-Re-assessments for years 1950-51 to 1956-57-Legality and validity of-Jurisdiction u/s 34(1)(a) and (b)-Distinction-There being no omission on part of appellant company to fully and truly disclose material or primary facts necessary for assessments-Reassessment proceedings initiated u/s 34(1)(a) were invalid for years 1950-51 to 1956-57-Whether proceedings for reassessment initiated u/s 34(1)(a) could be sustained u/s 34(1)(b) ?-(Yes, if pre-requisite conditions for application of clause (b) are satisfied)-Raghubar Dayal s case, 63 ITR 572 (All) : Overruled-Information obtained by Income Tax Officer need not be one outside the record.

       Held : A look at section 34, clauses (a) and (b) will show that the said clauses deal with two different situations. Section 34 is only a machinery section. They cover different contingencies and situations, but they do not deal with two distinct and separate jurisdictions. Section 34 as a whole - clause (a) or clause (b) deals with cases of reopening of income escapement assessment. Whereas Section 34(1)(a) requires the formation of a belief by the Income Tax Officer, that there is a failure or omission on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts and there must be some material to form such a belief that the failure or omission on the part of the assessee has led to the escapement or under-assessment of income of the assessee, Section 34(1)(b) requires that even if there was no omission or failure on the part of the assessee, but the Income Tax Officer has information and he could form the belief that the income has escaped assessment, he could do so within the period of four years. There are limitations for the exercise of power under Section 34(1)(a), namely, that the Income Tax Officer is bound to record the reasons, which led to the formation of the belief and further sanction of the Commissioner of the Central Board of Revenue is required. Section 34(1)(a) is more onerous or stringent, but Section 34(1)(b) is of wider import covering a larger class of cases. In ordinary civil actions, if a party prays for a larger relief and the Court holds that he is not entitled to the same, but it is apparent from the facts proved or admitted that the party is entitled to a lesser relief, it is always open to the court to grant the latter. Similarly, if the Income Tax Officer has initiated proceeding under the stringent and onerous provisions of Section 34(1)(a) which is found to be invalid, nothing could prevent the appellate or other higher authority from invoking Section 34(1)(b) if the pre-requisite conditions for the application of clause (b) are satisfied. In other words, if the conditions for applicability of Section 34(1)(b) which only provides for shorter period of limitation is satisfied, the assessment though initiated under Section 34(1)(a) could be sustained or justified under Section 34(1)(b) of the Act. (Para 8)

       (ii) Income Tax Act, 1922-Section 18A-Assessment years 1957-58 to 1961-62-Order levying penal interest u/s 18A-Appealability.

       Held : The High Court has rightly answered question No. 5 stating that the penal interest calculated and charged under Section 18A(6) or 18A(8) can be challenged in an appeal filed by the assessee against the order of assessment to tax and the assessee would be entitled to deny his liability to payment of penal interest also while denying his liability to be assessed to tax under Section 18A of the Act. It was opined that no appeal would lie against the order levying interest under section 18A(6) or 18A(8) of the Act. The law so stated by the High Court is not open to objection. Under the Income-tax Act, 1922 there was no specific right against an order levying interest. But, if an appeal is preferred against an order of assessment and interest is levied by the assessment order itself, the assessee can raise the question regarding the exigibility of interest. (Para 9)

       (iii) Income Tax Act, 1922-Appellant, public limited company was incorporated in then Indian State of Kotah for carrying on business of quarrying stones-Lease agreement-Kotah State merged with United State of Rajasthan-Applicability of Income Tax Act, 1922-Assessee s application for exemption from payment of tax-Whether royalty paid by it in excess of minimum amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- was in lieu of income-tax, super tax etc ?-(Yes)-Assessee company was entitled to the credit of amount from Income-tax authorities. (Para 13)

       

JUDGMENT

Paripoornan, J.-The appellant is a public limited company. It was incorporated in the then Indian State of Kotah on 17.1.1945 for carrying on the business of quarrying stones. It is an assessee to Income-tax. This appeal is filed in pursuance to the certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench dated 26.11.1979 arising out of the judgment and order dated 30.7.1979 in Income-tax Reference No. 24 of 1970. The said judgment is reported in CIT v. Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd.1. The High Court considered the validity of the re-assessments made on the appellant for the years 1950-51 to 1956-57 as also the legality of the assessments made for the years 1957-58 to 1961-62 in its common judgment dated 30.7.1979 (ITR No. 24 of 1970). In deciding the legality and validity of the re-assessments for the years 1950-51 to 1956-57 some aspects were decided in favour of the assessee/appellant. On a consolidated reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in respect of the assessment years 1950-51 to 1961-62, seven questions of law were referred for the decision of the High Court. Out of the same the following 5 questions of law, namely question Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7, which were answered against the assessee, are still in appeal before us :-

"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the re-assessments for the years 1950-51 to 1956-57, were validly made under section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 ?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Revenue was entitled to contend that reassessments for the years 1954-55, 1955-56 and 1956-57 were validly made under section 34(1)(b) of the Act ?

3. Whether an appeal can lie against an order levying penal interest under section 18A of the Act for the assessment years 1957-58 to 1961-62 ?

4. Whether the assessee-company was entitled to a credit of the amount of excess royalty paid which is held to be in lieu of the income-tax and super-tax liability of the company ?

5. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the payment of royalty in excess of Rs. 1,50,000 paid under clause 18 of the lease granted by the Government of His Highness the Maharao Saheb of Kotah on May 2, 1945, which has been held to be in lieu of income-tax, super-tax etc., by the District Judge, Kotah, is a permissible deduction in the assessment years 1957-58 to 1960-61 ?"

2. At this stage, it should be mentioned that the assessee has filed special leave petition No. 10840 of 1980, by way of abundant caution against the very same judgment of the High Court to be considered in case the certificate granted by the High Court is found to be defective or unsustainable. It is unnecessary to consider the said special leave petition on merits separately.

3. We heard counsel.

4. The relevant facts for deciding the controversy involved in this appeal are not in dispute. The High Court has summarised them correctly in its judgment as follows :

The then Maharao of Kotah State granted a lease to assessee-company on May 2, 1945, for a period of 15 years beginning from October, 1944. Clause 18 of the lease agreement entered into by the assessee-company with the then Maharo of Kotah for quarrying flooring stones was as under :-

"18. (i) In consideration of the concessions and privileges granted by the GRANTOR and in lieu of income-tax, super-tax and excess profits tax, the GRANTEE covenants to pay to the GRANTOR royalty on the stone excavated at the rate of rupee one per 100 sq. ft., subject to the minimum amount of Rs. 1,50,000 per financial year, provided that the aforesaid rate of Re. 1 per 100 sq. ft., will be operative so long as the selling rate of unpolished slabs does not exceed Rs. 10 per 100 sq. ft.; in the event of the selling rate going above this figure the royalty per 100 sq. ft. shall be increased by 25 of the excess over ten





































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