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1997 Supreme(SC) 773

1997(5) Supreme 71
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Bombay High Court)
K. Ramaswamy and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.
High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar    -Appellant
versus
Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 9894 of 1996
Decided on 30-4-1997
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Harish Salve, Sr. Advocate, and D.M. Nargolkar, Advocate.
For the Respondents : J.C. Batra, W.C. Chopra and P.R. Chopra, Advocates.

IMPORTANT POINT
Once a resolution is passed by the Full Court of the High Court, there is no further necessity to refer the matter again to the Full Court while taking such procedural steps relating to control of the subordinate judiciary as the entire gamut of procedural steps of disciplinary action is by the High Court through the Committee constituted in that behalf by the Chief Justice of the High Court.

Headnote:(i) Judicial Service-Constitution of India-Art. 235-Control over subordinate courts-Power of taking a decision by High Court against a member of subordinate judiciary-A resolution passed by Full Court authorising Committee of five Judges to deal with imposition of punishment on judicial officers-Whether it requires Chief Justice and Committee to initiate disciplinary proceedings?-Recommendation made by a Committee of four Judges-No error of law.

       

       Held : The "delegation of the function of the High Court in respect of punishment of judicial officers is an expression of width and of wide amplitude to cover within its ambit the power to take a decision by the Committee from the stage of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, if necessary, till its logical end, viz., recommendation to the Government to impose a penalty proposed by the Committee. The recommendation is by the High Court, the controlling authority under Article 235 of the Constitution. In fact, the High Court has no power to impose any punishment by itself. The appointing authority, viz., the Governor is the competent authority under the Constitution to impose punishment in accordance with the rules framed for the purpose. Therefore, the entire gamut of procedural steps of disciplinary action is by the High Court which is the controlling authority through the Committee constituted in that behalf by the Chief Justice of the High Court. (Para 10)

       Further held; the practice has grown that generally majority of the Committee, when assembled, would transact the administrative business and take decisions. In the light of the settled legal position that the decision taken is that of the High Court and the Committee acted for and on behalf of the High Court, the majority of four Judges of the Committee, even in the absence of such express resolution, does constitute the quorum and is competent to transact the administrative business of the Court. Out of five, three members always constitute a quorum so as to be competent to take decision since even if it is assumed that all the five members were present and they decided against the respondent, the opinion of four Judges would constitute majority decision. It may be expedient that all the Judges sit or the record is circulated to all of them and they take decision. Unless someone of the members express their/his dissent from the decision taken per majority, the fifth member also must be deemed to have agreed to the decision of the majority, though no formal concurrence in that behalf was recorded. It is seen that all the four learned Judges unanimously decided recommending to the Governor to impose the punishment of dismissal of the respondent from service. It constitutes the quorum. The Governor acted upon the same and issued order of dismissal of the respondent. A resume of the contents of dismissal order by the Government, does indicate that the Government did in fact understood the recommendation is of the High Court, i.e., Chief Justice and companion Judges. The Governor being the competent authority, validly and legally passed the order dismissing the respondent from service. Even if there is any irregularity in the procedure, i.e., absence of a Judge, it does not vitiate the order of dismissal by any error of law. (Para 11)

       (ii) Constitution of India-Art. 235-Dismissal from service-Validity of-Respondent was working as a Probationer Civil Judge-Charge of misconduct by demanding illegal gratification from an Advocate for deciding in his favour-Evidence adduced during departmental enquiry proves proclivity of corrupt conduct on part of judicial officer -Enquiry conducted is fair and germane -This Court cannot by itself appreciate evidence, and reach a conclusion different from that of Disciplinary Authority-Order of respondent s dismissal stands confirmed. (Para 16)

       (iii) JUDICIARY - Concept of judicial independence -Constitutional duty of judiciary-Subordinate judiciary-Conduct and status of a judicial officer-High Court s control of subordinate judiciary.

       Held : The Judges do not do an easy job. They repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to avoid, i.e., make decisions. Judges, though are mortals, they are called upon to perform a function that is utterly divine in character. The trial Judge is the kingpin in the hierarchical system of administration of justice. He directly comes in contact with the litigant during the day to day proceedings in the Court. On him lies the responsibility to build solemn atmosphere in dispensation of justice, the personality, knowledge, judicial restraint, capacity to maintain dignity character, conduct, official as well as personal, and integrity are the additional aspects which make the functioning of the court successful and acceptable. The Judicial Officers are at once privileged and restricted; they have to present a continuous aspect of dignity and conduct. If the rule of law is to efficiently function under the aegis of our democratic society, Judges are expected to nurture an efficient, strong and enlightened judiciary. To have it that way, the nation has to pay the price, i.e., to keep them above wants, provide infrastructural facilities and services. A sense of confidence in the court is essential to maintain the fabric of ordered liberty for free people and it is for the subordinate judiciary by its action and the High Court by its appropriate control of subordinate judiciary and its own self imposed judicial conduct, on and off the bench, to ensure it. If one forfeits the confidence in the judiciary of its people, it can never regain its lost respect and esteem. The conduct of every judicial officer, therefore, should be above reproach. He should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour, regardless of public praise, and indifferent to private, political or partisan influences; he should administer justice according to law, and deal with his appointment as a public trust; he should not allow other affairs or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his judicial duties, nor should he administer the office for the purpose of advancing his personal ambitions or increasing his popularity. If he tipps the scales of Justice, its nippling effect would be disastrous and deleterious. (Para 12)

       Their tenure is ensured by Article 311 of the Constitution Subject to the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, under Article 310 of the Constitution. Thereby, they are insulated from any pressure of whatsoever to adjudicate disputes between the citizens and the State, without any fear or favour, prejudice or predilictions. (Para 13)

       (iv) Corruption-Subordinate Judiciary-Conferment of exclusive power of judicial review on judiciary -May become means to personal gain or advantage-There should be constant vigil by High Court on subordinate judiciary and self -introspection-Vigilant watch by High Court, and many a times by members of Bar-(As per K. Ramaswamy, J.) (Para 14)

       D.P. Wadhwa, J.-(Partly concurring)

       Held : I agree that appeal be allowed and the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 dismissed. However, with utmost respect at my command for my learned Brother I do not associate myself with the views expressed by him on corruption. If a certain matter is not relevant for decisions on the issue in the case I would refrain from saying anything on that howsoever strongly I may feel about it. (Para 18)

       

JUDGMENT

K. Ramaswamy, J.-This is an appeal by certificate granted by the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench on July 11, 1996 in Writ Petition No. 3095 of 1995 certifying that it is a fit case to file appeal against the judgment dated April 26, 1996 passed by that Division Bench.

2. The admitted facts are that the first respondent was working a Probationer Civil Judge, Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Pathri in District Parbani, Maharashtra between December 12, 1990 and March, 5, 1991. He was charged with the imputation that he had demanded illegal gratification from an Advocate, Ashok S. Kharkar of the District Bar for deciding in his favour an injunction application filed by the plaintiff in R.C.S. No. 150/90 titled Uttam Depale v. Sardarkhan Hasankhan and thereby he indulged in corrupt practice which amounted to gross misconduct. It was further alleged that he did not pass orders in the said injunction application; manipulated the judicial records by getting the roznama written through a Court Clerk showing that the matter was fixed on five occasions after the arguments were concluded with a view to achieve his ulterior motive, viz., demand of illegal gratification and, thereby, committed gross misconduct. He was also charged with other allegations details of which are not material for the purpose of disposal of this appeal. Yet another charge against him was that after hearing the arguments in RCS No. 138/90 title Arjun v. Gangubai and in RCS No. 134/90 titled Ratnamala v. Pnadurang, he did not pass orders for nearly seven months and left the charge of the Court without passing the final orders.

3. After giving reasonable opportunity to the respondent-delinquent officer, the Enquiry Officer held that the aforesaid charge Nos. 1 and 2 and part of charge No. 3 were proved but the other part of charge No. 3 and charges 4 and 5 were not proved. On receipt of the enquiry report and consideration thereof, on July 29, 1983, show cause notice was issued to the delinquent officer together with copy of the enquiry report, calling upon him to show cause as to why findings could not be accepted and penalty of dismissal imposed. On submission of his representation in response to the said show cause notice, on 18th September, 1993, the Committee of five Judges of which four met on January 12, 1994, accepted the findings of guilt recorded by the Enquiry Officer and recommended to the Government imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service. The Government by order dated March 2, 1994 recorded as under :

"AND WHEREAS, thereupon the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay being the Disciplinary Authority had served a show cause notice on the said Shri S.R. Patil calling upon him to show cause why the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer should not be confirmed and why the punishment of dismissal from service should not be imposed upon him.

AND WHEREAS, after considering the cause shown by the said Shri Patil, the Disciplinary Authority has recommended to the Government to impose the punishment of dismissal from service on said Shri Patil.

AND WHEREAS, on considering the report and the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the cause shown by the said Shri Patil and the recommendation of the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, being the Disciplinary Authority the Government of Maharashtra has decided to accept the said recommendation."

4. Accordingly, the State Government directed the respondent s dismissal from service from the date of receipt of the said order by him. Feeling aggrieved, he filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the order of his dismissal and the recommendation made by the Committee of the High Court and the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The High Court set aside the order of dismissal on two grounds, viz., that a resolution was passed by the Full Court on behalf of the High Court s "recommendation by way of disciplin






















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